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This dissertation examines the Supreme Court’s impact on the constitutional development of the 
federal government. By applying a central state authority framework to an original database of 
hundreds of Supreme Court decisions, I uncover the ways in which the Court has constitutionally 
expanded and restricted the powers of the federal government from 1789 to 1997. I code each 
decision’s overall effect on central state authority as either restrictive, neutral, or expansion as well as 
code decisions along seven different dimensions of the federal government according to the central 
state authority framework. These constitutional decisions were gathered from fifty-eight 
constitutional law casebooks and treatises published between 1822 and 2010, and the decisions that 
repeated most frequently across these books were included into the dataset for analysis. After this 
systematic and empirical analysis of the decisions, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has 
persistently constricted and expanded the national government, but, at the same time, its decisions 
have always leaned toward supporting and developing the national government’s powers across each 
constitutional issue area. Thus, this dissertation speaks to scholarship that not only reconsiders 
nineteenth century national state power but also underscores the important role that judges play in 
advancing national state development. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On June 25, 2013 the small, ornate chamber of the Supreme Court was transformed into a more 
spirited space than we typically see. On that day, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg read her dissent in 
Shelby County v. Holder aloud, a practice reserved only1 for justices who strongly oppose the Court’s 
majority. Shelby County concerned Section 4 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which gave the federal 
government control over electoral changes in states that have had a history of voter discrimination. 
The Court declared that this “preclearance” power exceeded the federal government’s authority, 
violating, among other things, state equality and the reserved state powers of the 10th Amendment. 
Reading her strongly-worded dissent from the bench, Ginsburg said, “The sad irony of today’s 
decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the [Voting Rights Act] has proven effective. . . . 
Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory 
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” 
Ginsburg essentially claimed that Congress (i.e. as part of the central state) has an ongoing and 
relatively unlimited authority to oversee federal elections.  
By 2013, this debate over authority is nothing new for the Court, but what path did it take to 
get here? All of American constitutional law addresses questions about the federal government’s 
reach. And thus at the root of constitutional law is the language of federal authority.  The judiciary’s 
central responsibility is to determine the boundaries of this authority and, in doing so, it expands and 
contracts federal power. This is the basic pattern of constitutional development. Shaping the federal 
government in this way places the Court at the center of American state development. The moral of 
                                                 
1 The 36 years Warren E. Burger and William H. Rehnquist served as chief justices saw an average of three dissents read 
from the bench per term. Since Chief Justice John Roberts has led the Court, the average has risen to 3.75 (NYT, “In a 
Polarized Court, Getting the Last Word,” 8 March 2010. accessed 13 August 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/us/09bar.html?_r=0).  
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all this is: the Supreme Court will always crucially influence American political development. But we 
know little about this pattern, about when, where, and how the Court has decided to expand and 
constrict the federal power. If we better understand these patterns, we can understand the 
constitutional foundations of the American state.  
This study charts and interprets the complicated relationship between American law and the 
development of central state authority. Through a systematic cataloguing of Supreme Court cases 
from America’s founding until the present day, I reveal variation in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
affecting national authority and thus the development of the American state. I argue that the Court 
is much better conceived as an institution that both delimits and expands central state authority at 
any particular period in constitutional development rather than as an institution that does largely one 
or the other in a certain period. Indeed, I find that the Supreme Court has often done both 
throughout constitutional development, yet, at the same time, its decisions have typically leaned 
toward supporting and developing the national government’s powers. These patterns challenge 
academic narratives that see law as either an inhibitor or facilitator of the American state, narratives 
that pivot on understanding state development only as the emergence of the modern welfare-state. 
In other words, studies that view pre-New Deal legal decisions as largely inhibiting and post-New 
Deal decisions as primarily expanding state development overlook important patterns of American 
statebuilding vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. Instead, I offer a more rigorous explication of Supreme 
Court decisions, over a broader time horizon, to develop a stronger foundation on which to assess 
the Court’s position toward the federal government. 
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Research Problem  
 
 American Political Development (APD) research traces the expansion of the American state 
resulting from the evolution of political institutions.2 APD has closely charted the growth of the 
presidency (Skowronek 1993) and the bureaucracy (Carpenter 2003; Skowronek 1982).  Other 
studies have emphasized Congress as an important source of state development (Schickler 2001). 
Political party leadership, too, has been the focal point of studies of American state-building (Shefter 
1994). Still others have focused on regional (Bensel 1990; Sanders 1999) and city political patterns as 
factors that contributed to state-building (Bridges 1984, 1997). Therefore while parties, presidents, 
legislators, and bureaucrats are seen as primary agents of American state-building, the Supreme 
Court’s role in this expansion is considerably less well-charted. As a result, the Court’s proclivity and 
substantive impact on the expansion of central state authority remain relatively less well-known. 
While these important studies have advanced our understandings of American state-building 
and its concomitant effect on society, “a significant part of the field [has] pursued a delegalized study 
of the American state” (Skrenty 2006, 217).3 To the extent that APD examines the Court, it often 
portrays the judiciary as an obstacle to the growth of the federal government, focusing on the period 
between the late nineteenth century and the New Deal.4 However, those within the “law and APD” 
field have begun to revise this understanding of American state-building by showing how law and 
                                                 
2 American Political Development (APD) is a movement that began in political science in reaction to quantitative 
behavioralist studies of political phenomena. Students of APD “eschew small-scale hypothesis testing of the 
behavioralists in favor of large-scale historical studies asking big questions about the construction of political authority 
across time” (Kahn and Kersch 2006, 8). These scholars attempt to understand the effects of ideational and institutional 
factors on the creation of the modern state. For an overview of APD as a discipline, see Kahn and Kersch’s (2006) 
introduction to their edited volume, The Supreme Court and American Political Development. Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas. For a critical exchange about APD, its methods, and its objectives among some of APD’s founders, see 
Richard Bensel’s, John Gerring’s, Stephen Skowronek’s, and Rogers Smith’s articles in the 2003 volume 17 edition of 
Studies in American Political Development.  
3 Skrenty argues, “The American exceptionalism question that dominated the field led to a focus on the lack of a 
national administrative welfare state structure and on the historical period—the Progressive era to the New Deal—when 
Europe developed such state structures and the United States did not” (Skrentny 2006, 217). Consequently, law and 
courts played less of a role in studies of American state-building.  
4 Paul Frymer makes this argument in his review article, “Law and American Political Development,” Law & Social 
Inquiry 33, 3 (2008): 779-803, 789. See chapter 2 for citations pertaining to this view of the judiciary.  
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courts have successfully enhanced, and not just constricted, national regulatory power (Frymer 2003; 
Farhang 2010; Novak 1996). Scholars have also shown how the federal courts are part of both the 
broader national regime and electoral politics, expanding the powers of national governing coalitions 
(Gillman 2002; Graber 1993; Whittington 2007). Thus far, however, the literature typically 
understands constitutional development vis-à-vis critical junctures: the Founding, Reconstruction, 
and New Deal eras (Ackerman 1991, 1998), but a more sustained treatment of the effects of the 
Court’s constitutional doctrine on state-building across history has yet to be seen. A more expansive 
look across history and across constitutional issues will add important texture to our understanding 
of the Supreme Court’s hand in state formation. Therefore the purpose of this dissertation is to 
better understand the Court’s role in developing central state authority across American history and 
to explain these patterns of development.5  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
Given this problem, my dissertation charts the Court’s influence on national state authority 
across history and addresses two research questions: How has the Court impacted central state 
authority? And, when and in what areas of the central state has the Court facilitated state 
development? These questions are important because, as Shelby County demonstrates, the Court 
continually shapes government authority. With a more rigorous and systematic examination of 
Supreme Court decisions, we can develop a stronger foundation on which to assess the Court’s 
impact on American state development.  
 To uncover the Court’s influence on national state authority, this study compiles an original 
database of landmark constitutional decisions derived from fifty-eight constitutional law casebooks 
and treatises, which spans from 1789 to 1997. I adopt Richard Bensel’s (1990, 114) central state 
                                                 
5 Part of that state, of course, includes the Supreme Court itself. As such, Chapter 6 examines the Court’s own authority 
as well as its placement among the other branches of government.  
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authority framework, which helps determine whether a judicial decision expanded or restricted 
central state authority. With these data, I uncover the ways in which the Supreme Court has 
contributed to the development of the American central state and present patterns of expansion and 
restriction in constitutional development not fully discussed within historical institutionalist 
literatures about the Supreme Court. By doing so, this dissertation contributes to literatures that see 
judges as important state-builders (Forbath 2008), that see regime politics as important influences on 
the Court (Whittington 2007), and that view federal courts as significant forces, extending central 
state power to the periphery (Shapiro 1981; Gillman 2002).   
 
Significance   
 
These questions make an intervention in the American Political Development literature on 
national state formation. Much of APD defines the central state (and its relative strength) according 
to a Weberian typology based on increased administrative and bureaucratic autonomy. In doing so, 
scholars have typically viewed the Court as retarding central state expansion. The Weberian 
tradition, however, misses the myriad other forms of national state authority advanced and 
consolidated by the Supreme Court through the years.  
Correcting our interpretation of the Court is important because U.S. political discourse has 
been defined by its reliance on and mythological reverence for the Constitution. In this way, the U.S. 
stands in contrast to other Western democratic states whose constitutions are much younger and, in 
some cases, unwritten. Thus, studying the Court’s constitutional tradition illuminates great changes 
in national state formation because, as Alexis de Tocqueville opined back in the mid-19th century, 
many political problems eventually become legal problems.6 Tocqueville uncovered a now long-
                                                 
6 To be sure, contemporary constitutional scholars have persuasively challenged Tocqueville’s thesis that political 
questions often become legal ones. See Mark Graber. 2004. “Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: 
Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited.” Constitutional Commentary 21: 485.  
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recognized feature of America’s political development: that the United States has a much thicker and 
extensive legal discourse on political power than Western European nation-states. The reason for 
this discourse has much to do with a written constitution, but, as Judith Shklar points out, it also has 
to do with the institution of chattel slavery the rights-claims it has produced (Shklar 1998, 111). 
More specifically, these claims—born from a written constitution and chattel slavery—necessitate 
that the Supreme Court play a vital role in defining the relationship between the federal government 
and society. Since all citizens’ federal rights are inscribed in this written constitution, every citizen 
can claim her rights before the judiciary. The Supreme Court, as an institution, has traditionally 
defined what it means to be a citizen and what counts as legitimate state authority. As such, the 
study of the Court and its pivotal cases sheds light on far more than jurisprudential changes because 
the Court has shaped the contours of membership and authority more than any other institution. 
The United States’ reliance on a written constitution has enabled the Court to serve this unique role, 
a role not played by judicial institutions in the national state formation of other Western democratic 
countries.  
 U.S. political rhetoric is preoccupied with the size of government, which turns into questions 
about the constitutional boundaries of the federal government. The rhetoric of “big” versus “small” 
government, however, misses the nuanced constitutional evolution of national authority wrought by 
the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is important to examine where, when, and how the national state 
constitutionally expanded and narrowed. Understanding these changes might help produce a more 
intelligent political discussion about the role of the federal government in American lives. Ultimately, 
I study constitutional development because I want to find out the degree to which the Court has 
extended the federal government’s control versus prohibiting its control over society. By doing so, I 
help us understand that the growth of central state power has often required the Court’s enabling.  
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What is Constitutional Development?  
 
The progressive welfare state dimension is the metric by which most American Political 
Development studies assess “state development.” Traditionally, American Political Development 
has defined the American state in relation to its European counterparts, attempting to explain the 
U.S.’s comparative “weakness.” Recent comparative political development scholarship notes the 
conceptual problems with this traditional understanding.7 Still, even these recent studies focus on 
uncovering strength in the American state—defining ways the American federal state is “strong.”8 I 
see these understandings as ideologically-infused because they focus on assessing state strength 
along a singular European welfare-state model. A less ideologically-infused interpretation of judicial 
decisions, however, is necessary for a project exploring the Court and state development across 
most of American history. More to the point, a theoretical framework that allows us to interpret 
judicial decisions in terms of their impact on advancing the myriad kinds of states across time is 
needed.  
A less ideologically-infused understanding of state development produces different 
interpretations of the Court’s role in building the national government. Applying this interpretation 
                                                 
7In their review article, Desmond King and Robert Lieberman argue to move away from the Weberian framework of 
understanding modern states (King and Lieberman 2009, 551). They laud the studies reviewed (Gryzmala-Busse 2007; 
Hacker 2002; Johnson 2007; Ziblatt 2006) for “expanding the view of state building to include the role of actors that are 
conventionally considered to be outside the ‘state’ proper” and locating “stateness” in a variety of unconventional places 
(King and Lieberman 2009, 555-56). Desmond King and Robert Lieberman, “Ironies of State Building: A Comparative 
Perspective on the American State.” World Politics 61, 3 (July 2009): 547-588. 
 A recent wave of scholarship revises our understanding of American central state in the nineteenth century, 
arguing the central state was stronger than we previously thought. See, for example, Brian Balogh, A Government out of 
Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
William Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 752-72; William Adler, 
“State Capacity and Bureaucratic Autonomy in the Early United States: The Case of the Army Corps of Topographical 
Engineers,” Studies in American Political Development, 26 (October 2012): 107-24;  Richard John, “Governmental 
Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1785-1835,” Studies 
in American Political Development 11 (1997): 347-80. 
  Still, even these recent studies focus on finding strength in the American state—uncovering the unique ways 
the American state is “strong.” While these studies inform my discussion of the “state,” my project does not weigh in on 
the debate about American central state strength except to say that this dichotomy between weak and strong, in some 
ways, obscures our understanding of the evolution of the American state.  “Building” the state, in my view, means the 
advancement of federal authority to govern citizen behavior irrespective if that authority expands the welfare state.   
8 Balogh, A Government out of Sight;  Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State;” Adler, “State Capacity and 
Bureaucratic Autonomy in the Early United States;” John, “Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change.” 
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to a Court decision will help illuminate both this project’s view of state development and its 
divergence from the progressive interpretation discussed above. I will apply my understanding of 
central state authority to a judicial decision that perhaps most typifies the Court’s restrictive role, 
according to the Progressive interpretation: Lochner v. New York (1905). The Lochner Era has come to 
symbolize the Court at its most restrictive period, embracing a “laissez-faire” interpretation of 
Constitutional rights that prevented state governments from regulating the labor market.9 With a 
neutral understanding of state authority, however, Lochner represents an expansion not restriction of 
the state, in particular, an expansion of judicial power.  
 In Lochner, the Supreme Court held that a New York law forbidding bakers to work more 
than sixty hours a week was unconstitutional. New York fined Joseph Lochner $50 for allowing an 
employee to work more than 60 hours in a week at his bakery in Utica, New York. Lochner was sent 
to county jail until he paid the fine or, if he did not pay, for 50 days (Lochner, 47). The New York 
Court of appeals upheld the statute, but Lochner appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming the labor 
law was unconstitutional. 
 In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the law  “interferes with the right of contract between 
the employer and employees,” and declared that “the general right to make a contract in relation to 
his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution” (Lochner, 53).  Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham maintained that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from interfering with most employment contracts because these 
contracts represent the fundamental freedom to buy and sell labor, which the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibited states from 
                                                 
9 E.C. Knight, In Re Debs, and Lochner v. New York have been invoked as the “Holy Trinity of laissez-faire,” decisions that 
advanced corporate interests over monopoly (E.C. Knight), labor union strikes (In Re Debs), and workplace regulation 
(Lochner v. New York) (Novak 2002, 273). But state development, properly understood, should not necessarily equate 
laissez-faire as an obstacle to state growth because two of these decisions (Debs and Lochner) significantly advanced some 
of the dimensions in the central state authority framework employed in this project. I discuss this framework in chapter 
2.   
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depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and to the Court, the 
right to buy and sell labor through contract was a “liberty of the individual” protected under the 
amendment (Lochner, 53, 58).  
 By invalidating the New York Statute, the Court centralized decision-making authority over 
labor questions in one part of the central state: the judiciary. The Court’s interpretation and 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment advanced the central state’s authority to determine the 
boundaries of state-level regulation. While this interpretation prevented welfare state developments, it 
nevertheless helped create a powerful judiciary. In this way, constitutional development is not the 
advancement progressive welfare state ideals. Instead, constitutional development is better 
understood as the advancement of national governing authority over state governments and citizens. 
Lochner thus represents an important feature of American statebuilding: judicial expansion of power.  
 Beyond welfare state development, there are several other areas of constitutional law in 
which we can uncover the positive role the Court played in building the American state. A widely 
known theme in American constitutional development, for example, is the Marshall Court’s role in 
expanding central state power to create a stronger national commercial union through opinions like 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 10  McCulloch v. Maryland, 11  Gibbons v. Ogden, 12  and Fletcher v. Peck 13 
                                                 
10 17 U.S. 518 (1819). The Court held that the New Hampshire legislature could not change the college’s corporate 
charter to make it a public state university. Dartmouth’s corporate charter was a contract between private parties, which 
the legislature could not interfere.  
11 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Unanimously, the Court maintained that Congress had the power to incorporate a national bank 
and that Maryland could not tax this bank.  
12 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  Gibbons involved a New York state law giving individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats 
on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated by other states, and some would require foreign 
(out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case, Thomas Gibbons—a steamboat owner 
who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal license—challenged the monopoly license granted 
by New York to Aaron Ogden. In Gibbons, the Court was asked, did the New York licensing requirement infringe on a 
realm of authority reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? A unanimous Court 
found that the New York law did violate the Supremacy Clause and in so finding the Court consolidated and affirmed 
central state authority. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat 
operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the 
Congress. 
13 10 U.S. 87 (1810). In this case, the Court held that a contract between John Peck and Robert Fletcher over the sale of 
land had been legally “passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration” (Fletcher, 139). After Peck 
obtained the land from Georgia in 1795, the Georgia legislature subsequently voided the grant the next year. The 
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(Newmyer 1986, White 1990). All these decisions involve invaliding state-level actions over 
contracts and commercial activity, and by doing so, the Marshall Court centralized economic and 
property questions at the federal level. In these decisions, the Court’s interpretation of the Contract 
and Commerce Clauses expanded Congress’s power to rule over these questions. Ultimately, this 
project understands “development” as the construction of national governing authority over 
subordinate governments and over citizens, as represented not only in Lochner but also in these 
Marshall Court rulings.  
 
The Evolution of Constitutional Law: Primary Findings   
 
Constitutional change is the product of persistent contestation over the meaning of values 
and institutional powers the Constitution enshrines. The contestation over values and institutions 
produces a tension that any fallible institution, like the Court, would have difficulty applying to an 
evolving society.  
 But what does constitutional development look like? That is, how has the Court shaped the 
federal government since 1789?  My project contributes three things that help explain patterns in 
constitutional development. First, as noted above, the Court persistently expanded central state 
authority over time. Yet, there remained substantial variation between the restriction and expansion 
of state authority. While this variation persists across time, what changes is the kind of central state 
that the Court entrenches during any moment in political development. Rather than impose a 
teleological, progressive understanding of “the state” on constitutional development, this project 
recognizes that the variation between expansion-restriction changes during different eras and in 
relation to different models of central state formation.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Georgia act repealing the land grant act of 1795 violated the Contracts Clause thus Peck’s sale to Fletcher was not 
fraudulent. Noting that the Constitution did not permit bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, the Court declared that 
state laws annulling contracts or grants made by previous legislative acts were unconstitutional. 
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 Second, constitutional design made federalism a major project in American state expansion; 
reducing individual state autonomy became the primary avenue through which the central state 
expanded between 1870 and 1920, but federalism—delineating between federal and state power—is 
a large reason why we see so much variation among the decisions in the data. In this era, the central 
state’s primary problem was the reduction of state autonomy. Thus, conflicts over competing 
models of federalism were paramount during this time. Federalism decisions moved the U.S. from 
the federation created in 1789 to a consolidated nation-state in the wake of the Civil War. The 
consolidation of national power became one of the Court’s primary projects vis-à-vis federalism and 
thus the growth of central state power has occurred largely through constitutional doctrine.14  
Last, the Court used a strategy of calculated diffidence to maximize its own legitimacy while 
also enhancing broader central state powers of the other branches.15 As a political institution, the 
judiciary has always recognized its vulnerability in the central state ensemble and thus has recognized 
that its legitimacy depends on how it interprets its own powers as well as the powers of the broader 
federal state. Over time, the institution of the Court has displayed a reluctance to assert the 
judiciary’s primacy within the central state ensemble, which has contributed to this persistent 
consolidation of national power as well as helped build the ideological and institutional legitimacy of 
the Court.  
                                                 
14 Between 1870 and 1920 many scholars assume that the Supreme Court constrained central state expansion. On the 
contrary, this project demonstrates that the major challenge was not the development of a national welfare state but, 
instead, the consolidation of national authority at the expense of the individual states. For the Court, navigating 
questions of federalism was the central focus of national state development. During the turn of the twentieth century, 
the Court extended national authority into realms that were once previously considered the province of the states and 
thus helped solve many political problems associated with federalism.   
 This interpretation supports Skowronek’s (1982) understanding that the Court’s kept the American national 
regime together because it (and political parties) were the only institutions strong enough to confront the challenges of 
federalism. For Skowronek, the Supreme Court “shaped the boundaries of intergovernmental relations. It defined the 
legitimate forms of interaction between states, between state and national governments, and within the national 
government itself” (Skowronek 1982, 27).  
15 This project understands diffidence as the Court’s refusal to maximize political power for itself in an attempt to 
maintain its institutional and ideological legitimacy.   
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From these data, this study concludes that in every era of American history the Court 
expanded the federal government more often than it contracted that power. 16  This conclusion 
confirms arguments made by Martin Shapiro (1981) and the Anti-federalist Brutus:  that, on balance, 
the Supreme Court, as an instrument of the national government, will support the development and 
power of the national government. It turns out that a main pattern of constitutional development is 
the oscillation between restriction and expansion with a tendency toward expansion, irrespective of 
the ideological and political makeup of the Court.   
So what do these findings say about the evolution of constitutional law and the American 
state? We see that the boundaries of central state authority are ever-changing, and the Court has a 
decisive role in constructing these boundaries. We find a judicial institution that acts fairly 
consistently—when it expands federal power it usually does so by redefining federal relationships 
and extending the reach of the 14th Amendment, shifting power from the states to the federal 
government. When the Court constricts federal power, it typically does so by allowing states to 
control civil and political rights.  
Ultimately, the Court’s power over the central state’s reach and scope forms the 
constitutional foundation for governance. The fact is that the Court laid the constitutional 
foundations for the American central state power in some areas but left other areas to the states.  
The story of the American state is not necessarily about strong versus weak but rather about federal 
versus state. The contestation over the meaning and authority of the of the Constitution, at bottom, 
concerns one question—does the central state have power to regulate whatever issue is before the 
Court? Once we uncover the central state’s constitutional foundations, we can better understand the 
judiciary’s precise role in building the American federal government.   
 
                                                 
16 Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of these findings.   
 
 
13 
 
Overview of Methodology 
 
 While the research design is developed in the next chapter, a brief word on the overarching 
methodological approach is necessary. This project employs an historical institutionalist 
methodology to studying the Court, and by doing so, it speaks to both legal historical and American 
Political Development literatures. More specifically, in contrast to judicial behavioralist and rational 
choice scholars,17 historical institutionalists are less concerned with the behavior of actors with fixed 
preferences, but instead concerned with the behavior of actors who also have historically constituted 
beliefs involving the norms of their institution.18 Thus, historical institutionalist studies attempt to 
illuminate the long-term process that lead to the construction of both judicial preferences and of the 
institutions that constrains a judge’s preference. 19  In sum, historical institutionalism does not deny 
the attitudinal belief that judicial actors often vote their policy preference nor does it deny that 
justices often act strategically within a relatively stable environment when making decisions. 
However, since this project understands American constitutionalism as a developmental 
phenomenon, it rejects the idea that there is a single explanatory variable to explain judicial decisions 
at any one time. This study, like other historical institutionalist and APD studies, will examine longer 
periods and will emphasize how the construction of authority is formed, shaped, and changed.   
                                                 
17 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. This study is well-known for putting forth the ‘attitudinal model,’ which sees justices as voting their 
ideological preferences when issuing Court rulings. For rational choice institutionalists, justices seek to maximize their 
preferences in a complex setting; justices must bargain, compromise, and consider institutional structures (rules/norms) 
both internal to the Court and external constraints when seeking to achieve their preferences (Epstein and Knight 1998, 
Murphy 1964). Justices do not simply make decisions in a unidimensional context of ideological beliefs as behavioralists 
argue, rational choice scholars maintain. Rational choice studies focus on the “collegial game” by modeling the strategic 
behavior of justices to create majority coalitions (Maltzman, Spriggs II, Wahlbeck 2000). 
18 Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton’s edited volume The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist 
Interpretations provides an excellent overview of the historical institutionalist research agenda. (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1999). Looking more specifically at the Court and American Political Development, the contributors to 
Robert Kahn and Ken Kersch’s (2006) edited volume also embrace an historical institutionalist approach to Supreme 
Court politics. 
19 Paul Pierson recognizes the importance of studying politics as a long-term process. Pierson argues, “Contemporary 
social scientists are more likely to take a ‘snapshot’ view of political life” (Pierson 2005, 34). Too often, Pierson argues, 
social scientists focus on moments of specific policy enactments (or in this study’s case specific Court decisions) thereby 
blinding scholars to what happens before and what happens after such decisions.  Pierson, Paul. 2005. “The Study of 
Policy Development.” Journal of Policy History 17: 34-51. 
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Organization of the Project 
 
 In chapter 2 I explain this project’s research design and go into further depth about the 
scholarship to which this project contributes. My research design synthesizes the traditional and 
revisionist scholarship on law and state building discussed in the present chapter. To do this, my 
project moves beyond singular case studies of particular eras and constitutional issues and, instead, 
builds a dataset of constitutional law decisions spanning American history and constitutional issues.  
 The dataset samples the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions, decisions that have had the 
greatest effect on constitutional and political development. This sample of decisions is derived from 
58 constitutional law casebooks and treatises20 published between the early 18th century and the 
present (following David Mayhew’s 21  America’s Congress methodology). The breadth of these 
casebooks helps to reduce the “hindsight bias” risked by basing a list of landmark decisions solely 
on the perceptions of contemporary scholars.  
 I code each decision using Bensel’s (1990)22  central state authority typology, a typology that 
comprises seven dimensions of central state authority. Each decision is also coded on a nominal 
scale of state authority.23 With this method, I develop not only a stronger foundation on which to 
assess the Court’s position toward the state but also uncover constitutional law cases once 
considered salient by legal scholars that contemporary scholars may have now forgotten. In sum, 
chapter 2 explicates “state authority.” The collection of systematic empirical evidence on 
constitutional law will enable me to speak about law’s influence on state development more 
confidently than previous studies.   
                                                 
20 I include only law school casebooks. The selection criteria is explained below.  
21 David Mayhew uses a similar methodology to explain the behavior of Congressional representatives’ actions in the 
“public sphere.” See David Mayhew, America’s Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). Mayhew catalogued the “actions” of members of Congress in the “public 
sphere.” To do so, Mayhew used thirty-eight secondary source history textbooks to identify 2,304 instances of members’ 
actions in Congress. 
22 Richard Bensel. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press.  
23 This scale is discussed in the “Key Variables” section below in chapter 2.  
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 Using this dataset, chapters 3 presents the findings. Chapter 3 overviews the data, discussing 
the seven central state dimensions—which decisions expanded the federal government and which 
restricted the central state. The chapter also reports the dimensions that more frequently lent 
themselves to expansion. The “citizenship” dimension, for example, constricted the federal 
government far more often than did the “administrative capacity” dimension. However, the main 
takeaway is that Court’s decisions persistently expand and constrict national authority over time. 
  Chapter 4 builds on the data presented in chapter 3 by looking at the constitutional issues 
and framework that have justified expansion and restriction over time. It first begins with a section 
on dual sovereignty in the founding and early republic eras, a constitutional and political issue that 
contributed to the Court expanding and restricting central state authority. Moreover, this chapter 
discusses the Constitution’s design and how constitutional design, especially of federalism, has 
facilitated and hindered American state expansion.  
 Chapter 5 then shifts focus on the Court and the emerging modern state, roughly the period 
1870 to 1920—the primary era of modern state-building. In this era, issues of dual sovereignty and 
federalism came to a head where the federal government’s glaring problem was to reduce individual 
state autonomy. This problem produced conflicts over competing models of federalism, with some 
calling for a state-centered model while others advocating a federally-centered one. Ultimately, as a 
constitutional and political issue, federalism moved the U.S. from the federation created in 1789 to a 
consolidated nation-state in the wake of the Civil War. Chapter 5 argues that constitutional law, and 
institutional development, does not follow a linear path but, instead, develops unevenly, producing a 
central state that is strong in some areas and weak in others.  In particular, with its federalism 
decisions, the Court advanced commerce-related aspects of the central state while individual rights, 
especially in civil rights and labor decisions, constricted federal authority. Accordingly, I argue that 
the Court helped facilitate a compromise between race/labor and economics in American political 
 
 
16 
 
development during the emergence of the modern state. Doing so reconciled the call for economic 
nationalism with the call for a return to the state-centered federalism of the pre-Civil War era.  
 The final empirical chapter, chapter 6, places the Court within the broader central state 
ensemble, considering the Court’s relationship with the other branches. This chapter’s main question 
is how does the Court construct central state authority over time? From the data, we see that the 
Court has displayed diffidence in expanding its own powers, and instead has more often expanded 
the authority of the political branches. The Court’s diffidence helps produce the expansion and 
restriction we see throughout time. Reticent to assert itself over the other federal branches, the 
Court’s decisions over federal laws often lead to an expansion of the political branches. Similarly, the 
Court’s reluctance to expand the reach and scope of the Constitution over state governments helps 
contribute to the restriction of the authority of the federal government. Chapter 6 explains some of 
the mechanism for this behavior and why the Court engages in it.   
  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation contributes to the broader discussions of inter-branch politics and 
institutional development. The Court’s constitutional evolution implicates it in the American state 
building project, a story that has largely been the told vis-à-vis the other major federal branches (the 
Congress, the presidency, and the bureaucracy). A closer look at the Court’s hand in state expansion 
allows us to draw comparisons between it and the other major branches with respect to the 
substantive impact the Court has on central state power. Another contribution of this study is its 
emphasis on constitutional design and how this design shapes constitutional development.  
 More broadly, this dissertation revises our understanding that the Supreme Court was largely 
responsible for inhibiting state growth until 1937 when, finally, the Court accepted New Deal efforts 
to expand federal government powers. This interpretation juxtaposes Court power against other 
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political institutions, and, as such, overlooks the many ways the justices have acted as state-builders. 
The Court’s constitutional interpretation did much to build a national government powerful in some 
areas while slowing it in others. To show that the Court did not mainly inhibit state expansion, I 
construct an original dataset of Court decisions—gathered from constitutional law casebooks 
published between 1822 and 2010. Each decision’s effect on national governing authority is coded 
along seven different dimensions of the federal government. Thus, this dissertation speaks to 
literature that, first, reconsiders nineteenth century national state capacity, and, second, emphasizes 
the Court’s role in advancing the national state.  
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Chapter 2: Literature and Research Design 
 
 
 
Law and American Political Development 
 
The Supreme Court’s assumed opposition to regulatory state expansion, especially during the 
Lochner era has been the dominant narrative surrounding the Court and state-building. But APD 
scholars have viewed court power in opposition to other political institutions and state building for 
too long. Part of the reason for this rests on how APD scholars define “development” and on the 
time-periods that they study. Development turns on the creation of the social-welfare and regulatory 
state as well as on the creation of positive rights (i.e. obligations of the government to protect to 
citizens). Consequently, APD tends to focus on the Progressive and New Deal eras, critical 
junctures in the development of the modern state and positive rights. The problem is not that APD 
scholars have misinterpreted these histories. Instead, the problem is that they have defined the 
“state” (and the state powers the Court could advance) too narrowly. Because the Court opposed 
regulatory expansion in these critical junctures, the literature concludes the Court to be an obstacle 
to state expansion.  When we look beyond these narrower conceptions, we find that court power 
has not persistently opposed other political institutions both during the emergence of the “modern” 
state and the periods preceding and proceeding it.   
The historiography of constitutional development and state expansion pivots on two 
perspectives. The first perspective, “Progressive,” views the Court as an inhibitor of state 
development because the Court invalidated federal and state laws that attempted to create a stronger 
welfare state. Charles Beard’s Economic Interpretation of the Constitution typifies this “Progressive” school 
of thought. In it, he argued the Constitution “was essentially an economic document based upon the 
concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally 
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beyond the reach of popular majorities.”24 American Political Development as a subfield—with its 
original intention to explain why the U.S. was a relative laggard in the creation of a centralized, social 
welfare state—has generally taken up the cudgels for Beard’s interpretation. Certainly, Skowronek’s 
Building a New American State—which has been held as an example of portraying the Court as an 
obstacle 25  interprets the Court’s behavior through this Progressive lens. 26  In other words, the 
Progressive standard is the metric by which APD has evaluated the growth of the central state.27  
In detailing the emergence of a “new American state” during the late nineteenth century, the 
scholarly work has emphasized the importance of elected officials responding to a variety of 
interests, from laborers to farmers to capitalist entrepreneurs (Sanders 1999). The Supreme Court, in 
contrast, is seen as the foe in these efforts in the pre-New Deal Era, as it gutted the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (Skowronek 1982, 154-156, 253), state-level workplace laws (Gillman 1993, 
10-11), railroad regulation (Berk 1994), and laws designed to promote labor union formation 
                                                 
24 Charles Beard quoted in William Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886-1937 
(New York, Oxford University Press: 1998), 256. 
25 William Novak “Legal Origins of Modern American State,” in Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, Robert Kagan, Looking Back 
on Law’s Century, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 2002); John Skrentny, “Law and the American State” Annual Review of 
Sociology 32 (2006): 213-244; Paul Frymer, “Law and American Political Development.” Law and Social Inquiry 33 (2008): 
779-803. 
26 One of the primary reasons for the “the limits of America’s achievement in regenerating the state through political 
reform,” Skowronek argued was the “outmoded judicial discipline” spurred on by “the constancy of the Constitution of 
1789.” Skowronek concluded, “Forged in the wake of a liberal revolt against the state, the American Constitution has 
always been awkward and incomplete as an organization of state power” (1982, 287). Stephen Skowronek. 1982. Building 
a New American State. New York, NY: Cambridge Press. 
27 I elaborate on this Progressive interpretation of the Court in chapter 5, which looks specifically at the Court’s role in 
state expansion during the turn of the twentieth century. Suffice it to say here that Beard did not invent the Progressive 
critique of law as an obstacle to state growth. Many of Beard’s contemporaries joined him—people such as Louis 
Boudin (1932), J. Allen Smith (1930), Edward Corwin (1938), and Frank Goodnow (1911), and Gustavus Myers (1912). 
Boudin’s Government by Judiciary, for example, claimed, “We are ruled by dead men . . . generations of dead judges” 
(Boudin 1932, viii). J. Allen Smith similarly indicted the Court’s interpretation of constitutional law, declaring law’s 
interpretation “inherent opposition to democracy [and] the obstacles which it has placed in the way of majority rule” 
(Smith 1930, vii). What these Progressive studies overlook is how a powerful judiciary advances the American state. 
These studies only measure state power vis-à-vis the creation of a European welfare state, but the centralization of 
decision-making authority in the judiciary should not be overlooked. So while the Progressive interpretation sees a 
strong judiciary, they understand this as an obstacle to state development. But, by doing so, the Progressives implicitly 
view the judiciary as separate from the central state.  
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(Forbath 1991, 59; Hattam 1993 chapter 4; Orren 1991, 208).28 Accounts of the role of courts and 
state development of the post New Deal era continue to convey this perception, such as Jacob 
Hacker’s work (2002, 296-7), which argues that courts discourage government activism in the realms 
of retirement and health insurance expansion.29 These studies, however, often only examine defining 
moments in the Court’s legal development, primarily the Progressive and New Deal eras. I suspect 
broadening the scope of study will yield more dynamic variation than these studies maintain.   
Like political scientists, legal historians also depict the Supreme Court as a foe in the 
narrative of state development not just during the late nineteenth century but also after the New 
Deal. Bruce Ackerman’s (1991, 1998), two volume, We the People, in particular, argues that during 
“normal politics”—the day-to-day operations of the political system where elected representatives 
make decisions for the “People”—the Court’s role is “preservationist” across constitutional history 
(1991, 10). The Court, much like the political science literature posits, exerts a negative power on 
legal development whereby the Court’s duty is to protect the “hard-won principles” achieved by the 
People during a constitutional moment. Moreover, he subscribes to a similar punctuated equilibrium 
model of constitutional development, dividing development into three “constitutional moments:” 
the Founding, Civil War Reconstruction, and the New Deal (1991, 59).  
                                                 
28 To be sure, studying the pre-New Deal Era, William Novak (1996) illuminates the myriad of ways in which courts 
have worked as bulwarks of the state by providing workers common law protections against employers and corporations 
that the national government refused to pass. 
29 Other studies of the post-New Deal era also depict courts as obstacles. Although his work does not speak directly to 
the APD community, Robert Kagan’s (2001) study of “adversarial legalism” portrays an APD version of U.S. courts as 
an obstacle to expansions in the area of social regulation (e.g. environment, consumer protection, and health). Similarly 
Steven Teles (2006) has shown the restrictive impact of courts on state growth and development since the New Deal. He 
attributes this largely to the successes of conservative organizations using a litigation strategy to limit the national 
government. The idea of courts as obstacle to state development pertains mainly to a particular conception of the 
modern central state—one that is typified by social welfare provisions and increasing bureaucratic autonomy. Because of 
this conception of the state, APD studies have tended to focus on the late nineteenth century to the New Deal period, a 
reason that the courts as obstacles interpretation prevails in this period. Part of this project’s purpose, then, is to 
recognize other forms of the national state which the Court helped build and to apply APD’s focus on statebuilding to 
other historical periods.  
 To be sure, the Court has not constrained federal expansion writ large. Exploring various policy areas’ 
influence on central state expansion would be a useful way to capture these differing effects on national state 
development. One way to do this might be to categorize each judicial decision along more specific policy areas than the 
present central state authority framework allows.  
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Rebutting Beard and the Progressive interpretation, Charles Warren (1922) represents the 
second perspective, defending the Court’s decisions. He analyzed 790 state police power and tax 
decisions handed down between 1889 and 1918 and discovered that only 53 invalidated police-
power regulations, and of those, only 14 involved what he called “the general rights and liberties of 
individuals” (Warren 1922, 741). Scholars in this camp have attempted to revise history by relocating 
quintessentially “anti-Progressives” like Justice Stephen Field and Judge Thomas Cooley in the 
context of their era and to dissociate their ideas from “shorthand caricatures” 30  of 
Progressive/liberal historiography.31  
In Warren’s camp, but more contemporary (and thus in direct conversation with American 
Political Development), are revisionist studies like William Novak’s (2002, 2008). Looking at 1877 to 
1937, he maintains that law and courts were not the “great bogeymen of liberal reform,” persistently 
frustrating modern welfare state building (Novak 2002, 251). Contrary to the progressive narrative, 
Novak contends that American public law was a “font of creative energy” at the state and local level, 
and therefore crucial to the development of the modern American state—a state comprised of a 
centralized, administrative, and regulatory government (Novak 2002, 260). Additionally, Paul 
Frymer’s (2008) and John Skrenty’s (2006) review articles join Novak’s broader argument about 
uncovering the way law has acted as a positive force toward (as opposed to an obstacle toward) 
American state-building.32 
                                                 
30 Wiecek, The Lost World, 255. For a thorough historiography of the legal ideologies dominant on the Supreme Court 
between 1886 and 1937 see Wiecek’s Appendix in The Lost World.  
31 For example, Michael Les Benedict’s study of the ideological foundations of laissez-faire constitutionalism rests less 
on class-based motivations and greed of a governing elite and more on an ethical libertarian foundation expounded by 
Progressive Era “moral philosophers” such as Francis Wayland and Amasa Walker. Michael Les Benedict “Laissez-Faire 
and Liberty: A Reevaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” Law & History Review 3, 
293 (1985): 293-331. 
32 Paul Frymer (2008) notes APD scholars’ “skepticism of courts,” which leads APD scholars to go “too far in 
juxtaposing court power against other political institutions and . . . miss the important ways that courts contribute to the 
development of state power” (Frymer 2008, 789). Additionally, in an Annual Review article, sociologist John D. Skrentny 
concurs with Novak and Frymer: “I argue here for increased attention to the positive role of law and courts in 
policymaking and statebuilding” (Skrentny 2006, 214). Indeed, he also maintains that studies of the Gilded and 
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In the end, these rather narrow understandings of development muddy our view of the 
Court’s role in state-building. The progressives—who implicitly define “development” or 
“expansion” as enhancements to the welfare state—naturally see the Court as constraining state 
development. Those in Novak’s and Warren’s camp, meanwhile, are not as concerned with 
questions about state development but instead seek to push against this progressive narrative. Still, 
even these revisionist studies pivot on a welfare-state conception of state expansion.  Although 
Novak does address state development, his study focuses on how and where scholars can locate the 
Court’s positive role in state development rather than on actually showing us that the Court does, in 
fact, do so.  
What is more, the idea of the Court as an obstacle does not stem just from its behavior 
during the emergence of the modern state. It also stems from the more general view that the 
American (federal) constitutional tradition has been built upon principles of limited government and 
negative rights (i.e. rights devoted to the restraint of government) (Hartz 1955). The negative 
character of American rights is often attributed to political culture and to American’s deeply rooted 
suspicion of government (Schauer 2005, 46), which has led us to conceptualize the Court as a 
persistently limiting institution (Zackin 2010, 33-34). Like APD depictions of the state, the negative 
rights tradition centers primarily on welfare-state rights thereby viewing the Court as an obstacle to 
development. But while the Supreme Court has embraced a largely negative reading of constitutional 
(individual) rights, it still has contributed a great deal to the positive expansion of the central 
government’s right to coerce and aggrandize power. Therefore, it is important for to ask, to what 
end has the Court been an obstacle? And to what end has it expanded central state power? 
Despite these varying perspectives, they all adhere to the same punctuated periodization and 
to the same definition of the “state.” Yet there is still no broad consensus on the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Progressive Eras (citing Skowronek 1982) and “national welfare state studies” (citing Orren 1991; Forbath 1991; Hattam 
1993) view the courts as “crucial actors but are typically an obstacle to growth and development” (Skrentny 2006, 218).  
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role toward the state’s authority and development. As such, my study seeks to take a wider approach 
to understanding the Court’s position toward state-building and state authority by explicitly coding 
the Court’s leading constitutional law decisions across issue areas and across American history. In 
doing so, I take a more dynamic view of constitutional development and seek to show that broad 
characterizations of, for example, the Progressive Era Court as an inhibitor to state development or, 
alternatively, the 1960s as a period of persistent positive lawmaking power, miss important variation. 
Moreover, in taking a wider approach to constitutional development, I uncover how the Court 
developed central state authority during moments studied less by APD scholars—that is, pre-
twentieth century constitutional development. Thus, I attempt to offer a more comprehensive 
analysis of the Court’s role in state development and bring law into APD’s theoretical core of state 
autonomy and institutional apparatuses of power 
 
Developmental Explanations 
This project’s focus is on the outcomes in terms of the collective decisions handed down by 
the Supreme Court, and these outcomes are explained with an emphasis on the intricacies of law, 
precedent, and constitutional design.33 There are three interrelated explanations that contribute to 
American constitutional development’s tendency toward expansion. These three explanations work 
in tandem to cause many of American’s most important constitutional and political outcomes. At 
the same time, these three explanations will relate to each other differently during different moments 
of constitutional development. Shifts in the state-building project largely rests on these three 
                                                 
33 Accordingly, this study’s theoretical approach is not competitive with reigning political science theories of judicial 
decision-making—the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 1993) and the governing coalition model (Dahl 1957)—
because they focus on the decisions of individual justices. Both models could fully explain the decisions in my data and, 
at the same time, offer explanations for how justices make up their minds that would be fully compatible with my 
approach.  For example, if justices always preferred, for whatever reason, to hand down rulings that were fully aligned 
with precedent (because they were very “conservative”), the attitudinal model would constitute a satisfactory explanation 
for both those decisions and complement my approach. 
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explanations. This section briefly overviews the explanations as well as outlines expectations derived 
from the literature.   
 
Institutional Explanation: This explanation recognizes that the Supreme Court (and the rest of the 
central state) will grow in strength exponentially over time due to constitutional design. We see this 
argument in the early republic with the debate between Brutus and Publius (Hamilton)34 and we see 
this in the contemporary work of Martin Shapiro (1981).  
 
Legal Explanation:35 The Court operates legally.  It limits central state authority where the 
Constitution and precedents dictate it should. It expands central state authority where the 
Constitution and precedents permit it to do so. Here, again, constitutional design makes some parts 
of the central state amenable to expansion (e.g. Commerce Clause) while prohibiting power in other 
parts (e.g. criminal rights). That particular areas of the law are more susceptible to expansion is an 
explanation founded in both legal historical and American political development scholarship.36  
                                                 
34 As I discuss in Chapter 4, the constitutional framers laid the foundation for the institutional expansion of the federal 
branches. Among the framers, Hamilton was the “premier state-builder in a generation of state-builders” (Kramnick 
1987, 67). Hamilton’s zeal for a strong central state came together in his writings on the American presidency. The 
presidency, for Hamilton, was at the heart of the new American state (Kramnick 1987, 70). More than that, Hamilton’s 
desire for an expansion of central state authority fulfilled his fantasies of grandeur and the glory that history accords to 
empire builders. In Federalist 11, he discussed “what this country can become,” and the glories for an America of a 
“striking and animating kind.”  He wrote, “Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of 
the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our 
growth” (Federalist 11).  Hamilton’s beliefs were emblematic of the fervor for a strong central government that many of 
his fellow framers helped put in motion.   
35 The “legal explanation” has its foundations in a theoretical approach to the study of law and courts rather than in 
specific scholars. In fact, the “legal” approach encompasses much of what Shapiro’s body of scholarship sought to 
debunk: assuming that the legal features of courts distinguished them from conventional political institutions. In contrast 
to the legal approach, Shapiro’s work, broadly speaking, viewed American politics as made up of many centers of 
decision-making and asked how courts fit into these decision-making centers (Gillman 2004, 364-5). See Gillman’s 2004 
Annual Review article on Shapiro for a longer discussion (363-82). Additionally, Howard Gillman’s (1993) Constitution 
Besieged demonstrates the importance of law and precedent in explaining constitutional development. He finds that the 
decisions of the Lochner era were not the product of “Neanderthal justices” advancing their preferences for laissez-faire 
constitutionalism but rather, “a principled effort” to uphold a legal distinction having its foundations far before the 
Lochner era. Substantive due process during this era, according to Gillman, reflected “an overarching set of well-
established legal doctrines and principles governing the legitimate exercise of police powers” long before laissez-faire 
ideologies were dominant among America’s legal and political elites (1993, 177).  
36 Paul Frymer (2008) has shown the ways in which the Court helped build and expand the state’s power in the realm of 
labor law. He argues, “[J]udges, lawyers, administrators, as well as the rules and procedures that define and influence 
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Historical Context Explanation: The Court, for example, expanded central state authority in the Early 
Republic when the new state was vulnerable.  The Court also expands central state authority during 
wars because the state (and the nation) are threatened and thus new expansions of power become 
engrained in American political culture.37 
  
Expectations of Development 
   
In arguing that some areas of the law are more susceptible to expansion than other areas, I 
am supporting a broader theoretical argument: that law develops non-linearly (Kersch 2004; Wilson 
2008, 4). Non-linear development understands the tensions and contradictions inherent in 
constitutional adjudication, which might lead the Court to advances the state in one area of law 
while constricting the state in another area of law. 
Nevertheless, the conventional, more-linear narrative of the Court argues that the judiciary 
hindered American state development from (roughly) 1880 to 1937, and in 1937, the courts accepted 
and welcomed the expansion of state power; and finally, by the 1960s, courts took major steps to 
expand the authority of the federal government (Schwartz 1957; Horwitz 1992, 1998; McCloskey 
2004, Leuchtenburg 1995). This conventional narrative, while having much validity, overlooks some 
of the nuances in the multiple Supreme Court eras of America’s history. The data collected in this 
project will begin to asses some of the expectations regarding when and where the Court expanded 
state authority such as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
their actions were absolutely vital to integrating labor unions during the latter stages of the twentieth century” (Frymer 
2008, 75). Similarly, Gillman (1997) shows how changes in constitutional interpretation helped advance the modern 
American state. He argues that the Court largely abandoned its doctrine of originalism during the New Deal era in order 
to “cope with the innovative challenges of managing a national industrial economy” (Gillman 1997, 192-3).  
37 Geoff’s Stone study of free speech makes this argument. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1789 
to the War on Terrorism. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).   
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1. The Supreme Court aggressively expanded state authority during the Early Republic 
when the Court itself was politically vulnerable (Newmyer 1986, White 1990, Ellis 
2007). 
2. The Court more likely expanded central state authority at a greater rate after the mid-
1930s than before by allowing for the delegation of authority to the bureaucracy and 
by expanding the scope of civil liberties and rights (Konvitz 1966; Horwitz 1998). 
3. It also impeded state expansion most frequently at the turn of the twentieth century 
when it resisted the growth of administrative agencies (and the broader central state) 
(Skowronek 1982). 
A wider collection of empirical evidence, however, will enable me to confirm or disconfirm these 
developmental expectations and will provide stronger foundation upon which to assess the 
conventional narrative. More than that, a wider collection will allow us to better understand the 
Court’s effect on developing national government powers in the nineteenth century. The empirical 
evidence used to assess these expectations is the focus of the next section.  
 
Dataset Construction 
 
This section explains how I selected the judicial decisions and coded the variables in the 
dataset, but first a word on the theoretical foundation of the dataset. It adopts Richard Bensel’s 
(1990) “central state authority framework,” which he grounds in the traditional understanding of a 
Weberian “state” in order to measure central state power.38 Recent studies, however, suggest that 
                                                 
38 Governmental organization and policymaking are routinely measured against Weber’s chief characteristics of modern 
statecraft: (1) a rationalized and generalized legal and administrative order amenable to legislative change; (2) a 
bureaucratic apparatus of officers conducting official business with reference to an impersonal order of administrative 
regulations; (3) the power to bind—to rule and regulate—all persons (national citizens) and all actions within the state’s 
official jurisdiction via its laws; and (4) the legitimate authority to use force, violence, and coercion within the prescribed 
territory as prescribed by the duly constituted government. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) Bringing the State 
Back In.  See especially Skocpol’s introduction to the volume.  
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students of the American state should move away from the tradition Weberian understanding and 
toward understanding the central state in action, but these suggestions are not well-suited for 
studying the Supreme Court.39 This dataset applies a Weberian conception to judicial decisions for a 
number of reasons. First, coding individual judicial decisions necessitates a delimited, explicit 
definition of state authority rather than the more nebulous concepts put forth by the revisionist 
strand. Second, and more importantly, the business of the Court involves the specification of state 
authority and, as such, my project fits within the Weberian framework—a judicial ruling only formally 
bestows (or diminishes) state authority through a text; it does not involve the implementation or 
government in action understanding of the state embodied by the revisionists. Last, the competing 
explanations in the literature that I wish to engage have held the Supreme Court responsible for 
either increasing or decreasing authority in this Weberian sense.   
The Supreme Court’s position as a central state actor poses a difficult conceptual problem 
for understanding its role in national state expansion. In particular, it can be argued that each time 
the Court issues a decision—no matter the case outcome—it expands national state authority simply 
because the Court itself is a central state actor. To address this conceptual problem, this project 
distinguishes between a substantive understanding of the aims of the national state and the 
jurisdictional understanding of the Court when it decides which branch has the right to decide what 
the central state does. The interpretation that each judicial decisions represents a positive expansion 
of the national state (vis-à-vis the Court) makes little sense because this interpretation would often 
result in ignoring the substantive policy aims of the statute under Court review.  
                                                 
39 Revisionists uncover American state growth and strength by looking at some of the unique features of the American 
state that while not “strong” according to the European understanding of the state, still demonstrate the power of the 
American federal government especially in collaborating with lower level governments. This revisionist trend concerns 
itself with uncovering state growth by looking at “state capacity” (as opposed to “authority”), that is, government in 
action, which uncovers the ways in which the state, in practice, implements its policy goals (Novak 2008, 762-763; King 
and Lieberman 2009, 568-569; Hacker 2002; Johnson 2007).  
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Take Citizens United vs. Federal Elections Commission (2010) for example. Here the Court 
reviewed a challenge to the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, an act which sought to 
regulate “big money” in federal campaign elections. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that Congress 
may not prevent corporations or unions from spending money to support or oppose individual 
candidates because this form of spending qualifies as a kind of protected speech. By invalidating part 
of this Congressional statute, the Court weakened the authority of actors in the central state (the 
Federal Electoral Commission and Congress) to regulate parts of society. Thus, Citizens represents a 
restriction on national governing authority. If we understood every Court decision as an expansion 
of national authority, however, then we would misinterpret decisions such as Citizens that very 
clearly undercut national authority to control society. While it is true that jurisdictionally the Court 
determined it had the power to hear this case, substantively the Court’s decision did far more to 
restrict central state authority than advance it by its mere assertion of jurisdiction.40   
 
Constitutional Casebooks and Treatises  
 To demonstrate the Court’s multifaceted relationship with central state authority, I compiled 
a list of landmark constitutional law decisions. No two scholars, however, agree on the same list of 
landmark decisions (i.e. the constitutional law canon). This canon, as Keith Whittington and 
Amanda Rinderle note, “is neither timeless nor natural” (Whittington and Rinderle 2012, 5). Given 
the ever-changing nature of the canon, my project required a research design that allows me to 
construct a relatively unbiased list of landmark decisions. I derived my decisions from fifty-eight 
                                                 
40 This same logic applies when the Court reviews state and municipal-level statues, too. In Kelo v. City of New London 
(2005), for example, the City of New London used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to 
private developers. The property owners challenged New London’s property taking, arguing it violated the Fifth 
Amendment. However, the Court declared that New London did not violate the Fifth Amendment and thus the city’s 
land taking could continue. Because the Court held that a federal constitutional right did not apply in this case, 
substantively this decision restricted central state authority from protecting these property owners. Like in Citizens, a 
pure jurisdiction interpretation of national power (that is, the Court decided to rule), would overlook the more accurate 
interpretation and substantive effect of Kelo: that it restricted the application of federal protection and thus authority.  
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constitutional law casebooks and treatises41 published between 1822 and 2010, following David 
Mayhew’s42 America’s Congress methodology, which is detailed further below in Figure 1. The breadth 
of these casebooks mitigates the hindsight biases associated with creating a list of landmark 
decisions grounded in the opinions of contemporary scholars.43 These landmark decisions were the 
basis upon which to discuss the constitutional foundations of the American state. Each decision is 
interpreted along the seven dimensions44 outlined above in order to discover the Court’s overall 
influence on central state authority. With this method, I developed not only a stronger foundation 
on which to assess the Court’s position toward the state but also uncovered constitutional law cases 
once considered salient by legal scholars that contemporary scholars now consider superseded or 
defunct.   
The main selection criteria for the fifty-eight constitutional law casebooks was their influence 
on the instruction of law students. The Appendix lists, in chronological order, all the casebooks used 
                                                 
41 I include only law school casebooks. The selection criteria is explained below.  
42 I explain Mayhew’s methodology below.  
43 External validation of the cases selected is an important issue because I do not want to select decisions that only 
lawyers think are salient. The sample of cases should not just represent the casebooks selected but also should represent 
what the Court and other communities think are important, too. 
 While the casebook design used in this project relies upon what legal scholars view as important, the decisions 
extracted using this design also dovetail with non-legal scholars’ opinions, too. In particular, Jerry Goldman conducted a 
study in 1992 of twelve leading constitutional law casebooks authored by both legal scholars and political scientists used 
in undergraduate classrooms. He attempted to identify a constitutional law canon—“a widely accepted body of rules, 
principles, and norms exemplified in a common set of Supreme Court opinions” (Goldman 1992, 134). Like my 
research, Goldman found very little overlap in the cases that comprise these casebooks (Goldman 1992, 137). In 2005, 
he conducted a similar study of thirteen casebooks authored by political scientists for undergraduate teaching. Using his 
loosest definition of “canonical,” Goldman identified 49 constitutional law decisions. My database includes 46 of his 49 
decisions. While this is not sufficient external validation of my case selection, it begins to show that the cases identified 
by my method are not systematically biased by lawyers’ own educational experiences and their intellectual beliefs.  
 A more thorough form of external validation (and identification of landmark decisions) would examine the 
citations counts of Supreme Court decisions over time. On using citation counts as a form of identifying landmark 
decisions and precedent, see Ryan Black and James Spriggs. 2013. “The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme 
Court Precedent,” Journal of Legal Empirical Studies 10 (2): 325-358. As a way to link Supreme Court decisions to lower 
federal and state courts’ behavior, I could use Westlaw or LexisNexis legal databases to gather citation counts for all the 
decisions in a given Supreme Court term. Doing so would allow me to see if the cases identified by my research design 
are also cases that the Court (and lower courts) frequently cite as precedent.  
 Finally, I could cross-check some of my case selection with other scholars’ indicator of case salience. Lee 
Epstein and Jeffrey Segal have a measure of Supreme Court case salience for the 1946 to 2009 terms; their measure relies 
on cases appearing on the front page of the New York Times. See Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal. 2000. “Measuring Issue 
Salience.” American Journal of Political Science, 44 (1): 66-83.  
44 Bensel, Yankee Leviathan. See Part C in the Appendix for a description of all seven dimensions.   
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to construct the dataset; these are all the earliest editions of a casebook/treatise. The books selected 
are considered some of the most important treatises and casebooks of constitutional law.45 In each 
instance, the first edition was consulted because many of the casebooks are still in print and used 
throughout the most prestigious law schools in the U.S. In addition to using first editions of each 
book, I distributed casebooks fairly evenly across American history (weighted toward the present-
day) and chose only casebooks used to train lawyers; I selected books that were used to train legal 
actors, individuals who would most likely shape the development of American law. Moreover, I also 
selected books for their wide use in current law school curricula. Most, if not all, the major 
casebooks currently used in law schools are represented on my list (Sullivan and Gunther; Brest et 
al.; Choper et al.; Stone et al.; and Varat et al.). The authors of these major casebooks often use their 
books in their respective institution. And, of course, these authors have taught at some of the most 
well-regarded law schools around the country—Yale (Balkin), Stanford (Brest and Sullivan), Texas 
(Levinson), Choper (Berkeley), and Varat (UCLA). The casebook list thus includes the most 
authoritative and contemporary casebooks used to teach constitutional law.46  
 This project created an original dataset, spanning America’s history, coding judicial decisions 
for their importance toward constitutional law as well as their relationship toward central state 
                                                 
45 I have accessed syllabi, where possible, from leading law schools as well as explored a widely-read legal academic blog 
regarding the selection of casebooks for constitutional law classes: “Choosing a Constitutional Law Casebook” 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/05/choosing_a_case_1.html accessed 23 June 2014. I have included 
all the casebooks referenced in this blog entry.       
46 Because I am unable to include all casebooks ever published, there is a selection effect on the casebooks included in 
the database. This concern pertains especially to the latter part of twentieth century when casebook publication 
proliferated. Accordingly, I selected more casebooks from the twentieth century to mitigate this problem (see the 
distribution of casebooks in Figure 2 below). Still, a great deal of books have been omitted. The omission of these books 
is less of a problem considering that there is a large consensus, in a given era, of what comprises landmark decisions. From 
the link in footnote 45, it appears that the law schools, in a given period, use only a handful of casebooks to teach 
constitutional law. I have included what seems to be the most widely-used casebooks. Nevertheless, to fully counter 
concerns of selection bias, it will be important to obtain sales records and the specific number of law schools using these 
books. Another way to assuage selection bias problems would be to uncover the case listing for a handful of books 
excluded and see if these case listings differ widely from the case listing of the books chosen for inclusion.  
 Concerns over casebook selection resemble concerns over individual case selection: that the method biases 
against selecting a representative sample of decisions from the population. Thus, showing that these decisions—and the 
books used to extract these decisions—are, in fact, viewed as landmark decisions by broader communities would 
properly solve both selection bias issues (i.e. addressing the external validation concern in footnote 43).  
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authority (expanding, restricting, or neutral). Following David Mayhew’s (2000) American Congress 
dataset construction style, I used secondary source constitutional law casebooks (textbooks used to 
teach constitutional law in law schools) in order to collect my observations. In his book, Mayhew 
sought to catalogue Congressional members’ “actions” in the “public sphere.” To do so, Mayhew 
used thirty-eight secondary source undergraduate history textbooks to identify 2,304 instances of 
members’ actions in Congress. From this database, Mayhew offers insight on a variety of 
Congressional public actions, from the nature of congressional opposition to presidents and the 
surprising frequency of foreign policy actions to the timing of important activity within 
congressional careers (and the way that term limits might affect these behaviors).  
 In a similar sense, I assembled a dataset of Supreme Court cases from dozens of 
constitutional law casebooks published between the late-nineteenth century and the present day. The 
publications of these casebooks began in the mid-1800s when universities started to offer law 
degrees. 47 Accordingly, the legal community considers these casebooks authoritative and 
representative of the important decisions spanning America’s constitutional history. Indeed, many of 
the casebooks used in this study have appeared in many revised editions thereby indicating the legal 
community’s high regard for these sources. To represent the period before the rise of casebooks, I 
incorporated widely read legal treatises, such as James Kent’s (1826) Commentaries on American Law 
and Joseph Story’s (1833) Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, in my casebook list (see 
                                                 
47 Dean of Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus Langdell, instituted the now-prototypical three year casebook 
method law school curriculum in 1876. Langdell’s casebooks were excerpts of actual cases arranged to illustrate the 
principles of law and how law developed. As a result, writes Lawrence Friedman in his seminal A History of American Law, 
“the classroom tone was profoundly altered” (Friedman 2005, 468). Before the rise of law schools, legal education took 
place through apprenticeships: “Most lawyers gained their pretensions by spending some time in training in the office of 
a member of the bar. . . . For a fee, the lawyer-to-be hung around an office, read Blackstone and Coke and miscellaneous 
other books, and copied legal documents” (Friedman 2005, 238). See Friedman p. 238-241 for an overview of legal 
education in America until the mid-19th century.         
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Appendix). Legal treatises were the primary way individuals learned how to practice law before the 
advent of law schools.48  
The first step in creating the dataset was to create a single, alphabetical list all the cases found 
in each casebook’s index in an Excel spreadsheet. This list comprised the far left column in the 
Excel spreadsheet (see Figure 1 below). When a casebook distinguishes49 “principal” cases in its 
index, I listed only the “principal”50 Supreme Court cases in the far left column of the spreadsheet. If 
the casebook did not distinguish among cases then I listed all cases found in the index. Each column 
within the spreadsheet represents the author of one of the fifty-eight casebooks. From left to right, 
the columns are listed chronologically. If a case appeared in casebook, I placed a “1” in the cell; if a 
case did not appear in the book, I placed a “0” in the cell. Figure 1 is a representation of this 
method:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 There is a well-documented history regarding the evolution of American legal education. For an extensive overview of 
this literature, see Hugh C. MacGill and R. Kent Newmyer’s chapter in The Cambridge History of Law in America, Volume II 
(1789-1920): “Legal Education and Legal Thought, 1789-1920 (p. 36-67). Of particular importance to American legal 
education, MacGill and Newmyer note that through the War of 1812 most of American law students educated 
themselves by reading primarily English treatises, especially Sir William Blackstone’s (1764) four volume Commentaries on 
the Laws of England. They maintain that, up until the 1870s, Blackstone “did more to shape American legal education and 
though [more] than any other single work” (MacGill and Newmyer 2008, 40-41). Nevertheless, American treatises like 
James Kent’s (1826) Commentaries on American Law because progressively widely used (MacGill and Newmey 2004, 43). 
MacGill and Newmeyer note that several developments—among them, the steam press, cheap paper, and the 
establishment of subscription law libraries—enabled wide circulation long before the advent of law schools in the 1870s: 
“The treatise tradition, which did so much to shape law-office education, also greatly influenced the substance and 
methods of instruction in early law schools” (2004, 44). 
49 Casebook editors most frequently distinguish principal cases by italicizing the case name in the index.   
50 “Principal cases” are the Supreme Court decisions quoted and discussed at length in a casebook whereas non-principal 
cases are merely cited in a footnote or parenthetical within the casebook. An average casebook discusses anywhere 
between 100 to 500 principal cases.  
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Figure 1: Example of Casebook Listing Method   
   
 Case: 
Sergeant, 
Thomas 
1822 
 Pomeroy, 
John 
1868 
Cooley, 
Thomas 
1880 
Boyd, 
Carl 
1898 
Hall, 
James 
1913 
Wambaugh, 
Eugene 
1915 
Abate v. Mundt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abby Dodge, The   1 0 0 0 0 0 
Abercrombie v. Dupuis 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ableman v. Booth  0 1 1 0 0 1 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Abrams v. US  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adair v. United States  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Adams v. Brenan  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Adams v. Chicago, B & N R. 
Co. 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
Adams v. Hackett  0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Note and Sources: Compiled by author. This graphic represents a microcosm of the larger database, but these 
decisions and casebooks appear in the Excel case-listing in actuality. The far left column are the cases, and the 
remaining columns each represent a casebook (author and year of publication).  
 
Once all cases were listed, I noted the overlap of cases across the books; the cases cited most often 
across books will be considered leading decisions in constitutional law. Using this case listing method, 
I extracted 12,192 total cases from these fifty-eight casebooks and treatises of which the vast 
majority were not Supreme Court cases. Moreover, 8,391 of these 12,192 cases were cited in only 
one book.51 From this collection, I selected the 388 decisions (of which all but four were Supreme 
Court cases) that overlapped across the books eight times or more, which produced an even 
distribution across history and thus ensured the dataset captured sufficient variation.52  
While the list is weighted toward contemporary casebooks, I drew from almost two centuries 
of casebooks. Drawing casebooks across two centuries’ time allows me to track changes in the 
                                                 
51 This might indicate something about the canon—or lack thereof—of American constitutional law. For a discussion 
the different kinds and objectives of constitutional canons, see Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson. 1998. “The Canons of 
Constitutional Law.” Harvard Law Review 111 (4): 963-1024.   
52 This eight-book cutoff number produced a manageable-sized dataset as well as prevented biasing against decisions that 
were handed down later in American constitutional history. The selection criteria intentionally ends the case sample date 
at 2000, but the casebook sample date ends in 2000. As eight casebooks appear after 2000, a decision in, say, 1999, 
would have to appear in all casebooks in the 21st century in order to appear in the dataset. Since over 8,000 of the just 
over 12,000 cases appeared in only one casebook or treatise, a decision appearing in eight or more books proved to be a 
relatively high rate of appearance.  
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constitutional law canon; I chose casebooks across time beginning with the earliest publication I 
could find (1822) and ending with the most recent (2010). Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of the 
distribution of casebooks used in the dataset.  
 
Figure 2: Casebook Distribution (N=58) 
 
 
Note and Sources: Compiled by author. This is the distribution of the 58 casebooks and treatises 
from which I derived the landmark decisions in my database. The selection criterion for these 
books is outlined above.  
 
 
Key Variables   
 After identifying the judicial decisions that constituted the dataset, I coded for several 
variables. There are three central variables to the dataset: “central state dimensions,” “impact on 
state authority,” and “constitutional issue area.”  To determine if a judicial decision expanded or 
constrained central state authority, my project followed Bensel’s (1990) seven-point central state 
authority framework (see Table 1 below).  
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Central State Dimension and Impact on State Authority  
 The “central state dimension” variable, listed in Table 1, categorized the seven areas of the state 
that could be affected by a judicial decision. These dimensions of state authority identify the specific 
policy area that the Court expanded or restricted in particular decision. This variable is a nominal 
variable coding of the seven areas of the state potentially expanded-restricted by a judicial decision.  
I aimed to capture variation in areas of the state that the Court expanded-restricted in particular eras 
of American history.  This variable allows me to say, for example, what areas of the state the Court 
expanded/restricted in the early republic, in the New Deal Era, in the regulatory era, and so forth. 
 “Impact on state authority” measured whether a judicial decision expands, restricts, or remains 
neutral towards central state authority. This measure consists of three points. “-1” represents a 
judicial decision that restricted state authority; “0” represents a decision that is neutral toward state 
authority; “1” is a decision that expanded some aspect of state authority. I will code the “impact on 
state authority” -1/0/1 for each of Bensel’s seven dimension of central state authority for every 
judicial decision. A decision that enhances any one of Bensel’s (1990) seven dimensions of the 
central state receives a “1” in my coding scheme while a decision that restricts any one of the 
following dimensions receives a “-1” (see Table 1 below). However, the coding is not additive (e.g., 
expansion on two dimensions does not necessarily mean that the decision had a greater effect on 
state authority than a decision that expanded only one dimension).   
 Most importantly, I restricted coding to the text of the majority decision for three reasons. 
First, that was the form the decision was rendered in at the time it was issued (avoiding 
anachronistic readings from later periods when the meaning of the decision may have changed). 
Second, Court opinions are not only public rationales for a ruling because they also serve, as 
bureaucratic rulings, to guide the decisions of the lower courts and, at some remove, litigants 
generally. Moreover, when political institutions and legal actors respond to the Court they are 
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responding to the directives found within the Court’s formal decision thereby necessitating I 
restricted my coding to the text of these decisions. And, last, I am interested in the relationship 
between Court rulings (as formal statements of constitutional interpretation) and the actual impact 
of these rulings on the practice of government. If I conflated formal statements with the impact on 
governance then it would difficult study this relationship. For example, Brown v. Board of Education53 
(1954) meant one thing as a formal interpretation of the Constitution and quite another, for a decade 
or more, in terms of its impact on government practice. Ultimately, the business of the Court 
involves the specification of authority, and the Court can only bestow (or diminish) this authority 
through a text.  
 The areas of the central state are derived from Bensel’s work on the origins of central state 
authority in America.54 This project uses these seven dimensions as the interpretative framework 
through which to assess a constitutional decision’s effect on central state authority as well as to 
discuss the primary findings of these data. Any decision that advances/constricts one or more of 
Bensel’s seven dimensions is interpreted as expanding/restricting overall state authority. Table 1 
enumerates Bensel’s exhaustive central state dimensions. 
 
Table 1: Bensel’s Dimensions of Central State Authority55:  
1. Centralization of authority: Measures involving the transfer of decision-making authority from 
subordinate governments and the citizenry to the central state; in the case of individual citizens, such 
measures do not involve a substantive expansion of central state activity but, only, the allocation of 
influence and control over that activity. In the case of subordinate governments, such measures 
include the review of subordinate government decisions by central state institutions and the form of 
subordinate government participation in central state decision making.  
2. Administrative Capacity: measures involving a broadening or narrowing of bureaucratic 
discretion and long-term planning capacity within the central state; these measures affect only 
                                                 
53 347 U.S. 483 
54 In his study, Bensel compares Union and Confederate state strength along “seven dimensions of central state 
authority.” Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, p. 114). 
55 The following section is taken directly from Bensel (1990, 114). 
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institutions within the central state itself; in analyzing policy, reference is made to a hierarchy based 
on relative insulation from societal or outside political influence.  
3. Citizenship: measures involving the religious practices, political beliefs, ethnic identity, and rights 
and duties of citizens in their relations with the state; this category excludes measures affecting 
property but includes all measures concerning the physical movement and labor of citizens (such as 
conscription). 
4. Control of property: measures involving the control or use of property by individuals or 
institutions other than the central state itself, including expropriation, regulation of the marketplace, 
and labor contracts between private parties.  
5. Creation of client groups: measures that increase the dependence of groups within society upon 
the continued existence and viability of the central state; includes only measures that provide income 
or income substitutes to individuals (pensions, employment by central state institutions, welfare, and 
price-control programs for specific groups in society), that establish future-oriented obligations that 
depend on state viability (the issuance of long-term debt), and that control the value of the currency 
(the gold standard and redemption of paper money).  
6. Extraction: the coercive dimensions of material resources from society into the central state 
apparatus; extraction measures skim wealth and resources from the flow of commerce and 
marketplace transaction without significantly redirecting or influence the volume of these 
transactions (unlike otherwise similar measures falling under the property, client-group, or world 
system dimensions); primarily forms of light taxation or manipulations of the financial system such as 
gradual inflation of the currency.  
7. The central state in the world system: measures concerning the relationship of the central state 
and nation with other states and the world economy; these include access to foreign markets 
(licensing, import quotas, export subsidies, and tariffs), diplomatic relations (membership in 
international organizations, treaties, and military conflict), immigration restrictions, and broadly 
conceived polices of internal development (the construction of a railroad to the Pacific Ocean, the 
Homestead Act, and administration of territorial possessions).  
 
Notes and Sources: Richard F. Bensel. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 
1859-1877. New York: Cambridge University Press (p. 114). Bensel uses this “exhaustive” list to measure the 
comparative strength of the Union and Confederate states.  
 
 
The unit of analysis in my dataset is the judicial decision. In other words, the row in my dataset is 
the decision. After collecting these data, I analyzed them in the context of the institutional 
development of the Court as well as within the broader development of the emergence of the 
modern central state.  
 
 
Constitutional Issue Areas56  
 The issue area comprises seven legal issues adapted from Harold Spaeth’s widely-used 
Supreme Court Database.57 Although this is a broad variable (with multiple issues existing in any 
                                                 
56 These issue areas, and their definitions, are derived from the “Issue Area” variable of Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court 
Database. Accessed here: http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=issueArea 
 
 
38 
 
given case), the constitutional issue represents the most central legal issues in a given decision as 
gleaned from the casebooks and from the treatment according to the LexisNexis “headnotes” and 
summary. Like the central state dimensions, the constitutional issues consist of an exhaustive list of 
issues that may arise under U.S. constitutional law.  
 
Table 2: Constitutional Issue Areas  
1. Individual rights:   
I. Criminal procedure encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the 
due process rights of prisoners. Such as: involuntary confession, habeas corpus, plea 
bargaining, search and seizure, self-incrimination, contempt of court, Miranda warnings, 
right to counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, retroactivity (of newly 
announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights). Often includes: Amendments 
4, 5, 6, 8, and 14.  
II. Civil rights/liberties includes cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including 
American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, 
and alienage. Often includes: Amendments 13, 14, 15, and 19. Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 
1870, 1871, 1875, and 1964.  It also includes the following: 
III. First Amendment58 
IV. Due Process is limited to civil guarantees (but does include criminal due process). Such 
as:  prisoners' rights and defendants' rights,  government taking of property for public use 
(takings clause), impartial decision maker,  Due process rights as written in the Fifth59 
and/or Fourteenth60 Amendments, which encompasses procedural as well as substantive due 
process:  
V. Privacy non-criminal privacy, abortion, use of contraceptives/birth control, right to die, 
Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations 
                                                                                                                                                             
57 The database can be accessed here: http://scdb.wustl.edu/ 
58 First amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or  prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
59 Fifth Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in 
actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
60 Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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VI. Unions encompasses those issues involving labor union activity.  
 
2. Economic Activity is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions (suing 
business entities) and employee actions in relation to employers.  
 
3. Judicial Power/Jurisdiction concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. To the extent 
that a number of these issues concern federal-state court relationships, they may be included in the 
federalism category.  
 
4. Federalism pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the 
states, except for those between the federal and state courts, often includes interstate commerce 
clause, Amendments 10 and 11. It also includes:    
I. Interstate relations not relating to interstate commerce, but including boundary dispute 
between states, miscellaneous interstate conflicts, and non-real property disputes (anything 
that is non-real property is personal property and personal property is anything that isn't 
nailed down, dug into or built onto the land. A house is real property, but a dining room set 
is not). 
 
5. Federal/State Taxation concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes and the general 
extraction of material resources from citizens. Often includes: Amendment 16 
 
6. Private law relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, 
contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. This 
category also pertains to slavery, land claims (mostly state and territorial), and incorporation of 
foreign territories. The passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 gave the Court control of its docket, as a 
result of which such cases have disappeared from the Court's docket in preference to litigation of 
more general applicability.  
 
7. Executive Power pertains to the authority of the president to execute his/her office. Often 
includes Article  
 
Notes and Sources: These issue areas come from Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court Database accessed here: 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=issueArea. They represent an exhaustive list of constitutional 
issues with these data.  
 
 All of the variables and their coding protocol are outlined in detail in the Appendix. This 
coding protocol is both accurate and reliable. I provided and explained this coding protocol to four 
research assistants who remained anonymous to one another. Three of these research assistants were 
exceptional undergraduate students (all upperclassmen) who I taught either in constitutional law-
related writing seminars or lectures previously. I chose them because they were intelligent and 
dedicated to their coursework, and I assumed they would demonstrate the same care toward their 
 
 
40 
 
work for me. More than that, their coursework showed that they were capable of independent 
thinking, applying difficult theories to analyze legal phenomenon. The fourth assistant was a third 
year Fordham Law student who I chose because of his constitutional law coursework. More than the 
undergraduates, he was accustomed to reading difficult judicial decisions, making him a good fit for 
applying a central state authority framework to arcane Court decisions. After I chose these assistants, 
I randomly selected fifteen constitutional decisions from the dataset, asking each assistant to code 
each decision along the constitutional issues and impact on authority variables thus yielding a total 
of 30 outcomes in each set of fifteen decisions. The research assistants matched my coding between 
86% to 93% similarity. Thus the coding protocol is accurate to the interpretation outlined in the 
Appendix as well as fairly reliable in reaching the accurate outcomes.  
 To illustrate the application of these variables, I applied them to three Supreme Court 
decisions from my dataset, decisions that represent the outcomes of restriction and expansion. The 
decisions below were chosen because they are well-known cases in the constitutional canon, come 
from different moments in American constitutional history, and typified the outcomes on the central 
state authority variable.    
 
State Authority and the Supreme Court: Applications of the Variables 
 
 This brief section applies the taxonomy outlined above to three Supreme Court decisions—
Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), and Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954). Coding the judicial decisions that comprise my dataset will require thorough textual analysis 
of each individual decision.  The purpose here is to demonstrate how I code a Court decision as 
either enhancing or restricting national state authority. 
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Barron v. Baltimore (1833): Restriction  
 Barron was decided shortly before Chief Justice John Marshall’s tenure ended in 1835. In this 
case, John Barron was co-owner of a successful wharf in Baltimore’s harbor. As part of a road 
construction project, the city deposited sand and earth into Baltimore harbor, depriving Mr. Barron 
of the deep waters that made his wharf profitable. Because the dirt made the waters around the 
wharf too shallow to dock most vessels. Barron sued, claiming that the city ruined his business and 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights, which provides that the government may not take private 
property without just compensation. The question confronting the Court was: Does the Fifth 
Amendment deny the states as well as the national government the right to take private property for 
public use without justly compensating the property’s owner? 
 In a very brief, unanimous decision, Marshall held that the limitations on government 
articulated in the Fifth Amendment were intended to limit the powers of the national government 
not state governments: “The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United 
States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual 
states” (247). Citing framer intent and the development of the Bill of Rights,61 Marshall argued that 
the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the 
states. 
 Because Marshall declared the Court (part of the central state) had no jurisdiction to hear 
this case, this decision represents a restriction along the “centralization” dimension. Because the 
Court denied its own authority to review the actions of the Maryland state legislature with respect to 
                                                 
61 Of the framers’ intentions with respect the Bill of Rights, Marshall said:   
[I]t is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the constitution of the United 
States, was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those 
powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to 
union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a 
manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments 
to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the 
apprehended encroachments of the general government -- not against those of the local governments (250).  
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property rights, the Court also restricted federal authority along the “property” dimension. In other 
words, the central state—in this case the Supreme Court—had no authority to remedy Mr. Barron’s 
property claim. In confronting questions both about decision-making authority and property, Barron 
thus interacted with two of Bensel’s seven dimensions: centralization and property, restricting the 
central state authority in both realms.  
 With respect to the constitutional questions raised, the most salient issue concerned 
federalism. While Barron raises questions about individual property rights, these questions were 
merely byproducts of the Court’s primary argument: that Maryland, as a state, had the authority to 
regulate property within its boundaries and the Fifth Amendment’s purview extended only to 
national government. In concluding, the Chief Justice wrote, “[T]he provision in the fifth 
amendment to the constitution…is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the 
government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states. We are 
therefore of opinion that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of 
Maryland” (250-51). Here, Marshall indicates the central issue in Barron concerned who has the 
authority to govern and the potential conflict between federal and state rights concerning legislation 
pertaining to property. Thus, Barron is fundamentally about centralization and federalism.  
 Barron demonstrates restriction vis-à-vis the federal-state relationship, but there is another 
way the Court often restricts or expands state authority: through structural reallocation of decision-
making authority exclusively within the central state. In the next decision, Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States, the Court confronts issues concerning only the federal state.62  
 
                                                 
62 Bensel’s Yankee Leviathan argues of his administrative dimension that “since generally accepted administrative 
principles favor the executive bureaucracy over the legislative and judicial branches, statist alternatives are those that 
further the autonomy and discretionary authority of the central state bureaucracy. From the perspective of strong state 
advocates, the least attractive of the major central state institutions is the Congress” (Bensel 1990, 108). This is 
essentially an argument about the “permeability” central state institutions—the more democratic the institution, the less 
statist.   
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Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935): Restriction  
 On December 10, 1931, President Herbert Hoover nominated, and the Senate eventually 
confirmed, William Humphrey as head of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). When Franklin 
Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933 he asked for Humphrey’s resignation since Humphrey, as 
a conservative, might not be sympathetic to many of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies over which 
Humphrey had jurisdiction. When Humphrey refused to resign, Roosevelt fired him. However, the 
FTC Act63 only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office” (623). Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed, his executor sued 
to recover Humphrey’s lost salary. The Court was asked to determine if section 1 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfered with the executive power of the president to 
remove appointees.  
 The Court’s unanimous decision said the FTC Act was constitutional and President 
Roosevelt, given the circumstances, did not have the authority to dismiss Humphrey. The Court 
reasoned that the Constitution had never given “illimitable power of removal” to the president and, 
instead, authority rested with Congress to create agencies of the central government independent of 
executive control:  
We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in 
respect of officers of the character of those just named. The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative 
or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control 
cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during 
which they shall continue in office (629)64 
Humphrey thus limited the power of a more statist branch of the central government (the presidency) 
while expanding the power of a less statist branch (the Congress). In doing so, Humphrey typifies a 
                                                 
63 15 USCS § 41 
64 Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland dismissed the government’s primary defense in this case, which relied heavily 
on the Court’s decision in Myers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court had upheld the president’s right to remove 
officers who were “units in the executive department” (627). Sutherland argued that the FTC was different because 
Congress created the agency to perform quasi-legislative and judicial functions and hence it was not “subject to the 
exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive” (627). The Myers precedent, therefore, did not apply 
in Humphrey.  
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restriction of the administrative capacity dimension and thus its overall impact on central state 
authority is restrictive. In other words, Humphrey constricts the administrative dimension because it 
lodged the authority to control an administrative agency within the less statist branch of the national 
government—the Congress. As Humphrey centered on the president’s removal power, it falls into the 
“executive power” constitutional issue area. 
 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954): Expansion  
 Brown v. Board of Education expanded central state authority. In Topeka, Kansas, the school 
board denied black children admission to public schools attended by white children under local laws 
mandating race segregation. White and black schools, in Topeka, were generally equally endowed in 
terms buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. The central question in Brown was did 
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment? Despite the equal endowment 
of the schools by “objective” criteria, the Court held that intangible psychological issues foster and 
maintain inequality. More specifically, racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect 
on minority children because it is interpreted as a public judgment of inferiority. Consequently, the 
Court rejected the long-held doctrine, first promulgated in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), that segregated 
facilities were permissible provided they were equal.  The unanimous decision invalidated state-
maintained racial separation in educational settings.  
 Brown conferred rights on blacks by expanding their national citizenship rights and thus 
diminished local state authority to promote segregationist laws. Here, the Court rested its justification 
on the importance of public school education in shaping democratic citizens:  
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship (493).  
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Any state policy that obstructed the creation of “good citizenship,” then, was unconstitutional. In 
Brown, the policy, of course, was state mandated segregation and, according to the Court, such 
segregation impeded the education of African-Americans:  
To separate [African-Americans] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of 
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn (494).  
 
Brown, therefore, falls along one of the seven dimensions in the above taxonomy, citizenship.  
 In addition to the citizenship dimension, the decision also falls within the “centralization” 
dimension. The Court moved the authority to determine citizenship (education) rights from 
state/local governments to the federal Supreme Court. Brown thus brought a policy area (education) 
under federal sovereignty. In the end, Brown expanded the private rights of African-Americans by 
consolidating authority over questions such as education in the hands of the central government. To 
that extent, the Court simultaneously contracted local governmental authority and expanded central 
state authority, indicating that Brown’s primary legal issues concerned civil rights.  
 The decisions above exemplify how the Court influences central state expansion vis-à-vis 
Bensel’s seven dimensions. Delineating the central state along these attributes enables us to examine 
American state expansion in a nuanced and systematic way. 
Justifications for Casebook Design  
 
A few words justifying the project’s casebook design are necessary. I am concerned with 
constitutional law decisions because these decisions mainly deal with the nation state’s relation to its 
citizens. Hence, the use of constitutional law casebooks to create a dataset of salient decisions across 
U.S. history. Critics may argue that including what scholars see as the most salient, “principal” cases 
may will lead to oversampling decisions that increase state authority and under-sample ones that do 
not. That is, scholars might likely consider “prominent” decisions as the ones that only increased 
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state authority. However, two factors temper this potential problem. First, I found great variation in 
the degree to which these cases expand/constrain state authority because of the typical 
constitutional law curriculum in law schools (and thus the casebook used to teach this curriculum). 
More specifically, constitutional law casebooks are organized along two themes I.) structural and 
governmental powers and II.) individual rights. These two overarching divisions present divergent 
predictions of the path of central state development. With respect to governmental power, the 
expectation is that the Court facilitates central state growth over time. By contrast, in the realm of 
individual rights, the Court’s negative rights interpretation of the Constitution enables the restriction 
of the reach and scope of rights afforded by the federal government. Second, salient judicial 
decisions selected for inclusion in casebooks are worthy of study; they are the decisions that, over 
time, legal educators have deemed the most important for the teaching of legal principles. 
Consequently, the most salient cases should be the ones initially included, but as I expand the 
dataset, I will include less salient cases. 
But, there also remains the problem of editor bias. Constitutional decisions that might have 
been salient in one period (because they were still “live” law in that lawyers had to learn) might not 
have been salient in another period (when the holding had been superseded by one or more 
subsequent rulings). To counter this problem, I created my dataset based on casebooks published 
from across time because whether or not a historical decision is now “live law” is irrelevant for my 
project; such a decision (whether live or not) still affected state development and thus needs to be 
included in the dataset. Moreover, there are many casebooks in my list (especially in the present era) 
from the same era. The post-2000 era, for example, contains eight casebooks. Accordingly, any 
ideological or political editorial biases will not skew my results because I have included the spectrum 
of views in the casebook list.    
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Thus, using casebooks, and the salient decisions therein, is a sound way to assemble my 
dataset. This is because salient decisions are those that guide the decisions of the lower courts in 
making their own rulings as well as guide lawyers when they decide whether or not to litigate. Salient 
decisions, for that reason, do almost all the “work” of hindering or facilitating central state 
development; they influence a wide range of legal thinking and activity thereby affecting many more 
decisions than the one for which the salient decision is named.  In fact, many non-salient decisions 
not included in casebooks can be interpreted as the descendants of one or more “salient” decisions. 
Considered in this way, it is not presently necessary to include non-casebook decisions in my dataset.  
The data derived from this design will prove useful in assessing important interpretations of 
the growth of central state power. The next chapter presents these data and shows that the Court 
expands and restricts state authority yet, overall, constitutional interpretation has facilitated much of 
the growth of the American state.  
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Chapter 3: The Constitutional Foundations of American Central State 
Expansion 
 
That the judicial power of the United States will lean strongly in favour of the general government, and will 
give such an explanation to the Constitution, as will favour an extension of its jurisdiction, is very evident 
from a variety of considerations.  
 -Brutus, Letter XI, 31 January 1788  
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 Recently scholars have presented impressive evidence demonstrating the strengths of the 
early American central state, but a broader discussion of state strength over time has yet to be seen.65  
In order to further our understanding of state development, this chapter analyzes the dataset 
outlined in the previous chapter. Chapter 3 presents the descriptive findings from these data and 
reaches several conclusions. Chapters 4-6 frame and interpret these findings.  
  First, the Court tends to expand central state authority over time especially through 
centralization—that is, by transferring decision-making authority from the states to the federal 
government. Second, the division between “weak” and “strong” obscures our understanding of state 
development66; indeed, Court decisions frequently alternate between the expansion and restriction of 
authority, thus revealing the difficulty in dubbing the state “strong” or “weak” at least from the field 
of constitutional law. These findings cast doubt on the standard developmental narrative and show 
that the rate of state expansion remains relatively static across time, even during critical junctures. 
This chapter provides an overview of the Court’s role in statebuilding not just from between the 
Progressive to New Deal eras but from the Founding until the present day. The Court did much to 
advance the powers of the central government along federalism and individual rights as well as along 
the centralization and citizenship dimensions discussed in Chapter 2.  
                                                 
65 See footnote 7 above.  
66 Peter Baldwin (2005) makes a similar argument in “Beyond Weak and Strong: Rethinking the State in Comparative 
Policy History.” Journal of Policy History 17, 1: 12-33. He calls for more a nuanced analysis of state strength: “[States] may 
not be consistently laissez-faire or interventionist, but be so in one respect and the opposite in another,” 19.  
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Central State Dimensions and Constitutional Issues  
 
 The standard narrative of constitutional development argues that, from 1870-1920, the 
Court inhibited American state expansion then, in 1937, an amalgam of exogenous factors quickly 
shifted the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence so that it accepted a larger and more powerful 
central government. This kind of “punctuated equilibrium” model, however, draw too sharp of a 
distinction between normal politics and moments of constitutional change.67  
 Rather than punctuated change, constitutional development is better conceived as what 
Orren and Skowronek have termed “layered political development.” They underscore that 
punctuated equilibrium models, by contrasting “normal” politics with moments of exogenous 
disruption, obscure “a good deal of what is characteristic about politics and…political change” 
(Orren and Skowronek 1994, 320).68  They encourage scholars to focus, instead, on the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in politics. While the state expands in myriad ways, the judiciary offers a 
unique view of state expansion because it reviews the governing authority of other political 
institutions. Studying the Court in this way recognizes the tensions inherent in constitutional 
development and decision-making.  
 
 
 
                                                 
67 For an example of this model see Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Adam Sheingate’s (2003) study argues against punctuated equilibrium 
models as a way to understand institutional change. Focusing on political entrepreneurship, he contends that “an 
endogenous account of institutional change would appreciate the way institutions themselves make change possible and 
therefore would not rely on the occurrence of some exogenous shock or event to explain when and how change takes 
place” (Sheingate 2003, 186, emphasis original). “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American 
Political Development.” Studies in American Political Development 17 (2003): 185-203. Similarly, Kimberly Johnson’s study of 
Congress and federalism also argues against the punctuated equilibrium model (Johnson 2007, 7–9).   
68 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. 1994. “Beyond the Iconography of Order” in Lawrence Dodd and Calvin 
Jillson, eds. The Dynamics of American Politics, Westview Press. 
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The Court and Central State Expansion: Descriptive Findings  
 
 This section reports the findings when Bensel’s framework, as outlined in Chapter 2, is 
applied to the constitutional decisions comprising the dataset. The dataset design produced a total of 
388 decisions. The findings show that the Supreme Court has moved back and forth between 
contraction and expansion of state authority across constitutional development. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
display the histogram distribution of the leading decisions across year and across influence on 
national government power.  
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Landmark Decisions Across Years, 1789-1997 (N=388)  
 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. This graphic arrays the frequency of all 
leading casebook decisions contained within the dataset with a bin size set at 5. 
Important to note is that each quarter-century contains at least thirty landmark 
decisions. The number of decisions is generally greater toward the present day because 
casebooks were also weighted toward the present day, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Cases Affecting Central State Authority, 1789-1997 (N=388)    
 
 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. This distribution represents an important trend 
of American constitutional development—that it generally expanded the powers of the 
federal government. The trend in this chart reveals that the Court did much to expand 
federal power through its constitutional interpretation. Of the 388 decisions, 141 restricted 
authority, 8 remained neutral, and 239 expanded governing authority. Important to note is 
that we see only the overall impact on federal government power; the impact on each of the 
seven central state dimensions is presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 in this chapter and in 
Figure 14 in the Appendix. 
 
 
While expansion remains the largest of the three categories, the Court also frequently restricted state 
development. Figure 4 portrays this distribution over time. The line chart shows us that 
constitutional development expands and restricts governing authority throughout history.  
 The Court’s expansive and restrictive decisions, however, consistently grows farther apart. 
Below, Figure 4 considers time as it maps the number of constitutional decisions influence on 
overall state authority. Decisions that expand grow at a far quicker rate than those that restrict 
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especially after 1900. More than that, Figure 4 demonstrates that expansive decisions grow at a faster 
rate than restrictive decisions throughout all of American constitutional history.  
 
Figure 4: Cumulative Frequency of Constitutional Decisions Impact on Central State Authority,  
1789-1997 (N=388) 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. This cumulative frequency chart shows the relatively 
steady growth of decisions that both expand and restrict federal government power. Around 
1900, decisions that restrict experienced a more gradual growth rate while expansion decisions 
experience a faster growth rate.  
 
 
 Nevertheless, the story of American constitutional development rests largely on the push 
and pull between expanding and restricting the federal government’s power. Breaking down the 
Court’s behavior across quarter centuries reveals a more detailed look at the Court’s impact on 
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national power so Figure 5.1 maps these cumulative frequencies across quarter-centuries. In Figure 
5.1 we begin to see a more detailed relationship between decisions that restrict and expand than we 
see in the overall cumulative frequency. The founding period witnessed the greatest disparity 
between decisions that expand and those that restrict while the period that followed (1825-1849) saw 
roughly an equal number of decisions that expand restrict federal power. After around 1874 the 
decisions mirror each other’s trajectory, that is, the shape of their lines resemble one another, but 
restrictive decisions nevertheless remain less frequent.  
 
Figure 5.1: Impact on Central State Authority Line Chart across Quarter-Centuries, 1789-1997 
(N=388) 
 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. The graph plot the number of 
decisions in each quarter-century, presenting the relationship among the three 
outcomes on central state authority across constitutional history. Expanding 
and restricting decisions follow similar patterns to one another after 1874. 
Before 1874, however, developmental patterns do not follow as neat of a 
pattern. The disparity between decisions that expand and decisions that restrict 
is greatest during the founding until about the Jacksonian era (1789-1824).  
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 Figure 5.2 simply takes the line chart above and transforms it into a clustered bar chart, 
across quarter centuries, allowing these frequencies to be compared more precisely side by side. It is 
clear that while restriction declined in the twentieth century, it remained a prominent feature 
throughout constitutional development. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court, contrary to well-known 
accounts,69 handed down many decisions expanding central state authority between 1875 and 1920. 
Typically, the Court is depicted as inhibiting central state growth, but Figure 5.2 demonstrates the 
opposite: the Court was active in advancing important dimensions of central state authority.  
 Still using the quarter centuries in Figure 5.2, the ratio of state expansion graph (Figure 5.3) 
reveals a relatively static picture of constitutional development post-1900; constitutional 
development vis-à-vis central state authority did not shift too far from the average rate of expansion 
across quarter-centuries. But before 1900, constitutional development fluctuated more widely than it 
did post-1900. Figure 5.3 maps the rate of expansion as a ratio across time, supporting Figure 5.2 in 
showing that some supposed periods of restriction (i.e. 1875-1920) show more variation than we 
think, and other periods (like the New Deal era) witness more stasis than we think.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 For example, Stephen Skowronek’s (1982) Building a New American State and Howard Gillman’s (1993) Constitution 
Besieged both of which see the Court as a the foil in efforts to build the American state. See Chapter 2 (pages 23-27) for a 
more detailed discussion.  
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Figure 5.2: Clustered-Bart Chart of State Authority across Quarter-Centuries, 1789-1997 (N=378) 
 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. For the purpose of this graph, neutral outcomes were 
not included because they comprise only 10 of the 388 decisions in these data. We see here that 
the Court persistently expanded the federal government’s power but not without significantly 
restricting central state power throughout constitutional history. Important to note is that 
number of decisions that expand become much larger in the twentieth century yet that ratio 
between expansion-restriction stabilizes in this period, too, as demonstrated in Figure 5.3 below. 
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Figure 5.3: Ratio of Central State Expansion across Quarter Centuries (N=378) 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. Neutral decision were not included. The ratio is a 
function of the number of decisions that expanded authority over the total number of 
decisions in a given quarter-century era. The Y-line is set at the mean rate of expansion (.63). 
This graphic maps Figure 6.2 (the clustered bar chart) as a line chart. Until the twentieth 
century, there was much greater fluctuation in the rate of state expansion yet, even during 
the slowest rates of state-building, the Court’s decisions expanded governmental power over 
half the time. 
 
 The ratio of state expansion (Figure 5.3) tells us a great deal about the evolution of the 
constitutional interpretation pertaining to state authority: it has not changed a whole lot. Surely, the 
interpretation of the federal government’s specific powers have changed immensely, but the overall 
impact on the growth of the state has not. Taking the long view, the Court has not focused on the 
general domain of authority but has, instead, usually ruled on whether or not central state authority 
should be expanded in particular policy areas. Moreover, the punctuated equilibrium depictions of 
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the New Deal are put into question with Figure 5.3. This Figure has implications for the standard 
interpretation of the New Deal as a critical juncture, which, it is held, witnessed an abrupt shift in 
federal government authority.70  On the contrary, Figure 5.3 shows that the process of change was 
far more gradual than typically posited.  While Figures 3 through 5 offer sweeping characterizations 
of the Court’s role in state development, incorporating the seven central state dimensions and 
constitutional issues yields a more nuanced story than Figures 3 through 5 allow. 
 Two constitutional issues dominate the Court’s jurisprudence—individual rights and 
federalism.71 Federalism pertains to decisions concerning the relationship between national and state 
governments (often Commerce Clause related) while individual rights concerns the government’s 
control over individuals. Individual rights decision do not become prominent in the data until after 
1870 when we see a steep increase in the frequency of these decisions, which surpasses the 
federalism decisions by around 1920. By contrast, federalism steadily rises throughout American 
constitutional history. Figure 6.1 demonstrates these trends along seven legal issue areas.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Cushman’s Rethinking the New Deal and White’s Constitution and the New Deal also push against the standard 
interpretation that the New Deal was an abrupt turning point in constitutional development. See footnote 35 above.   
71 See the Appendix for definitions of each constitutional issue area.  
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Figure 6.1: Cumulative Frequency of Constitutional Decisions across Issue Areas, 1789-1997 
(N=388) 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. The legend displays legal issues in descending order with the 
frequency line corresponding with the legend (e.g. Individual Rights is the most frequent thus it is at 
the top of the legend). By measuring these frequencies, this chart tracks the evolution of seven 
different legal issue areas. A more fine-grained legal issue variable includes sixteen categories (Figure 
6.2 below), but for the purposes of visual display, this graphic collapses sixteen issues into seven. 
“Individual rights,” for example, includes issues of procedural and substantive due process, criminal 
procedure, First Amendment, and civil rights and liberties decisions. Most telling is that individual 
rights and federalism decisions comprise the vast majority of decisions in the data.   
 
The crosstabulation seen in Table 3 examines these constitutional issue areas with respect to their 
impact on central state authority. All legal issues both expand and restrict central state authority save 
executive power, but at twelve total decisions, there are not enough cases within executive power to 
draw any conclusions.  
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Table 3: Crosstabulation of Constitutional Issue Area by Impact on Federal Authority, 1789-1997 
(N=388) 
 
 
                             Constitutional Issue Area  
Impact on Central State Authority                 
Total   Restrict    Neutral      Expand 
 
Individual Rights 
Count 70 3 99 172 
% of Total 18.0% 0.8% 25.5% 44.3% 
Economic Activity 
Count 7 1 8 16 
%  1.8% 0.3% 2.1% 4.1% 
Judicial Power 
Count 14 5 18 37 
%  3.6% 1.3% 4.6% 9.5% 
Federalism 
Count 23 0 67 90 
%  5.9% 0.0% 17.3% 23.2% 
Taxation 
Count 12 0 21 33 
%  3.1% 0.0% 5.4% 8.5% 
Private Action 
Count 11 0 17 28 
%  2.8% 0.0% 4.4% 7.2% 
Executive Power 
Count 2 1 9 12 
%  0.5% 0.3% 2.3% 3.1% 
                             Total 
Count 139 10 239 388 
% of Total 35.8% 2.6% 61.6% 100.0% 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. The crosstab indicates that individual rights and federalism decisions are 
most abundant in the data and that each issue tends generally toward the expansion of federal power.   
 
 Graphing Table 3 into clustered bar chart offers a more fine-grained look at constitutional 
issues’ impact on federal power. Figure 6.2 disaggregates the constitutional issues into further 
categories, offering a more nuanced depiction of the legal issues. First Amendment and federalism 
decisions greatly expand federal government power.  
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Figure 6.2: Impact on Federal Authority by Constitutional Issue, 1789-1997 (N=388) 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. This chart disaggregates the constitutional issues 
see above in Figure 7.1 and Table 2 into sixteen different issue areas. Notably, First 
Amendment and federalism decisions enhance federal government control over lower 
governments and citizens. More than that, in virtually every legal issue area the Court 
expanded the powers of the national government. As noted in Chapter 2, these issue areas 
come from Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court Database accessed here: 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=issueArea 
 
 
Because individual rights and federalism comprise almost 68% of all the decisions, it is worth 
exploring the two central state dimensions72 that touch closely upon these constitutional issues: the 
centralization and citizenship dimensions. Centralization involves the transfer of decision-making 
                                                 
72 See Table 1 above for a list of all seven dimensions.  
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authority from the individual states or citizens to the national government. And citizenship pertains 
to issues concerning individual rights. Consequently, these two dimensions interact with civil rights 
and federalism frequently.   
 Of the seven dimensions, centralization and citizenship are the most frequent—nearly 50% 
of all decisions interact with citizenship while 94% of all decisions interact with centralization. 
Indeed, the development of the centralization dimension looks identical to the development of the 
overall impact on central state authority seen in Figure 4.73 The graphs in Figure 7.1 juxtapose the 
development of citizenship and centralization dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Figure 4 graphs the overall impact on central state authority, that is, the change of any one of the seven central state 
dimensions. Thus, as Chapter 2 details, “overall impact” is not separate from the seven central state dimensions. For 
example, if a decision restricted/expanded the centralization dimension then that would also indicate a 
restriction/expansion of the overall impact on authority. However, simply because these two variables (central state 
dimensions and overall impact) are intimately linked does not explain why the centralization dimension—more than any 
other dimension—is the most abundant in these data.  
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Figure 7.1: Frequency of Citizenship and Centralization Dimensions, 1789-1997 
  
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. There is much fluctuation on both these dimension 
of the central state. Between 1920 and 1970, the citizenship dimension saw a surge in decisions 
that expanded the federal government’s control over this dimension. Conversely, the 
centralization dimension did not experience as long-lasting of a surge in decisions that either 
expanded or restrict control over this dimension.   
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Like many of the graphs above, Figure 7.1 indicates that both central state dimensions fluctuated 
between expansion and restriction. Nevertheless, expansion is the predominant outcome over time, 
especially in the centralization graph, as the cumulative frequency graphs below in Figure 7.2 also 
demonstrate. Expansion is persistently the more frequent outcome for centralization while -
expansion-restriction stays much closer together for citizenship until around 1940 when decisions 
that expand federal power rise dramatically.  
 
Figure 7.2: Cumulative Frequency of Citizenship and Centralization Dimensions, 1789-1997 
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Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. These graphics take a cumulative count of the 
expansion-restriction decisions under the centralization and citizenship dimensions, first 
displayed in Figure 7.1. Important to note that expansive decisions within centralization always 
outweigh restrictive decisions, which resembles the pattern of overall impact on state authority 
displayed above in Figure 4. In contrast, expansive-restrictive decisions within citizenship grow 
at nearly the same rate until 1940 when these decisions diverge greatly. After 1940, decisions 
that expand the federal government’s authority along the citizenship dimension grow sharply.  
 
 
 From the foregoing discussion, we see that the Court’s interpretation of constitutional law 
both advances and constricts the federal government’s authority, and it does so primarily through 
the medium of individual rights and federalism. That the central government’s authority expands 
more frequently than not comes as no surprise, but we do not yet know why this happens. Figure 
7.2 seems to indicate that this expansion occurs largely through the channel of centralization, that is, 
through the transfer of decision-making authority from subordinate governments to the central 
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government—a hallmark of American constitutional development.74 At bottom, constitutional 
development deals with who has the authority to decide,75 and this question is enshrined by 
constitutional design.  
 Any of the central state dimensions can theoretically involve any of the legal issue areas. The 
stacked bar chart (Figure 8.1) below shows the ubiquity of centralization across the constitutional 
issue areas. The bar chart represents the number of decisions (and their corresponding legal issue 
areas) that fall under the centralization; every legal issue entails some form of centralization and 
nearly every judicial decision (363 of 388) interacts with centralization. The constitutional issue areas 
do not fall neatly into each of the seven dimensions; there is some overlap among legal issues and 
central state dimensions. For example, “federalism” does not fall solely under the centralization 
dimension, as one might think; 76  it is also seen as the primary legal issue in some individual rights-
related decisions (Figure 8.2), though to a far lesser extent than in the centralization dimension. 
Similarly, individual rights decisions affect not only the citizenship dimension, as we might suspect, 
                                                 
74 Others have recognized that transferring of governing authority typifies constitutional development, but that 
transference often centers of the emerging “modern state” of the New Deal era. See, for example, Keith Whittington 
“Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism.” Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 483 (1997): 483-528. Whittington argues that the “logic of the modern state” of the early twentieth century 
“favored centralization of political authority and influence” (Whittington 1997, 489). I agree with this interpretation, but 
I would also argue that the Court’s interpretation of constitutional law began centralizing political authority long before 
the emergence of the “modern state.” 
75 This claim is supported by David Robertson’s comprehensive study of American federalism, which argues that the 
Framers created “a double battleground.” The first pertains to battles fought in every country, “whether the government 
should do something about health, welfare, the economy…” The second battleground touches upon the question of 
who decides; Robertson says this battleground “turns on which level of government should have the power to choose 
whether to act.” David Robertson. 2012. Federalism and the Making of America. (New York, NY: Routledge), p. 35.  
76 Since federalism is a question about national versus state governing authority, one might logically assume that it would 
fall entirely within the centralization dimension. While federalism nearly always pertains to centralization, there are a 
couple decisions where it involves a dimension other than centralization.   
 For example, Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288 (1936) involved not the centralization but the 
administrative, property, and world system dimensions. In this case, the Court held that Congress did not exceed its 
power by creating the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a government corporation created as part of the New Deal to 
improve the economy. Ashwander concerned the creation of a federal agency, the TVA, to advance the long-term 
regional planning capacity of the central state (administrative dimension); and it dealt with the TVA’s acquisition of 
property and equipment of a private power company (property dimension). Last, the Court argued that the Wilson 
Damn—from which the TVA generated electricity—had been built originally for national defense: to produce materials 
involved in munitions manufacturing and thus the federal government could assert authority (world system dimension).  
 Nevertheless, eighty-three of eighty-five federalism decisions implicated the centralization dimension. 
However, the vast majority touched upon more than simply centralization: forty-nine decisions affected two central state 
dimensions, and nineteen dimensions concerned three central state dimensions.  
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but also the centralization dimension (Figures 8.1).  Unlike centralization, the citizenship dimension 
does primarily comprise one legal issue area: civil rights/liberties, but nevertheless, it does entail a 
handful of other legal issues at times.  
 
Figure 8.1: Constitutional Issues as a Subset of Centralization (N=388) 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. In this stacked bar chart, federalism decisions, the 
tallest column, primarily fall under the “centralization” dimension. Only a very small portion of 
federalism cases do not involve centralization as indicated by the dotted “neutral” category. By 
contrast, the striped (restrict) and white (expand) patterns indicate that when a federalism 
decision expanded or restricted central state authority, it did so typically through centralization. 
This graphic shows the prevalence of centralization in American constitutional development 
across a multitude of legal issues.   
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Figure 8.2: Constitutional Issues as a Subset of Citizenship (N=193) 
 
 
Notes and Source: Compiled by author. Because almost 200 decisions did not implicate the 
citizenship dimension they were not included. Individual rights decisions—criminal procedure, civil 
rights/liberties, First Amendment, and due process—mainly comprise the citizenship dimension as 
indicated by the columns on the far left. But much like “centralization,” “citizenship” does not solely 
subsume individual rights related constitutional issue areas as we might expect. Some federalism and 
judicial power issue areas, for example, involve the citizenship dimension, albeit to a far lesser extent 
than the individual rights issue areas. It is important to note that constitutional issues, as seen in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2, do not fall neatly into a single dimension of the central state.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 The data presented here reveal two facts about constitutional development: 1.) there is a bias 
toward state expansion and yet 2.) there is still considerable variation, over time, between decisions 
that expand and restrict authority. By coding hundreds of decisions along seven dimensions of the 
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federal government, we are able to see when and where the central state grew in authority. The 
persistent expansion of the “centralization” dimension begins to show us that the unsettled 
boundary between state and national authority was an integral part of American constitutional 
development. Additionally, even decisions that were not overtly about centralization (like the 
individual rights decisions) still had at their foundation questions about who (i.e. what level of 
government) had the authority to regulate individual rights. Focusing on watershed moments in 
political development, current theories of American political development do not currently 
recognize these patterns.77 The data here, however, reveals the similarities across periods of history 
and, as such, theories of American political development might benefit from considering the nature 
of the Constitution in structuring state development as opposed to looking at exogenous moments 
of “shock” to explain change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Recently, Karen Orren put forth a “theory of the Constitution” that views “each period of major constitutional 
development [Founding, Reconstruction, New Deal] was driven in significant part by a preceding crisis in the 
enforcement of criminal law” (Orren 2012, 72). Orren. “Doing Time: A Theory of the Constitution.” Studies in American 
Political Development 26 (April 2012): 71-81, p. 72. Orren’s theory gets us to think holistically about the Constitution and 
development, but it still focuses our attention on “critical junctures.” The data presented in this chapter, however, 
attempts to show that even during moments of great change the Court never really strays too far in either expanding or 
constricting state development.  
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Chapter 4: Structures of Constitutional Development 
 
The question of the relation of the states to the federal government is the cardinal question of our 
constitutional system. At every turn of our national development we have been brought face to face with it, and 
no definition either of statesmen or of judges has ever quieted or decided it. It cannot, indeed, be settled by the 
opinion of any one generation because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political and 
economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new question. 
  --Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University, 190878  
 
 
Introduction 
 Americans’ skepticism and ambivalence toward central state power is as old as the republic 
itself.79 This ambivalence toward central state government rests on an interpretation of the United 
States as a liberal polity, a polity of limited government designed to protect private rights from 
public interference. This interpretation rejects classical notions of the public good and instead 
recognizes that the founders left individuals to seek their own self-interest (Morone 1998, 15). 
American Political Development scholars have long noted—if not the anti-statism shared in political 
culture—then the virtual absence of a central state in the U.S.80 Indeed, the APD field is largely 
premised on the comparatively weak American central state, which stemmed from this skepticism of 
                                                 
78 Woodrow Wilson. 1908. The Constitutional Government in the United States. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 
p. 173.  
79 In Democratic Wish, James Morone points out that both republican communitarian and liberal individualistic 
conceptions of democratic ideology share one thing:  “each rests on a suspicion of government” (Morone 1998, 8). For a 
nice overview of the American “dread of government” see Morone (1998, 2-4); Part I (33-145) is devoted to 
demonstrating how this fear of central state power ironically helped build the American state (Morone 1998). In fact, this 
ambivalence, Morone contends, was what precisely led to a larger, administrative central state; this is the “great irony” of 
American political development that animates Morone’s narrative: “the search for more democracy builds up 
bureaucracy” (Morone 1998, 1). Like most studies within the APD tradition, Morone understands “state-building” as the 
creation of a centralized, bureaucratic administration. Moving beyond this conception, my study allows us to see where 
the tentacles of the central state expanded into other policy realms.   
80 This sentiment is shared not just by APD scholars. German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel thought the United States had 
no state at all—without a bureaucracy, a national culture, or a monarch to represent the permanent interests of the 
national community (Hegel quoted in Skowronek 1982, 6-7). See also Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover, 
1956), 84-87. Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is also remembered for recognizing the relative statelessness in 
the U.S. Of the “administration in New England,” Tocqueville wrote, “Nothing is more striking to a European traveler 
in the United States than the absence of what we term the Government, or the Administration. Written laws exist in 
America, and one sees that they are daily executed; but although everything is in motion, the hand which gives the 
impulse to the social machine can nowhere be discovered” (Tocqueville 2003, 51–52). Distinctions between state and 
society, according to Tocqueville, were difficult to discern.  
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state power.81 Yet, despite Americans’ fear of state power, Chapter 3 revealed the persistent 
expansion of the federal state vis-à-vis constitutional development. Chapter 4 will explain the effects 
of a dual sovereign design on constitutional development and the importance of this design was in 
the debates surrounding central state power, debates that persisted during the emergence of the 
modern central state (the focus of Chapter 5).82 In particular, the founders’ establishment of federal 
and state sovereigns left unanswered many questions of political authority that the Court had to later 
address.83 These murky boundaries help explain why constitutional development consistently 
expanded and restricted state power.  
 Ultimately, Chapter 4 frames some of the findings overviewed in Chapter 3. The previous 
chapter has shown an important pattern in constitutional development: that while state power 
consistently grows, it also experiences regular restrictions on its growth. Thus, Chapter 4 charts 
some of the legal doctrines and constitutional interpretations that facilitated expansion with a focus 
on the centrality of federalism—that is, the constitutional relationship between national and state 
governments—in constitutional development. American skepticism of central state power belies the 
                                                 
81 APD began as an enterprise based upon the idea that the American state was weak—or absent—compared to Western 
European nation-states. The comparison to Europe focused less on what the American state had than what it did not 
have: a consolidated national executive branch with an extensive civil service system. See (Skowronek 1982) and (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) for examples of these comparative analyses of state strength. The American 
exceptionalism at root in this field centered on the lack of a national administrative welfare state and thus on the 
historical period when Europe developed such a welfare state and the United States did not: from around the 
Progressive era to the New Deal. Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol's (1988) edited volume, The Politics of Social Policy in the United 
States, expanded on these ideas of the American state as especially diffuse and lacking in capacity. The Court’s 
constitutional evolution, however, challenges some of these narratives that focus more narrowly on the administrative 
welfare state.  
  I realize, however, that central state weakness and anti-statism are not synonymous. Nevertheless, if the 
American central state did, in fact, lack a strong central state, then this was due in no small part to the anti-statist ideas 
that made their way into the design of the Constitution. As this chapter will discuss, the fear of a strong central state 
contributed greatly to America’s federalist structure, a structure that created two sovereigns—the state governments and 
the federal government—whose boundaries of powers would be—and continue to be—determined largely by the 
Supreme Court.  
82 Chapter 5 will discuss how the Court played a pivotal role in navigating between these two sovereigns especially 
between 1870 and 1920 during the emergence of the American modern state. 
83 David Robertson recognizes this in his article “Madison’s Opponents and Constitutional Design,” American Political 
Science Review 99, 2 (2005): 225-243. His article understands constitutional design, like this dissertation does, as an 
independent variable that influences the behavior of political actors by allocating authority and providing “legally defined 
constraints, opportunities, and incentives” (Simeon 2009, 242). Richard Simeon, “Constitutional Design and Change in 
Federal Systems: Issues and Questions, Publius 39, 2 (2009): 241-261.  
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empirical reality of the constitutional development. This is puzzling because we often interpret 
American political culture as largely anti-statist and because we believe that the period before 1870 
was when federalism impinged state development. On the contrary, however, the ambiguity in the 
design of federalism—and the boundaries of powers allotted to America’s two sovereigns—has 
been a political idea that the Court has wrestled with since the founding.   
 Given the finding that the centralization dimension—the idea of who decides—is 
fundamental to development, the constitutional design of federalism helps explains the ebb and flow 
depicted in chapter 3. Centralization, as the most frequent dimension represented, shows us that the 
trajectory of constitutional development has much to do with the allotment of decision-making 
authority between the states and the federal government. One place to examine this idea’s effect on 
constitutional development is the Founding era and the early republic where distributing powers 
between these two levels of governments was paramount.  In designing America’s Constitution, the 
founders nearly ensured that the debate over the boundaries between state and federal sovereignty 
would color constitutional development, reaching a crescendo during the emergence of the modern 
state—the focus of Chapter 5.  
 
Constitutional Design at the Founding: Federal versus State Sovereignty 
 
 The Constitutional Convention comprised two main groups—broad nationalists and narrow 
nationalists. Broad nationalists such as James Madison of Virginia sought to build a very strong 
central government that had complete authority over tax, commerce, and defense. These broad 
nationalists aimed to diminish state governments’ powers and relegate states to a secondary role in 
American government. By contrast, narrow nationalists like Roger Sherman of Connecticut, 
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supported only a few and limited national powers.84 Sherman and his supporters believed that states 
should remain the locus of power, governing most of American life, as the states did under the 
Articles of Confederation (Robertson 2012, 19).85 The Convention, then, pivoted on negotiating 
between the preferences of broad and narrow nationalists, ensuring the Constitution would enshrine 
an amalgam of vague boundaries between state and national governing authority.   
 The compromise between these two groups produced what Madison called a “compound 
republic”86 that left the relationship between national and state authority imprecise (Robertson 2012, 
34). Given the ambiguous nature of national and state powers, the framers of the Constitution were 
aware that the boundary lines of governing authority would produce persistent conflicts over time. 
Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee, suspected author of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, noted that 
the extent of national authority would be left for subsequent politicians to determine:  
The powers of this [national] government as has been observed, extend to internal as well as external objects, 
and to those objects to which all others are subordinate; it is almost impossible to have a just conception of 
                                                 
84 Robertson’s Federalism and the Making of America carefully details the arguments for both the broad and narrow 
nationalists, see chapter 2. For a detailed discussion of Roger Sherman’s pivotal role at the Convention see Robertson’s 
(2005) “Madison’s Opponents and Constitutional Design,” p. 231-235. (Robertson 2005a) 
85 Prominent Anti-federalist literature underscored the importance of states’ rights. After the Convention adjourned, and 
during state ratification of the proposed Constitution, Anti-federalist and Federalists alike took to persuading their fellow 
citizens of their perspectives. The Antifederalist, “John DeWitt,” penned a number of articles circulated among his 
fellow Massachusetts citizens. He feared an enlarged central state, claiming the proposed Constitution asks the states and 
their citizens to “invest the new Congress with powers, which you have yet thought proper to withhold from your own 
present government” (John DeWitt, II, 27 October 1787), accessed 12 October 2013:  
http://www.constitution.org/afp/dewitt02.htm.  
 Other Anti-federalists agreed with DeWitt. After the Pennsylvania Convention ratified the new Constitution in 
December of 1787, a dissenting address appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, which was subsequently 
reprinted in many other states. Judging by similarities between the author of “Centinel,” Samuel Bryan, and the 
Pennsylvania address, scholars believe that the author was likely Bryan. Within his lengthy address, Bryan reiterated 
DeWitt’s fear of a strong central state and the erosion of states’ rights: “[T]he new government will not be a confederacy 
of states, as it out, but one consolidated government, founded upon the destruction of the several governments of the 
states…The powers of Congress under the new constitution, are complete and unlimited over the purse and the sword, 
and are perfectly independent of, and supreme over, the state governments, whose intervention in these great points is 
entirely destroyed” (“The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their 
Constituents,” 12 December 1787, accessed 3 November 2013 http://www.constitution.org/afp/pennmi00.htm).  
86 Madison uses the phrase “compound republic” in Federalist Papers 51 and 62. In Federalist 9, Alexander Hamilton called 
this compromise a “confederate republic.” Here, Hamilton laid out his theory of federalism: “The proposed 
Constitution, so far from implying abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national 
sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and 
very important portions of sovereign power.” In contrast, Madison’s theory of federalism was animated more by the 
ambiguity between state and national governmental authority, as Federalist 51, quoted at length above, suggests.  
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their powers, or of the extent an number of the laws which may be deemed necessary and proper to carry them 
into effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and make the laws.87  
As shown throughout his Letters, Lee was highly skeptical of a centralized government, and the 
Letters outlined what would become the Antifederalist’s main objections to the Constitution 
(Kramnick and Lowi 2009, 248). Madison also recognized the ambiguity in governing authority, but 
unlike Lee, Madison celebrated it as a potential check on national power:   
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single 
government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate 
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and 
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself (Federalist 51). 
Madison thus argued that the state governments would have the ability to check the national 
government. The ambiguity between national and state authority, combined with the Tenth 
Amendment that left the states with powers not specifically granted to Congress, ensured that 
constitutional development would be characterized by clarifying the boundaries between state and 
national power (Robertson 2012, 34). 88   
 American constitutional design created an inherent tension89 between the central and state-
level governments, relationships that created questions the Supreme Court—and other political 
institutions—would have to later address. Conflicts over the authority of subordinate governments 
and the national government became the sine qua non of constitutional development as well as the 
focus of the convention itself. William P. Murphy’s (1968) extensive study of the making of the 
Constitution finds, “The convention thus had before it a clear-cut choice between two systems. . . a 
                                                 
87 Letter IV, Letters from the Federal Farmer, 12 October 1787, in Isaac Kramnick and Theodore Lowi, American Political 
Thought: A Norton Anthology, p. 253.  
88 With respect to drawing the line between federal and state sovereignty, both the Marshall and Taney Courts had 
difficulty finding the precise boundaries of what Martin Shapiro called “the absurdity of two-sovereignty federalism” 
(Shapiro 1980, 360). This difficultly, I argue below, contributed to the Court restricting and expanding central state 
authority at any given period in constitutional development. Constructing precise boundaries between these sovereigns is 
unrealistic and, more than that, such boundaries have never existed historically in America (Shapiro 1980, 367).   
89 Scholars have noted that the Constitution creates conflicting governing prerogatives. Karen Orren and Stephen 
Skowronek have recognized that “the Constitution stands midway between prescriptive and positive law and in that 
sense is a perfect example of multiple orders” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 171). For Orren and Skowronek, the 
Constitution, in general, represents “intercurrence”—their idea that “the normal condition of the polity will be that of 
multiple, incongruous authorities operating simultaneously” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 108). I embrace the general 
idea advanced by Orren and Skowronek that the Constitution creates conflicting spheres of governing authority.     
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national government of virtually unlimited powers, armed with complete and absolute supremacy 
over the states” and “a confederation in which the central authority had enforceable supremacy only 
in sharply limited areas, with the states retaining their sovereignty in all others” (Murphy 1968, 147). 
He concludes, “The convention rejected the continuation of a system based on state sovereignty and 
decided in favor of a system based on national supremacy. It was a decision which was never 
changed” (Murphy 1968, 148). Nevertheless, it was a decision that would be repeatedly challenged, 
at least until the Civil War, vis-à-vis economic questions largely pertaining to tax, property, and 
contracts issues, which focused on the boundaries between state and federal sovereignty.  
 Both federalism and individual rights decisions—decisions that comprise the majority of 
these data—had, at their foundation, unsettled questions about the boundaries between state and 
national government. The constitutional design of sovereignty—and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the accompany powers of each sovereign—facilitated the continued expansion of 
the American central state. 90  The Supreme Court has favored central state expansion precisely 
because it is part of the federal government. More specifically, since the other political branches 
have favored expanding their own authority—and because these branches control judicial 
appointments—this has introduced a tendency toward the gradual expansion of national state 
powers.91 As the Court has adjusted its constitutional interpretation to modern conditions, this, too, 
has created a bias toward central state expansion. Indeed, the federal government has involved itself 
                                                 
90 Federal versus state sovereignty colored not only the constitutional convention but also animated subsequent 
constitutional development. This debate was especially prominent in the early republic during Chief Justice Marshall’s 
tenure (1801-1835). Indeed, as Figure 5.3 in chapter 3 shows us, the first period of constitutional development (1789-
1824) witnessed the greatest rate of state expansion whereby the Court attempted to ensure the national government’s 
supremacy. Murphy maintains, “The Constitution was fatal to the sovereignty of the states . . . there was no 
misunderstanding as to the effect that the Constitution would have upon state sovereignty, for in the campaign for 
ratification one of the principal bases of opposition to the Constitution was that it would destroy the sovereignty of the 
states.” Soon after ratification, however, people had “conveniently forgotten” that the Constitution destroyed state 
sovereignty, and from this grew doctrines of state interposition and nullification articulated by John C. Calhoun, for 
example, “the brilliant pre-Civil War high priest of state sovereignty” (Murphy 1968, 410–411).  
91 On the ability of the federal courts to help the national political branches overcome thorny issues, see Keith 
Whittington. 2005. “‘Interpose Your Friendly Hand’: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United 
States Supreme Court,” American Political Science Review 99: 584-96. 
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in a growing number of political issues, which in turn, necessitated the Court review a growing 
corpus of legal questions, too.92 To keep the coherence and legitimacy of the national regime intact, 
the Court has thus tended to support the aims of the political branches.  
 Yet, the oscillation between expansion and restriction of authority has grown out of defining 
federal and state sovereignty. Martin Redish observes, “The difficult problem facing the Court is to 
allow the Constitution to grow in recognition of the need for expanded federal power to meet new 
social needs while simultaneously preserving the values of federalism unambiguously embodied in 
the Constitution’s text” (Redish 1995, 61). Meeting new social needs has greatly contributed to the 
persistent central state expansion seen especially in the post-Civil War era when the Supreme Court 
shifted from a prescriptive to prospective understanding of law.93  
                                                 
92 The growth in law became particularly pronounced by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, 
the total amount of federal litigation in the United States rose from 47,553 cases in 1911 to 196,953 cases by 1930. 
Similarly, while the Supreme Court had only 253 cases pending before it in 1850, by 1890 the Court’s docket swelled to 
1800 appellate cases. Moreover, the law profession grew, too: lawyers in the United States numbered around 39,000 in 
1870 to 161,000 by 1930. Consequently, the number of law schools with a three-year program increased from seven 
schools in 1890 to over 170 in 1931. All these numbers come from Novak (2002, 262-263).  
93 Orren and Skowronek argue that the move from prescriptive to prospective law undergirds all of American political 
development (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 178-181). This sweeping theory has received scant attention in the literature, 
but with respect to the judiciary, it has long been held that the Civil War (and the subsequent passage of the 14 th 
Amendment) facilitated a move from prescriptive (based on common law precedent) to prospective (based on social 
circumstance) understandings of law. Yet even during the prescriptive of era of American political development the 
Court consistently expanded the powers of the federal government, a finding that does not necessarily contradict Orren 
and Skowronek’s argument. The ways in which the Court expanded central state authority, however, during prescriptive 
versus prospective eras differed.  
 In the prescriptive era (before the Civil War), courts typically expanded central state authority vis-à-vis 
questions that had an established history within English common law, largely pertaining to property and contract rights 
and to taxing powers. Dartmouth College (1819) exemplified prescriptive lawmaking, invalidating a New Hampshire state 
law that attempted to change Dartmouth College from a private institution to a state university. Marshall rooted his 
decision in a lengthy discussion of English common law concerning contracts (Dartmouth College, 707). Yet Dartmouth 
College still asserted judicial authority over the New Hampshire legislature and, in this sense, expanded federal power. 
Prescriptive-era decisions, while not based on broader questions of public welfare, nevertheless affirmed the enumerated 
powers of the federal government over state governments. For other prescriptive-era constitutional decisions that 
expanded central state authority, see Ware v. Hylton (1796), Terrett v. Taylor (1815), and Bronson v. Kinzie (1843).   
 But not until the twentieth-century did the Court (and the other national political institutions) turn toward 
proscriptive lawmaking, an approach that accommodated a society looking more to the federal government for 
regulatory solutions than it had previously. Just after the Civil War, however, the Court was reluctant to take on this 
proscriptive approach. In United States v. DeWitt (1870), for example, the Court refused to extend police powers to the 
federal level. DeWitt held that the federal government power was enumerated and limited, and it possessed nothing like 
the general police authority of state legislatures to regulate health, morals, and public welfare. The Court quickly 
abandoned its holding in DeWitt, in the twentieth century, and secured federal police power (and thus embraced a 
positive understanding of lawmaking) de facto if not de jure through commerce, taxing, and postal powers (Novak 2002, 
270). Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) typified central state expansion through proscriptive lawmaking—a 
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 Beyond the overarching design of dual sovereignty, there is another design attribute that 
helped create an ever-expanding federal state: the centrality of the national economy in the 
Constitution, which placed the federal state on an expansionary track especially within the realm of 
economics. “The convention deliberately left the distribution of commercial authority ambiguous,” 
which enabled the Court to interpret the Commerce Clause as a vehicle for state expansion, as 
indicated by the ubiquity of “federalism” decisions in the data from Chapter 3 (Robertson 2005b, 
183). The economic goals of the Founders thus provided a foundation upon which the Court could 
affirm the expansion of congressional power via the Commerce Clause.  
 
Economic Independence at the Founding 
 
 In drawing up the new Constitution, the Founders sought to escape “their mercantile 
dependence” from a world of “predatory European states” (Rana 2010, 133), which thus helped 
make the Commerce Clause, a central concern in “federalism” issues in Chapter 3, integral to state 
expansion.94 During the Convention, independence from Europe rested on creating a federalist 
system that could limit outside interference as well as insulate the central state from democratic 
pressure, a system that would enable strong national economic power.95 Moving away from a state-
based idea of liberty and sovereignty became the goals of Federalist constitutional architects like 
                                                                                                                                                             
decision based less on precedent and more on the social and psychological consequences of racial segregation (Orren 
and Skowronek 2004, 179).  
94 Aziz Rana’s claims echo Robert Wiebe’s The Opening of American Society who notes that a primary concern at the 
constitutional convention was the relationship between the U.S. and Europe: “Establishing a national government meant 
locating the United States in a European-dominated universe” (Wiebe 1985, 70). Moreover, the “American gentry 
responded to Europe’s revolutionary tremors as neo-colonials who saw their own independence at stake in the outcome. 
Since 1783 they had pictured their nation as a prisoner on parole, protecting its precarious freedom against international 
forces that it might elude but could never control” (Wiebe 1984, 68).     
95 Walter Licht recognizes this in Industrializing America. According to Licht, “The fortunes of the now former colonialist 
remained in the grips of the British commercial interests; the ups and downs of economic activity during and after the 
1780s reflected the abilities of British merchants to flood the American market with goods or block American exports. . . 
. Hamilton and his allies sought to build a power nation through commerce. . . . The United States was shredding its 
mercantile cast in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That is how best to characterize society at the time” 
(Licht 1995, 18–19). Doing so helped produce a central state that would grow exponentially in the economic and 
property realm.     
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Alexander Hamilton and James Madison (Rana 2010, 134). Many worried that if not united in a 
strong union America’s fate would be the same as the failed confederal republics of the past. David 
Hendrickson writes that the American founders, by 1787, “were coming to understand that they 
stood in danger of duplicating the circumstances that had produced [Machiavelli’s] 
recommendation” of a “strongman willing to act decisively” (Hendrickson 2003, 51).96 For example, 
Rufus King, a Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress, wrote in a letter to fellow 
delegate Jonathan Jackson that “the causes which changed the [republican] Governments alluded to 
may, and probably will, change those of America.”97 Delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
began to realize that to ensure independence of European states and to secure American safety 
would require a stronger, centralized federal government never before seen in the history of 
republics.  
 A strong, centralized federal government could better assure America’s safety and longevity 
in the international arena, Hamilton argued in Federalist Papers numbers 6 and 7. Conversely, he 
maintained, a decentralized U.S. would produce competing European alliances among the separate 
colonies. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton warned of this possibility:   
America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by 
the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European 
politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to 
became a prey to artifices and machination s of powers equally the enemies of them all (Federalist Paper no. 7, 
113). 
                                                 
96 Federalist Papers no. 18-20, penned by Madison, offer an account of the lessons gleaned from the history of previous 
republics. At the convention, Madison also referenced the history of republics and the dangers of loose confederations. 
See Max Farrand Records of the Federal Convention (RFC) vol. I (1911, 285-291). Madison’s solution: “The general power 
whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them” 
(RFC, 287). David Hendrickson’s Peace Pact also details how the history of failed republics such as those of Italy, Greece, 
and Germany informed the preferences for a strong, centralized federal government among founders like Madison and 
John Adams (Hendrickson 2003, 47–54). Hendrickson argues, “The fatal link between disunion and foreign 
domination—first demonstrated among the republics of ancient Greece, and sadly confirmed by in the experience of the 
Italian commonwealths—seemed self-evident to the Federalists, and they repeatedly warned their compatriots to treat 
these lessons with the utmost gravity” (Hendrickson 2003, 52).  
97 3 September 1786, King quoted in Hendrickson (2003, fn 14, 323-324).   
 
 
79 
 
Creating a centralized federal government would help the U.S. defend against the “arms and arts of 
foreign nations” if America otherwise remained “in a state of disunion” (Federalist no. 6, 104).98 To 
do this required a strong commercial union because commercial interests would create peace among 
the colonies, Hamilton believed:  
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of 
men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial 
republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They 
will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord (Federalist no. 6, 
106).  
 
He went on to argue in Federalist no. 12 that “the prosperity of commerce is now perceived and 
acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive 
source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares” 
(Federalist no. 12, 134). Accordingly he concluded, “one national government would be able, at much 
less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison, further than would be practicable 
to the States separately, or to any partial confederacies” (Federalist no. 12, 137). A strong central state 
authority—in its constitutional makeup—would have to be designed to advance the property and 
commercial interests of speculators, merchants, and manufactures which would contribute to a 
growing federal state partly designed to protect these financial interests, which helps explain 
relatively persistent state expansion along Commerce Clause issues.99  
 In Federalist no. 41, Madison reiterated Hamilton’s argument that without a strong central 
state, the United States would be prey to powerful European states: “Should a war be the result of 
the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on 
the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the 
                                                 
98 (Madison et al. 1987). Madison also echoed this sentiment during the federal convention. On 18 June 1787, in 
speaking to the committee of the whole house, Madison said, “Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will 
interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.” (Records of Federal Convention, 285) 
99 For a discussion on how the founders sought to create an environment conducive to investment, see Woody Holton, 
Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 179-223.    
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other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous” (Federalist no. 41, 271). Because of this possibility 
Madison argued for a vigorous union:  
A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of 
the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of 
disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who 
loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his 
heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it 
(Federalist no. 41, 269).  
In sum, as Rana points out, “In order to achieve not just juridical independence from foreign 
masters but substantive independence as well, the defenders of the new Constitution sought to 
develop a political system that was based on greater centralization and able to limit the internal and 
external challenges to freedom” (Rana 2010, 135).  
 Looking closer at the Constitution’s design shows us the areas that lent themselves to the 
expansion seen in the previous chapter as well as demonstrates how these calls for a mighty national 
economic power contributed to the structure and expansion of the federal state.  
 
Constitutional Architects: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
  
 America’s understanding of central state authority owes a great deal to two of the 
Constitution’s most prominent architects: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. And while 
economic commitments contributed to persistent central state growth, Hamilton’s and Madison’s 
divergence on the powers of the central state help us understand why expansion and restriction 
remain ubiquitous in constitutional development. Despite their Federalist alliance during the 
ratification of the Constitution, much of the competing conceptions of central state authority pivot 
on their differences regarding the strength and purposes of the national government. The 
constitutional framers laid the foundation for the expansion of central state authority and, among 
these framers, Hamilton was the “premier state-builder in a generation of state-builders” (Kramnick 
1987, 67). During the Constitutional Convention, Madison, Hamilton, and their Federalist allies 
 
 
81 
 
sought to create a government that would defend national sovereignty and support the expansion of 
market-driven economic development. 100  This constituency wanted a national government that 
could vigorously protect property rights, promote commerce, and grow markets (Robertson 2005b, 
28, 69).101 Yet, Madison envisioned a less active state than Hamilton. 
 The different conceptions of the central state embodied in Hamilton and Madison are simply 
illustrative of two important strands in American political thought, strands that contribute to the 
persistent expansion and restriction seen in chapter 3. On the one hand, Hamilton’s penchant for an 
active centralized government is seen in his writings on the presidency: “Energy in the executive is a 
leading character in the definition of good government. . . . A feeble executive implies a feeble 
execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a 
government ill executive, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, bad government” 
(Federalist 72). On the other, Madison saw the central state necessary only in its limited, Lockean 
sense—to protect private rights and to ensure justice. Isaac Kramnick argues, “Madison saw the 
central government providing an arena for competitive power, where the private bargaining of free 
men, groups and interest would take place, and the state would define no goals of its own other than 
ensuring the framework for orderly economic life” (Kramnick 1987, 74). Contrary to Hamilton, 
energy in politics, for Madison, came from individuals and groups seeking their immediate goals, not 
from a vigorous state seeking to make its place in history.102   
 Of course, disagreements over the vigor and energy of the central state were not confined to 
constitutional architects like Hamilton and Madison. The Supreme Court, especially during the 
                                                 
100 In 1791, Madison split from Hamilton and the Federalist Party, allying with Jefferson to form the Democratic-
Republican Party. On the divergence between Madison and Hamilton, see David Siemers. 2002. Ratifying the Republic: 
Antifederalists and Federalists in Constitutional Time. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
101 David Robertson. The Constitution and America’s Destiny. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
102 Siemers’s Ratifying the Republic provides an excellent treatment on the differences between Hamilton’s and Madison’s 
political thought, which were evident before the Constitution was ratified, he contends. Madison, according to Siemers, 
was simply too focused on ratifying the Constitution to let these differences get in the way. After ratification, Madison 
and the Republicans had much more in common with the Anti-Federalists than they did with the Federalists. Thus, 
Siemers shows that three strands of political thought existed at this time—Federalists, Antifederalists, and Madisonians.  
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Marshall Court years, had the onerous task of determining the boundaries between the federal and 
state governments. Defining these powers mapped onto the debates over constitutional 
interpretation during the early republic and Jacksonian years, and it is to these debates to which we 
now turn.   
 
Constitutional Interpretation on the Marshall Court   
 
 While these ideas made their way into the Constitution’s text and design, the persistent state 
expansion seen in Chapter 3 was far from inevitable. The Constitution’s text could just as easily lent 
itself to an American state development story of persistent restriction rather than one of expansion. 
Indeed, Walter Licht recognizes that the design of the Constitution facilitated economic 
centralization but did not make it certain and, as such, the Court’s interpretation played a pivotal role 
in state development:  “Did the Constitution guarantee economic development. No. . . . What it did 
was allow. A political framework was laid down in the United States that placed no obstacles in the 
way of economic transformation and expansion” (Licht 1995, 93, emphasis original).103 But, how did 
the Court contribute to this economic development and, more broadly, to central state 
development?  
 The debate between strict and broad interpretation has had an enormous impact on the 
growth of the federal government.104 In his three volume study of American government, James 
Bryce, a British academic and politician, noticed, 
Soon after the formation of the National government in 1789 two parties grew up, one advocating a strong 
central authority, the other championing the rights of the States. Of these parties the former naturally came to 
insist on a liberal, an expansive, perhaps a lax construction of the words of the Constitution, because the more 
wide is the meaning placed upon its grant powers, so much the wider are those powers themselves. The latter 
party, on the other hand, was acting in protection both of the States and of the individual citizen against the 
                                                 
103 Much like this chapter discusses below, Licht saw that the courts—not just the Supreme Court—“occupied a 
preeminent place in the nation’s divided system of government” (Licht 1995, 93–95).  
104 The Republican challenge to the Federalist’s broad constitutional interpretation of the 1790s “has framed much of 
American constitutional debate ever since,” claims Gillman, Graber and Whittington’s American Constitutionalism, 
(Gillman et al. 2013, 119) 
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central government, when it limited by a strict and narrow interpretation of the fundamental instrument the 
power which that instrument conveyed. The distinction which began in those early days has never vanished 
(Bryce quoted in Gillman et al. 2013, 119).105 
The expansion and restriction of federal powers in due in part to the divide between those who view 
the Constitution as bestowing broad powers on the central state and those interpret the 
Constitution’s language more narrowly. The Federalist and Republican divide in the early republic 
dealt fundamentally with the debate between a strong central state and a weak central state. These 
interpretational philosophies did not necessarily deal with specific provisions, but on the contrary, 
defined broad constitutional clauses such as the Necessary and Proper and Commerce Clauses as we 
will see below in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).  
 The origins of strict versus broad constitutional interpretation also map onto the notions of 
federal versus state sovereignty—broad interpretations dovetailing with federal sovereignty and strict 
interpretation favoring state sovereignty arguments. And like the debate over sovereignty, the 
constitutional interpretation debate began at the founding. In particular, Jeffersonians gave us the 
notion of “strict” interpretation, believing that the powers bestowed by the Constitution should be 
read narrowly. Similarly, a widely-read Virginia law professor and judge, St. George Tucker, injected 
the term into the legal lexicon with his publication of an Americanized 1803 edition of William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. In his appendix, Tucker explained that the 
Constitution should be understood as a “federal compact, or alliance between the states.” He 
                                                 
105 In the same section, Bryce went on to say that both American parties—Republicans and Federalist—did not strictly 
adhere to either form of interpretation; the parties used whatever form of interpretation serviced their momentary 
political interests: “Whenever there has been a serious party conflict, it has been in reality a conflict over some living and 
practical issue. . . .men did not attack or defend a proposal because they held it legally unsound or sound on the true 
construction of the Constitution, but alleged it to be constitutionally wrong or right because they thought the welfare of 
the country, or at least their party interests, to be involved.”  
 More central to the arguments made later in this chapter is Bryce’s claim that since the Civil War, the broad 
construction has “prevailed” thus indicating great consolidation of national power. Yet, he observed, “there is still a 
party inclined to strict construction, but the strictness which it upholds would have been deemed lax by the Broad 
Constructionists of thirty years ago. The interpretation which has thus stretched the Constitution to cover powers once 
undreamt of, may be deemed a dangerous resource”  (Bryce 1888, 379–380). That has been the story of constitutional 
development—it has consolidated central state power, especially after Union victory, and with each episode in political 
development, the threshold for what constitutes central state authority has ratcheted upward toward greater federal 
power.   
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believed that the powers of central government were “pretty accurately defined and limited” by the 
Constitution in order to distinguish between the sovereign people who made constitutions and the 
governments created by them, citing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as protections against the 
central state from infringing the rights of the people and of the states, respectively. He thus 
concluded, “The sum of all which appears to be, that the powers delegated to the federal 
government, are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, 
where the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually, may be drawn in 
question” (Tucker [1803] quoted in Gillman et al. 2013, 120).106 Jacksonian Democrats continued the 
Jeffersonian Republican’s strict constructionist creed: “We adhere to the constitutional doctrines of 
the republican party of 1789-9; we adopt the rule of strict construction they maintained, as the only 
true and safe one, applicable to our constitution,” declared Congressional Democrats in an address 
to the people before the launch of the campaign season (Gillman et al. 2013, 120).  
 Other important legal thinkers sought to rebut Tucker’s and the Republicans’ predilection 
toward strict constitutional construction. Justice Joseph Story—who sat on the Court from 1811 to 
                                                 
106 In the early 19th century, a strict interpretation of constitutional law was common among Republicans. The ascension 
of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency had much to do with the principle that federal government powers would be 
construed narrowly. Jefferson told his followers that when central state powers were questionable, it would be better to 
seek a constitutional amendment rather “than assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless. 
Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction” 
(Jefferson quoted in Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2013, 120).  
 To be sure, once in office, political circumstance presented President Jefferson with many situations, like the 
Louisiana Purchase, that required Jefferson to take a more expansive constitutional interpretation of executive power. 
How Jefferson reconciled his strict constructionist interpretation with the political demands of his office is the subject of 
Jeremy D. Bailey’s (2007) Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power. Prior to Bailey’s study, much of the scholarship viewed 
Jefferson as a hypocrite because he initially argued for limited national and executive powers, but then he presided over 
the greatest expansion of national and presidential power the country had seen. Contrary to this prevailing interpretation, 
Bailey argues that Jefferson was not ever an “enemy of executive power” (Bailey 2007, 4). Instead, Bailey finds that 
Jefferson’s frequent use of presidential prerogatives did not contradict his strict interpretational stance; instead, 
Jefferson’s strict construction demanded grounding executive power in popular consent. Expansion of executive power, 
for Jefferson, required public approval and justification, at least for the executive’s more-questionable actions. Jefferson 
defended his actions before the public in what Bailey calls “declarations of principle” (Bailey 2007, 22-24, 152).  This 
democratic understanding of presidential power contrasted with Hamilton and other advocates of a strong presidency 
who located executive prerogative in doctrines of implied powers and loose construction  
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1845 and authored a famous constitutional treatise107 first published in 1833—was one such figure. 
An advocate of Chief Justice Marshall’s nationalism, Story’s treatise provided an alternative 
interpretational theory to Tucker’s understanding.  
In construing a constitution of government, framed by the people for their own benefit and protection for the 
preservation of their rights, and property, and liberty; where the delegated powers are not, and cannot be used 
for the benefit of their rulers, who are but their temporary servants and agents; but are intended solely for the 
benefit of the people, no such presumption of an intention to use the words in the most restricted sense 
necessarily arises (Story quoted in Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2013, 121). 
Story thus argued that popular sovereignty required that judges take a liberal, or broad interpretation, 
of the federal government’s powers. By doing so, Story’s treatise sought to rebut Tucker’s 
scholarship, advanced Chief Justice Marshall’s broad constitutional vison, and equipped the Whig 
Party to oppose the Democrat’s arguments for strict interpretation well into the nineteenth century.  
 The Court expanded power, and did so exponentially, largely because the Marshall Court 
went to great lengths to employ broad interpretations of Congressional power, namely, the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause as demonstrated in Gibbons v. Ogden and 
McCulloch v. Maryland, respectively. In Gibbons, for example, Marshall defended the Court’s use of 
broad constitutional interpretation. When a lawyer urged the Court to use a strict interpretation of 
Congress’s commerce power, Chief Justice Marshall said that doing so would weaken the federal 
government.108 Gibbons structured Commerce Clause cases at least through the nineteenth century, 
which helps explain why the Court, via commerce and federalism decisions, persistently expanded 
central state authority across time.109  
 Defining the spheres of sovereignty (i.e. political authority) was also central to McCulloch. 
With regard to this issue, the Court held that the sovereignty of the Union lies with the people of the 
                                                 
107 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, 1833). This treatise is included 
in my dataset.  
108 Marshall wrote that a “narrow construction” would “cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object, for 
which it is declared to be instituted.” He thus concluded, “We cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, 
nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded” (Gibbons, 187-188). 
109 In their American legal history casebook, Kermit Hall, Paul Finkelman and James Ely note, “Gibbons is the most 
important commerce clause case in Supreme Court history. All subsequent nineteenth-century commerce clause cases 
(and many twentieth-century ones) were, to a great extent, merely commentary on Gibbons” (Hall et al. 2005, 155).  
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United States, not with the individual states that comprise it. The United States, not a simple alliance 
of states, is a “constitutional sovereign” with its authority resting exclusively with “the people” who 
created and are governed by the Constitution. To the Court, “the government of the Union is a 
government of the people; it emanates from them; its powers are granted by them; and are to be 
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit” (McCulloch, 409). With this logic, Marshall’s opinion 
struck down the Maryland’s tax on the bank as violation of constitutional sovereignty because the 
tax acted against all the people in the United States by a state accountable only to some of the 
people.  McCulloch—and those cases like it110 that determined the limits the Constitution placed on 
the sovereignty of states—primarily dealt with preserving the Union against powerful state 
sovereignty arguments that threatened the dissolution of the Union.111 Marshall thus favored reading 
the Constitution as providing Congress wide discretion in determining the reach and scope of its 
expressed powers.112 
 Nevertheless Marshall’s penchant for employing a broad interpretation of constitutional 
language evoked ire from powerful figures outside the courtroom.113  After Marshall’s landmark 
ruling, two eminent Virginia state judges, William Brockenbrough and Spencer Roane, protested 
McCulloch in a series of publications in the Richmond Enquirer.114 The Court delivered its opinion on 
                                                 
110 These cases include Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Brown v. Maryland (1827), Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), Craig 
v. Missouri (1830), and Barron v. Baltimore (1833).  
111 G. Edward White makes this argument in his comprehensive volume written for the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise 
History of the Supreme Court of the United States, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-35, Volume III-IV. 
White argues that many of the Marshall Court’s cases “did not so much promote federal sovereignty as restrict state 
sovereignty.” The nationalism promulgated in Marshall’s rulings “was not a nationalism in the modern sense of support 
for affirmative plenary federal regulatory power; the Court’s posture can more accurately be described as a critique of 
reserved state sovereignty” (White et al. 1988, 486). Nonetheless, throughout Marshall’s tenure, the Court was 
preoccupied with defining the boundaries between state and federal sovereignty, and the difficulty engendered by this 
duty produced decisions that restricted and expanded central state authority.  
112 Charles F. Hobson, editor of The Papers of John Marshall, sees Marshall less as a proponent of broad constitutional 
interpretation and more as an opponent of the “restrictive construction” advocated by Maryland’s counsel in McCulloch. 
Hobson notes that Marshall’s primary concern with strict construction was that it “would inexorably transform the 
Union into a league of sovereign states—a belated triumph for Antifederalism” (Marshall et al. 1974, 258).  
113 For a detailed treatment of McCulloch and the different degrees of opposition among states and between divergent 
factions within states, see Richard Ellis’s (2007) Aggressive Nationalism, especially chapters 5-7.     
114 (Marshall et al. 1974, 282–287). These men along with Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Enquirer, formed the “Richmond 
Junto”—a powerful Republican organization that controlled politics in Virginia. They saw the Federalists as expanding 
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March 6, 1819 and as early as March 13 criticisms were published. Hezekiah Niles, editor of Niles’ 
Weekly Register in Baltimore, published a series of attacks on the decision as a “deadly blow” to the 
“sovereignty of the states” and the “first grand step towards a consolidation of the states, or a 
separation of them.”115 Similarly, Marshall’s most vociferous and redoubtable opponent, Spencer 
Roane protested, “The states have also constitutions, and their people rights, which ought also to be 
respected. It is in behalf of these constitutions, and these rights, that the enlarged and boundless 
power of the general government is objected to. The construction which gives it, is in entire 
derogation of them.”116 These criticisms claimed that the Court, by expanding the powers of the 
central state, undermined the meaning of the Constitution’s text, which consequently prostrated the 
rights of the states and of the people.  
 Marshall expressed growing concern over these state sovereignty-based arguments to two of 
his fellow justices and closest confidants—Bushrod Washington and Joseph Story.117 So strong was 
this opposition that Marshall felt compelled to write eleven newspaper articles defending McCulloch 
under the pseudonyms “A Friend of the Constitution” and “A Friend of the Union.”118 Marshall 
went to great lengths to defend the Court’s interpretation of “necessary” and the resulting expansion 
of Congressional power this caused. In his second article, Marshall criticized Hampden for his 
narrow understanding of “necessary:” “Will any man seriously contend that the rights of a nation are 
                                                                                                                                                             
the powers of the federal government at the expense of state sovereignty primarily through the Supreme Court’s rulings. 
They saw Marshall Court decisions like McCulloch, Dartmouth, Sturgis v. Crowinshield, and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee as proof 
that the federal judiciary sought to overthrow state governments. Together, with Thomas Jefferson’s blessing, these men 
used the Enquirer to disseminate the Richmond Junto’s constitutional ideas regarding state rights (Marshall et al. 1974, 
284).   
115 Niles quoted in Papers of John Marshall volume VIII (Marshall et al. 1974, 282) 
116 18 June 1819 Richmond Enquirer, “Rights of the States and of the People,” p. 2-3.  
117 Writing to Justice Story about these criticisms in the Enquirer, Marshall said, “Our opinion in the bank case has roused 
the sleeping spirit of Virginia—if it indeed it ever sleeps. It will I understand be attacked in the papers with some 
asperity; and as those who favor it never write for the publick it will remain undefended & of course be considered as 
damnably heretical.” Marshall to Joseph Story 24 March 1819 (Marshall et al. 1974, 280, emphasis original). See also 
Marshall to Bushrod Washington 27 March 1819 (Marshall et al. 1974, 281). 
118 These articles can be found in The Papers of John Marshall, volume VIII (Marshall et al. 1974, 287–309; 318–327; 335–
349; 353–359). Marshall’s newspaper articles constituted his only direct engagement in public debate during his thirty-
four year tenure on the Supreme Court (Marshall et al. 1974, 282).  
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limited to those acts which are necessary for its preservation, in the sense affixed by Hampden to the 
term ‘necessary’? May it not pass the bounds of strict necessity, in order to consult or provide for its 
happiness, its convenience, its interest, its power?”119 Here Marshall argued that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause encompassed more than simply the enumerated powers listed in the Constitution 
because “the power to do a thing, and the power to carry that thing into execution, are I humbly 
conceive, the same power, and the one cannot be termed with propriety ‘additional’ or ‘incidental’ to 
the other.”120 Marshall also protested Hampden’s decentralized conception of the United States as a 
“league” of states: “our constitution is not a league. It is a government; and has all the constituent 
parts of a government. It has established legislative, executive, and judicial departments, all of which 
act directly on the people, not through the medium of the state government.”121 Marshall’s objection 
to Hampden thus rested in part on the conception of state versus federal sovereignty, which 
animated constitutional development at least until the end of the Civil War. 
 It comes as no surprise that dual sovereignty proved a difficult concept to balance in 
practice. Looking closer at the decisions of the Marshall Court, it becomes evident that drawing the 
boundaries between two sovereigns—defining federalism, essentially—occupied constitutional 
development; decisions from the dataset reveals this fact. Gibbons is known for its expansion of the 
central state’s power to regulate commerce, but just five years later in Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh 
Company (1829), 122  the Court’s ruling left power to the states. A unanimous opinion in Willson 
                                                 
119 “A friend of the Constitution,” II 1 July 1819, volume VIII (Marshall et al. 1974, 324) 
120 “A friend of the Constitution,” II 1 July 1819, volume VIII (Marshall et al. 1974, 323) 
121 “A friend of the Constitution,” VII 9 July 1819, volume VIII (Marshall et al. 1974, 350-351) 
122 27 U.S. 245. In Willson, Delaware authorized the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to build a dam spanning the 
Blackbird Creek. Willson. This dam obstructed the creek and prevented a small sailing vessel, possessing a coastal license 
similar to the one held in Gibbons, from navigating the creek. During the course of his travel on the creek, the licensed 
owner of the tiny sailing vessel broke part of the dam. Consequently, the Company successfully sued Willson for 
trespassing and obtained a Delaware court order requiring Willson to pay damages. Willson appealed to the Supreme 
Court, claiming that Delaware’s law violated Congress’s Commerce Clause. The Court disagreed because Congress had 
taken no action with which the Delaware law could conflict: “We do not think that the Act…can…be considered as 
repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the 
subject” (Willson, 252). Thus, Marshall laid the ground for the “dormant” Commerce Clause, a constitutional 
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allowed a Delaware state law regulating the navigation of Blackbird Creek to stand. 123  Other 
decisions during Marshall’s tenure like Providence Bank v. Billings (1830)124 also relegated power to the 
states thus restricting central state authority, demonstrating why we often see both expansion and 
restriction of federal power (Gunther 1969, 19-21).125    
 As Figure 5.3 in chapter 3 shows, the rate of expansion was greatest from 1789 to 1824. 
Indeed, Gibbons and McCulloch are representative of this general trend, which witnessed the Supreme 
Court affirming its own review powers as well as securing the supremacy of the national government 
over the state governments. Yet as the broad trends in chapter 3 also reveal, restriction remained an 
important facet of constitutional development and turns on the division of powers between state 
and national government. Consequently, the next era from 1824 to 1849 experienced the slowest 
rate of state expansion in all of the data because—during the final years of the Marshall Court and 
the rise of the Taney Court—a shift in the Court’s understanding of dual sovereignty occurred. This 
produced a growing number of restrictive cases that devolved power to state governments, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
interpretation of the Clause that allowed the Court to regulate commercial activity even when Congress had not 
promulgated a law intending to do so, which is discussed below.   
123 The attorney for the sailor argued that the dam “unconstitutionally impeded” the boat “in use of her license.” More 
than that, the Commerce Clause prevented Delaware from “closing a navigable river” (Willson, 248). In contrast, the 
attorney for the company argued that body of water being dammed was insignificant to water traffic: it was “one of 
those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but creep, and which, wherever it possesses, spreads its venom, and 
destroys the health of all those who inhabit its marshes” (Willson, 249). Thus, the attorney for the company claimed that 
damming unhealthy waterways was a justifiable use of a state’s police power to regulate healthy and safety of its citizens, 
especially since Congress had passed no legislation affecting the creek to which the Court agreed.  
124 29 U.S. 514. Influenced by the growing Jacksonian democracy sentiment, the Court limited the amount of protection 
afforded to corporate charters under the Contracts Clause (Hall et al. 2005, 801). Here Marshall rejected Providence 
Bank’s argument that its charter exempted it from state taxation. Writing for the majority, Marshall held that the 
Constitution “was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse of power which may be committed by the state 
governments” (Providence, 563).   
125 Gerald Gunther’s John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland supports this claim. Gunther shows us that “The 
degree of centralization that has taken place since [Marshall’s] time may well have come about in the face of Marshall’s 
intent rather than in accord with his expectations. That centralization may be the inevitable consequence of economic 
and social changes. And this development may suggest the impossibility of articulating general constitutional standards 
capable of limiting those centralizing forces” (Gunther 1969, 20).  
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nevertheless, Taney’s Court still did more to expand central state power than not, contrary to how 
we typically remember the Taney Court.126 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Consistency in the law required that the logic of a single, ultimate central authority trump the 
idea of dual sovereignty, or what Martin Shapiro calls, the “absurdity of federalism” (Shapiro 1980, 
361). Constitutional development reflected the need to reconcile the tension between federal and 
state governments, which the Court helped to do with its relatively consistent support of the two 
political branches, an idea discussed further in chapter 6. If the Court had not resolved this tension 
in favor of the central state then this would have constrained American political development and 
weakened the U.S. Given the ever-changing economy and technology of America, the only way that 
this logic could flourish was to assign supremacy—that is, single ultimate political authority—to the 
central state (Shapiro 1980, 361). A modernizing economy necessitated a Court that would respond 
to the growing economic pressures felt throughout the country if the country were to grow 
commercially. Thus the early republic witnessed rapid central state expansion because it comprised 
members sympathetic to creating a strong commercial republic. Yet, at the same time, the Court 
oscillated between expansion and restriction because it took seriously the boundaries of two 
sovereigns and because fitting constitutional doctrine to the ever-changing sociopolitical 
environment naturally produced these differing outcomes.127    
                                                 
126 Michael Les Benedict notes that the “divergence between the Marshall and Taney Courts on matters of federalism has 
been exaggerated,” and he emphasizes the Taney’s Court “continued commitment to national supremacy” (Les Benedict 
1978, 44), see also footnote 13 on the same page. Michael Les Benedict, “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the 
Waite Court,” The Supreme Court Review (178): 39-79.  
127 Loren Beth makes a similar argument in The Development of the American Constitution, 1877-1917. Of the interpretation of 
the Court during the Industrial Revolution, Beth writes:  
It does not do, in this latter day, to take a simplistic view of the judges or the way the courts handled the resulting cases. . . 
. What emerges is what might be expected of a human institution: a fumbling and vacillating response which in the long 
run was astonishingly but accidentally successful in allowing both for increasing governmental regulation of the worst 
aspects of the Industrial Revolution and for the maintenance of the system (sometimes loosely called ‘free enterprise’) 
which was creating the revolution (Beth 1971, 141).   
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Chapter 5: The Court and the Rise of the Modern State, 1870-1920 
 
 
“The great danger now will be that things will rush in the opposite direction, and the central authority, from 
being limited and straitened in all its powers and functions, and scarcely able to maintain a precarious 
existence, will be in danger of absorbing all the important functions of governmental administration” 
 --Vermont State Supreme Court Judge Isaac F. Redfield, 1867128 
 
 
Introduction  
 The previous chapter explored important ideas set in motion at the founding, ideas about 
the division between federal and state sovereignty and about the debate between strict and broad 
constitutional interpretation. The founding cemented these divisions within the constitutional 
lexicon and thus ensured the persistent conflict between national and state power. While this 
conflict persists to the present-day, its apotheosis was the Civil War. The Civil War and the 
Reconstruction Amendments mark the most important constitutional change since the founding, 
and accordingly, the effects wrought by these changes warrant closer investigation.  
 From 1870 to 1920, the Supreme Court, through its decisions, navigated a moderate course 
of state development between the Union and the former Confederacy.  On the one side, the Union 
wanted a unified national market (thus broad interpretation of the commerce clause) and little or no 
government regulation of private enterprise (thus narrow interpretation of the due process clause).  
On the other side, the former Confederate states wanted local control of race relations and politics 
generally (thus individual state control of citizenship/social policies).  From the northern 
perspective, constitutional development largely traded away civil rights for blacks in the South for 
rapid industrial expansion in the nation (particularly the Northeast and Midwest).  Thus, the Court 
nationalized a good portion of capital-labor relations during this period and, at the same time, 
localized civil and political rights. What is important to state development is that the Court played an 
                                                 
128 Isaac Redfield. 1867. “The Proper Limits between State and National Legislation and Jurisdiction. Speculations and 
Monopolies in the Staples of Subsistence. Railways a Matter of National Interest.” The American Law Register, 15 (4): 193-
202, 197.  
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integral role, through its decision, in the reconciliation between North and South after the Civil War. 
The Court helped steer a more moderate course between those who sought a return to a state-
centered understanding of federalism and those who wanted to aggressively expand federal state 
power.  
 Scholars interested in understanding the modern American state have closely examined the 
turn of the twentieth century—roughly, the last quarter century of nineteenth to the first quarter 
century of the twentieth. During this period the central enterprise of the Court was consolidating the 
nation state and reducing state autonomy as questions concerning federal-state relations became 
ever-more paramount in the wake of the Civil War. During this period, the modern American state 
began to take root. And while virtually all other aspects of modern governance emerged, the 
conventional narrative holds, that the Court was somehow a constant obstacle to the growth of 
modern state. The most glaring issue with this conventional narrative is that it is myopic in its view, 
looking only at the emergence of the administrative state as well as a few unrepresentative Supreme 
Court decisions.129 It also treats the Court’s doctrine as a monolithic entity, neglecting to dissect the 
various developments within the law. Indeed, the empirical reality presented in the previous chapter 
casts doubt on these overarching characterizations of the Court. The discussion below begins to 
revise this narrative and explains the nuanced relationship the Court had with central state authority 
from around 1870 to 1920, showing that the Court—because of its newly expanded jurisdictional 
powers and its interpretation of commerce—was far from a persistent inhibitor of state 
development.  
 
                                                 
129 John E. Semonche makes this latter point forcefully in his extensive treatment of the Supreme Court between 1890 
and 1920. He concludes, “To stress Pollock in the 1890s, Lochner in the 1900s, and Hammer in the 1910s presents a 
distorted image of the Court, which during these three decades was struggling, most often successfully, with the task of 
accommodating the law to the demands of a changing society” (Semonche 1978, 434). John E. Semonche. 1978. Charting 
the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a Changing Society, 1890-1920. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.  
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The Court and Central Authority   
 
 The epigraph above captured the central dilemma facing the Supreme Court as it confronted 
questions about the relationship between the states and the Union during the Reconstruction era. 
During this time, America’s federalist system came under close judicial scrutiny. The Civil War 
period was a time of extraordinary growth in national power—a federal income tax, new banking 
system, the beginning of national railroad control, and presidential suspensions of habeas corpus 
typified this important growth in central state power. Senator James Grimes 130  recognized that 
during the Civil War the Union drew to “the Federal Government authority which had been 
considered doubtful by all and denied by many of the statesmen of this country.” But he was quick 
to urge his fellow senators: “That time . . . has ceased and ought to cease. Let us go back to the 
original condition of things, and allow the States to take care of themselves.”131  
 The Civil War, however, definitively ended the idea that the United States was a confederate 
state, subject to the will of its individual states. Yet, in the aftermath of the war, the country did not 
embrace the centralization implicit on war based on union would predict.132 While there was no 
going back, the Civil War and Reconstruction were not enough to forge the modern American state, 
and instead, much of the building of the American state occurred as the Supreme Court balanced 
                                                 
130 A well-regarded Senate Republican from Iowa, Grimes served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the 
committee that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment.   
131 Congressional Globe, 39, 1, p. 2446. 
132 See, for example, The Boston Globe, “The State Rights Question,” 30 March 1876, p.4 and Chicago Daily Tribune, 24 
January 1909, “Nationality and the New South,” p. G4. Both articles rejected persistent calls for a return to pre-Civil 
War understandings of federalism. Similarly,  Johnson’s Governing the American State is built on the “curious puzzle” that 
the “crisis of the Civil War and Reconstruction was not enough to create a centralized state, yet the key elements 
necessary for a modern state to form were already in place before the crisis of the Great Depression and the response of 
the New Deal” (Johnson 2007, 5). Johnson’s purpose is to show the ways in which Congress through 
“intergovernmental policies” helped foster the “development of interlocking bureaucracies at the national and state 
levels” during a period of “New Federalism,” a period where the United States straddled a dual federalist system and a 
centralized modern state (Johnson 2007, 4, 6). While this dissertation recognizes this puzzle, it disagrees with Johnson’s 
view of the Court as a persistent inhibitor of state growth (Johnson 2007, 29-32) as well as with the conception that the 
pre-1877 era can be entirely dubbed as “dual federalist.” Other scholars have objected to this dual federalism 
characterization, too. See Martin Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure, (1995, 27-30). Redish finds little utility in the 
distinction between “dualist” and “cooperatist” federalism theories. Dualists see federalism where “each of the two 
sovereignties has its own exclusive area of authority and jurisdiction, with few powers held concurrently” (Elazar 1962, 
22). Cooperatists, Edward Corwin notes in his seminal law review article, claim that “the National government and the 
States are mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism” (Corwin 1950, 19).  
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this new authority bestowed upon the federal government against the calls to return to a state-
centered model of federalism.133      
The rest of this chapter argues that the Supreme Court—far from obstructing state 
building—often provided much of the foundation on which subsequent political actors built the 
coercive apparatus of the central state. Instead of viewing the Court as outside of the central state134 
(and juxtaposed to this state), I view the Court as part and parcel of the central state. My argument 
has two facets, one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical part shifts our understanding of 
“state development” away from European welfare-state conceptions and toward a broader definition 
of “development.” The empirical analysis, from a sample of 104 landmark decisions, reveals that the 
Supreme Court was an institution with a complex relationship toward federal authority, building it in 
some policy realms while obstructing it in others.   
Two developments greatly influenced this complex relationship. First, questions pertaining 
to federalism became ever-more pressing and thus the dominant vehicle through which the Court 
expanded its own power as well as the powers of the other federal branches. The Court at this time, 
legal historian Stanley Kutler argues, should be remembered for its “remarkable tenacity and 
toughness,” which enlarged its judicial power (Kutler 1968, vii). Second, the Court became the 
                                                 
133 Michigan Judge Thomas Cooley, arguably the most famous jurist and legal thinker of the post-Civil War decades, 
called for the return to the state-centered model of federalism: “The proper boundary between national and state powers 
was agreed upon after long discussion . . . and it has been found so satisfactory that we have willingly endured a most 
destructive war in its defence. The cost of that war has been expended in vain if at its conclusion we propose to treat 
that boundary as a shadowy line which none need regard. The only safety to our institutions consists in standing by their 
fundamental principles, of which the just division of local and general powers is, by the constitution, made first and most 
prominent” Thomas M. Cooley, “The Legal Aspects of the Louisiana Case,” Southern Law Review 1 (1875): 18-44, 42.  
134 It might be asked, who would place the Court outside of the central state? Narratives that view the Court as a 
persistent inhibitor, however, do just this—though not quite consciously. In viewing the Court as an obstacle during the 
Lochner era, for example, scholars have failed to recognize the very strength of the Court itself to rule over new questions 
and extend its reach into new areas of society. The increased power of the Court itself might also be an indication of 
greater judicial independence and insulation from other political institutions and society, indications of enhanced central 
state strength. Outside of the APD literature, judicial independence has also be recognized as a constitutional design 
principle that enhances economic growth; economic scholars have noted this causal connection (Congleton and 
Swedenborg 2006, 278). See Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voight, “Judicial Independence and Economic Development” in 
Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg, eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2006).    
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primary institution to resolve controversies over central state authority whereas, previously, other 
institutions had more of a say in regulating the whole political system. These changes were 
important because they inadvertently created a Supreme Court strong enough to define federalist 
boundaries as the New Deal approached—a central political and legal debate throughout the New 
Deal.  
The mechanism through which the Court operated was both legal and institutional. In 
particular, the creation of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine135 enabled the Court to strike 
down state-level barriers to interstate commerce even if Congress had not passed a law governing the 
behavior a state law sought to regulate. The dormant clause, in effect, allowed the Court to become 
a mouthpiece of the state, enhancing national state authority in the name of economic expansion.  
Moreover, institutional developments enhanced the power of the Court itself thereby enabling it to 
expand state authority; during Reconstruction, the Court acquired “removal” 136  power, broader 
jurisdiction, and an extension of habeas corpus powers of the federal courts, to name a few 
examples.137 Indeed, the congressional judicial reorganization bills of 1862 and 1863, of 1866, and of 
1869 were attempts to vest more power in the judiciary in order to help extend Republican Party 
                                                 
135 For an historical overview of the dormant Commerce Clause see Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, “The 
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism.” Duke Law Journal (Sep. 1987), 574-581.  The 
“dormant” Commerce Clause refers to the prohibition, implied in the Commerce Clause, against states passing legislation 
that discriminates against or excessively burdens interstate commerce. For a normative critique of the application of the 
dormant Commerce Clause over time see Martin Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure, chapter 3.  
136 Congress permitted many cases that started in state courts to be removed into federal circuit courts. The courts used 
this new power, at first, to defend the rights of African-Americans and federal officials in the South during the 
Reconstruction Era, but this quickly changed. See, William Wiecek, “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 
1863-1875.” The American Journal of Legal History. 13, 4 (October 1969): 333-359. For a list of the changes in Court powers 
see Wiecek “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,” 333.   
137 Wiecek notes these advancements “laid the groundwork” for subsequent judicial moments of state expansion of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Wiecek, “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,” 334).  For a close 
look at the Habeas Corpus Act’s effect on Court power, see William Wiecek, “The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,” The Journal of Southern History, 36, 4 (Nov. 1970): 530-548. Wiecek highlights the new role 
the federal courts played in the post-Civil War era, a role that required building the central state apparatuses:  
[T]he expanded scope of federal activity during Reconstruction, together with the problems facing the freedmen, made it 
apparent that the objectives of the [Congressional-judicial] partnership would have to be expanded. By 1865 it had become 
obvious that the overriding result of the Civil War was the supremacy of the Union over the claims of state autonomy. 
Federal policy was to take precedence over state objectives in the event of a clash between the two, and the federal courts 
were to protect this precedence (Wieck, “The Great Writ,” 537).  
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power. Changes in federal court jurisdiction were not embarked upon because of antipathy to the 
institution or to President Johnson, but instead, because the Republican controlled Congress sought 
to tailor “the judicial system of the United States to suit better the demands and needs of the 
dominant section, and, of course, the dominant party” (Kutler 1968, 62). 138  But, before any 
discussion of specific constitutional developments in this period, let us take a look at the broader 
state theories and changes in constitutional thought advanced in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. These help explain the expansion and restriction of central state authority.  
 
Evolving Constitutional Thought and State Theory after the War  
 
Beyond looking at the empirical reality, we can begin to revise the APD narrative concerning 
the Court and state development by looking at the constitutional thought of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Here we certainly see arguments for the restrictions of central state 
authority—state-centered federalism arguments—but, we also see evolving state and legal theories 
calling for a stronger, centralized national government. Political scientists and legal scholars offered 
new conceptions of the state, sovereignty, and law that helped justify the expansion of the federal 
government as well as called on courts to remember states’ rights arguments of the pre-Civil War era 
thus contributing to constitutional development’s restriction-expansion patterns.  
For all the evolving ideas arguing to an enhancement of central state power, there remained 
voices in the American legal community advocating for the maintenance of states’ rights. Coming 
out of the Civil War, the Court—and the rest of the country, for that matter—was unsure as to the 
                                                 
138 For further discussion regarding the expansion of federal court jurisdiction, see Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction 
Politics, (1968, 143-160). Like Wiecek (1969), Kutler stresses the importance of congressional legislation which removed 
cases from state to federal courts (Kutler 1968, 143-144). More recently, and with a focus on judicial institutional 
development, Justin Crowe contends that congressional removal legislation “not only expanded the reach of judicial 
power but also unequivocally affirmed the federal judiciary as a crucial partner in the emerging economic regime” 
(Crowe 2012, 163).  
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boundaries of state and federal power. These states’ rights arguments still had a great impact on 
constitutional doctrine.  
John Norton Pomeroy—a lawyer from New York, New York University professor, and 
widely read legal writer—believed that while the concept of state sovereignty was “illogical [and] 
absurd,” he nevertheless claimed that the states did retain rights “as perfect within their sphere as 
those of the general government.” He believed that the Constitution gave “to the agents appointed 
to manage the national affairs, power enough to meet any emergency.” At the same time, he argued 
that the Constitution had “clothed the separate states with capacities to limit and restrain any 
unlawful exercise of that power, and to preserve our liberties to all time” (Pomeroy and Bennett 
1886, 103–104).139  
Pomeroy understood that the Civil War guaranteed a perpetual national union. Yet the union 
was still a collection of active, strong states. If the national government were permitted to occupy 
these states with military troops at its discretion, or if federal courts had total jurisdiction over these 
states, then the union, under the Constitution, would no longer exist. Pomeroy resisted what he saw 
as a dangerous expansion of central state authority during the Reconstruction Era. Even as he saw 
benefits to this nationalism, he cautioned against these threats to the states (Paludan 1968, 292).140 
The ideas of Pomeroy made their way into an important Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the nature of the federal union, Texas v. White (1869)141. In settling a question over 
                                                 
139 An earlier edition of Pomeroy’s casebook is included in my dataset.  
140 Reviewing Francis Lieber’s On Civil Liberty in 1874, Pomeroy wrote, “The book is especially needed in our own 
country to counteract those tendencies of the day towards a complete centralization” (Pomeroy quoted in Paludan 1968, 
292). Here Pomeroy represents the push and pull between the expansion and restriction of central state power occurring 
during the post-Civil War era that the Court attempted to navigate.  
141  74 U.S. 700. Texas pertained to an 1851 Congressional authorization that transferred $10 million in U.S. bonds to the 
state of Texas in settlement of boundary claims. The bonds were to be redeemable in 1864, but in 1862, the Confederate 
Texas state legislature transferred some of the bonds to dozens of private individuals and to Droege & Co., in England, 
in payment for Confederate military supplies. After the Civil War, the Reconstruction state legislature filed a suit in the 
Supreme Court to recover the bonds held by these private citizens, which were located across various states at the time. 
The fundamental questions in this case revealed a principal dilemma facing the Court (and the country) during 
Reconstruction—was Texas a state in the union eligible to seek redress in the Supreme Court and could Texas 
constitutionally reclaim the bonds? The Court held that Texas did have right to bring suit in the Court. It also held that 
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bonds, the Court in Texas addressed the more important question of the nature of the union. 
Historians have considered Texas as a victory for congressional reconstruction in that it upheld the 
power of the central state to regulate the reentry of rebel states into the union. But while the Court 
had acknowledged such power, it robbed that power of significant meaning by defining the form of 
the nation in terms that would prove the undoing of Reconstruction. It provided Pomeroy’s 
definition of the nature of the nation.142 On August 9, 1869 Chief Justice Chase wrote to Pomeroy, 
“You have doubtless seen some traces of your own thinking in the late judgment of the Supreme 
Court” (Chase quoted in Paludan 1968, 291). Pomeroy added the letter to a footnote in his 
constitutional casebook because there was great resemblance between his thought and the Court’s 
decision (Paludan 1968, 291). The decision coincided so well with Pomeroy’s ideas that he called it 
“remarkable for its clearness and for the cogency of its reasoning.” It “struck the solid ground of 
historical fact.” The decision provided “the greatest security for the nation . . . also the greatest 
security for the several states” (Pomeroy quoted in Paludan 1968, 291).   
 In Texas v. White Chase promulgated an idea about the nation that the Court perpetuated—
and Pomeroy supported—throughout the Reconstruction era. Chase held for the majority, “The 
Constitution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states” 
(Texas, 725). Similarly, Justice Nelson held in Collector v. Day (1870)143 that the powers of states 
“remained unaltered and unimpaired” in most internal matters (Collector, 124). And, again, in Lane 
County v. Oregon (1869) the Court advanced ideas concurrent with Pomeroy’s: “in many of the articles 
of the Constitution, the necessary existence of the states, within their proper spheres, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual states could not secede from the Union and the acts of the rebellious Texas in 1862—transferring bonds to 
various citizens—were null.  
142 Historians often share the view expressed in Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A, Harbison’s The American Constitution that 
Texas v. White was “a major victory for the Radicals” (Kelly and Harbison 1967, 481).  
143 78 U.S. 113. Collector represented a restriction of central state power, inhibiting Congress from imposing taxes on 
states and state officials because the states and national government were two separate entities. Thus, restricting central 
state authority along Bensel’s extraction dimension.  
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independent authority of the states are distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole charge of 
interior regulation is committed” (Lane County, 76).144  
In these decisions and in Pomeroy’s constitutional casebook, we see the important question 
of state versus federal power continue to animate constitutional development. After the Civil War, 
states’ rights arguments did not disappear; yet as the country moved beyond Reconstruction, the 
consolidation of parts of the central state vis-à-vis the Supreme Court became ever-more apparent.    
Pomeroy’s ideas of states’ rights notwithstanding, the general trend of constitutional thought 
lent credence to the idea of an expanded, powerful central state. 145 A fundamental shift in the 
conceptualization of the American state was occurring as Pomeroy wrote in the treatises of Sidney 
Fisher (1862), John Jameson (1867), Orestes Brownson (1866), and John Hurd (1881).146 These legal 
thinkers moved us away from a state-centered understanding of the American union and toward a 
more nationalistic, centralized conception, often criticizing the compact theory and state sovereignty 
arguments of John C. Calhoun made in the mid-nineteenth century (Larsen 1959, 361).  The theories 
promulgated in these treaties believed “that sovereignty inhered in the American people as a nation, 
that the nation existed before the Constitution was adopted and that the nation was the source of 
                                                 
144 74 U.S. 71. Lane County also pertained to issues of taxation. Lane County, Oregon paid its county taxes to the state of 
Oregon in U.S. legal tender notes—not in gold and silver coin as stipulated by the Oregon legislature. Counsel for Lane 
County claimed that an 1862 Congressional statute authorizing U.S. notes to be used as legal tender to pay debts enabled 
Lane County officials to pay taxes with such notes. The Court, however, disagreed, holding that the Congressional 
statute imposed no restriction on the requirements stipulated by the Oregon legislature on its counties.   
145 Pomeroy is actually most remembered for his vigorous defense of a strong, centralized union, inspiring the 
nationalistic treatises of Orestes Brownson’s (1866) The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny, and John 
C. Hurd’s (1881) A Theory of our National Existence. See Charles E. Larsen, “Nationalism and States’ Rights in 
Commentaries on the Constitution after the Civil War,” American Journal of Legal History 3, 4 (1959): 360-369. (Larsen 
1959, 361–362). For a revisionist interpretation of Pomeroy, see Phillip S. Paludan, “John Norton Pomeroy, States’ 
Rights Nationalist,” who argues that it is a mistake to understand Pomeroy as inspiring the idea, in subsequent 
constitutional treatises, that “states’ rights was a casualty of war” (Paludan 1968, 279). For a discussion of Pomeroy’s 
understanding of constitutional interpretation, see David M. Rabban. 2013. Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the 
Transatlantic Turn to History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 349-351. 
146 Yet, as Morton Keller’s Affairs of the State recognizes, even in these nationalistic treatises, we can see the difficulty in 
discerning the reach of central state power. Indeed, Hurd dedicated his book “in homage to the Sovereign: whoever he, 
she, or they, may be” (Hurd 1881). Morton Keller, Affairs of the State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 41, see also footnote 6 on the same page. Certainly the Court was no 
different from the broader legal community in its inability to precisely and coherently draw boundaries between federal 
and state power, and this was not simply a phenomenon of the immediate post-bellum era.   
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the Constitution.” The fundamental premise uniting these treaties was that they “accepted as 
xiomatic the principle that sovereignty is indestructible” (Larsen 1959, 361).  
The chief aim in Brownson’s The American Republic, for example, was to topple the notion of 
state sovereignty, so long and so vigorously maintained in the pre-Civil War era (Brownson 1866, 
192-195). According to Brownson (the onetime Jacksonian radical who moved from Unitarianism to 
Roman Catholicism), the United States had always been one nation, never a confederation of 
states. 147  The doctrine of state sovereignty, said Brownson, was rejected in 1787, during the 
ratification of the Constitution, and in 1861 during the Civil War: “the first and last attempt to 
establish State sovereignty have failed, and the failure vindicates the fact that the sovereignty is in the 
States united, not in the States severally” (Brownson 1866, 217). These changes in state theory were 
best summarized by political scientist Charles Merriam in 1903: “In the new national school, the 
tendency was to disregard the doctrine of social contract, and to emphasize strongly the instinctive 
forces whose action and interaction produces a state. . .the great difference between ‘people’ and 
‘nation’ lies in the fact that the latter possess organic unity. . .In general, the new school thought of 
the Union as organic148 rather than contractual in nature” (Merriam 1903, 296–297).  
The new national school emerging in the wake of the Civil War virtually spawned modern 
political science as embodied in the works of Woodrow Wilson (1890), Westel Willoughby (1896), 
and John W. Burgess (1890). These political scientists shifted America’s understanding of the state 
away from local conceptions of self-government toward the national state and its broad sovereign 
authority. In his two-volume work, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, Burgess 
represented the changing American conceptions of the state: “The state must constitute itself in 
                                                 
147 Brownson’s argument has roots in America’s Declaration of Independence: “The declaration was not made by the 
states severally, but by the states jointly, as the United States. They unitedly declared their independence; they carried on 
the war for independence, won it, and were acknowledged by foreign powers and by the mother country as the United 
States, not as severally independent sovereign states” (Brownson 1866, 209, emphasis original).  
148 Pomeroy helped spread this notion of “organic.” The nature of the federal union, he argued, could be understood 
only by seeing the United States “as a nation, and its Constitution as the fundamental organic law of that nation” 
(Pomeroy quoted in Larsen 1959, 362).  
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sufficient power to preserve its existence and proper advantage against other states, and to give itself 
a universally commanding position over against its own subjects, either as individuals or associations 
of individuals” (Burgess 1890, I. 83). All forms of the state, Burgess contended, share one important 
attribute: “The essence of the state is everywhere, and at all times, one and the same viz; 
sovereignty” (Burgess 1890, I. 74). Moving away from social contract and natural law theories of the 
state (Willoughby 1896, 98-128), these political scientists put forth a positivist redefinition of law 
and the state. Following Burgess, Willoughby also argued for the broad scope of national state 
power vis-à-vis law. His positivist conception saw laws as the command of the sovereign: “All is 
considered as a command of the sovereign, which, for present purposes, may be considered as 
meaning State.” Willoughby even went so far as to claim that “there are in the individual no so-
called innate or ‘natural rights,’ that is such rights as exist independent of the state and beyond its 
control” (Willoughby 1896, 163, 181). Essentially, then, the positivistic theories promulgated by 
these political scientists contributed to the constitutional expansion and growth of the central state 
by providing new views on the powers of the federal government.  
While the “new national school” helped redefine state and sovereignty, another 
development—the invention of centralizing administrative law—put forth by Frank Goodnow also 
advanced the positive powers of the central state. For Goodnow, an important area of legal 
innovation focused on the problem of the constitutional separation of powers. A system of divided 
government (with its various institutional loci of power) posed an obstacle for Progressive reformers 
like Goodnow who sought to centralize administrative power in the executive branch. Goodnow 
helped consolidate power in the executive with his critique of the prevailing constitutional 
understanding of federalism and the separation of powers. In Social Reform and the Constitution, he 
argued that the emphasis on states’ rights and the American peoples’ “extremely individualistic 
conception of the powers of government has resulted in a constitutional tradition which is apt not to 
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accord to the federal government powers which it unquestionably ought to have the constitutional 
right to exercise” (Goodnow 1911, 11). He went on to say that courts should “abandon certainly the 
strict application of the principle of the separation of powers whenever the demand for 
administrative efficiency would seem to make such action desirable” (Goodnow 1911, 221). 
Goodnow’s work embodied the Progressive legal changes, and it reconceived the ideas of the state, 
sovereignty, and law that began shortly after the Civil War.  
But, in what ways did these abstract theories of the state, sovereignty, and union affect 
constitutional law? At the turn of the twentieth century, these ideas came together in the public law 
treatises of political scientist Westel Willoughby (whose 1912 casebook is in my dataset). Like those 
in the “national school,” Willougby argued, “Since the close of the Civil War the sovereignty of the 
National Government has been undisputed” (Willoughby 1910, 62). Unlike those before him, 
however, Willoughby went to great length to demonstrate that constitutional law—as promulgated 
by the Supreme Court (even before the Civil War)—developed not only federal judicial power but 
also the federal government thus demonstrating the positive force of constitutional law. His 1904 
casebook, The American Constitutional System: An Introduction to the Study of the American State, for 
example, devoted a whole chapter to the “development of national sovereignty” (Willoughby 1904, 
32-59). In this chapter, he posited that even the Taney Court—most often remembered for its 
penchant for state rights—built the American state:  
Regarding the attitude of the Supreme Court during [the Taney] period, the important fact is to be noticed that, 
though it threw the weight of its influence upon the side of the States so far as conferenced a liberal 
interpretation of the powers reserved to them by the Constitution, not once, in the slightest measure, did it 
during these years, any more than it had done in the years preceding, intimate that the actual legal and political 
supremacy was not vested in the National Government. The position of Taney and of the court upon this 
point was clearly shown in the judgment rendered, and in the opinion delivered, in the case of Ableman v. Booth 
(1859)149 (Willoughby 1904, 58-59).   
                                                 
149 62 U.S. 506. In Ableman, Sherman Booth was convicted by a federal district court in Wisconsin for violating the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 after he aided the escape of a slave. Booth petitioned the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for his 
release, claiming that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional and that the federal district court did not have 
jurisdiction. After the Wisconsin Supreme Court released him, the United States appealed to the Supreme Court. Chief 
Justice Taney, writing for the majority, dismissed Wisconsin’s claim of judicial power. Taney held that “it certainly has 
not been conferred on them by the United States; and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it” 
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With regard to these treatises concerning the nature of state power, the bottom line was that 
a positivist redefinition of the state bled into constitutional law, nationalizing many legal questions 
that once remained under the purview of the individual states. Questions concerning state police 
powers, for example, became thoroughly nationalized in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in 
decisions such as Munn v. Illinois (1877), Mugler v. Kansas (1887), and Budd v. New York (1892) (Novak 
2002, 268). This nationalization, by its very nature, provided the foundation upon which the Court’s 
review power grew, which thus resulted in an expansion of the central state itself. 150 Indeed, Ernst 
Freund—a progressive era law professor known for his treatises on police powers—noted the 
persistent expansion of central state power vis-à-vis law and the Court, remarking, “The 
consolidation of our own nation has proved our allotment of federal powers to be increasingly 
inadequate; and had it not been aided by liberal judicial construction, our situation would be 
unbearable” (Freund quoted in Thompson 1923, 10). The growing number of legal issues coming 
before the Court resulted in the development of a federal police power, which was premised largely 
on issues of Commerce Clause and economic regulation, as then-retired Justice Charles Evan 
Hughes151 pointed out in a 1918 speech to the American Bar Foundation: “the extended application 
of the doctrine that federal rules governing interstate commerce may have the quality of police 
regulations” (Hughes quoted in Novak 2002, 270). Hughes saw central state expansion as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Ableman, 515). In dealing with questions of habeas corpus and jurisdiction, Ableman expanded the powers of the federal 
government over Bensel’s citizenship dimension as well as the centralization dimension.   
150 For then-contemporary accounts of the centralization of federal judicial power and its effects on broader aspects of 
central state authority, see Fred Perry Powers, “Recent Centralizing Tendencies in the Supreme Court,” Political Science 
Quarterly 5, 3 (Sept. 1890): 389-410. Powers closely examines questions relating to commerce between the states and 
federal government and writes disapprovingly of the Court’s jurisprudential changes (Powers 1890, 410). See also L.H. 
Pool, “Judicial Centralization,” Yale Law Journal, 11, 5 March 1902): 246-55. The “strongest evidence” of the Court’s 
expanding power, Pool claims, rests with the battle between the “common law of the United States” and the 
“preservation of the right of local self-government” (Pool 1902, 251). Navigating this battle became the Court’s duty 
following the Civil War. In doing so, the Court expanded state authority along some realms (where it advanced U.S. 
common law) and restricting it along others (where it preserved local self-rule).  
151 In 1918, Charles Evans Hughes was in between Court appointments. Hughes served on the Court from 1910 to 1916 
then again he served as Chief Justice of the Court from 1930 to 1941.  
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inevitable consequence of a modernizing industry and economy (Hughes 1918, 93-94). With that, we 
can now turn to the empirical data concerning the Court’s decision between 1870 and 1920.  
 
 
State-building at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
 
During this period, the Court balanced the competing models of federalism advanced by 
industrialists and states’ rights advocates. Ultimately, the Court advanced the Republican Party’s 
most sacred rights—property, contract, and physical security—while granting the members of both 
parties their preference for state-centered federalism, allowing states to have the authority to regulate 
individual and race-related rights. The Supreme Court’s navigation of competing political demands 
for, on the one hand, a unified national market and, on the other, Confederate demands for local 
control of race relations represented the manifestation of this national community. 152 By navigating 
these competing demands, the Court helped along the calls made by the broader national 
community that began to form in the wake of the Civil War.153       
The period from roughly 1870 to 1920, in particular, is when the Court is said to have most 
frequently opposed state expansion. We should expect, then, that the Court’s most prominent 
decisions to stymie expansion. But when we shift our focus away from the creation of the 
administrative state and look more broadly at multiple dimensions of the federal state, we find that 
the Court and legal doctrine greatly advanced the federal government.154  
                                                 
152 Bruce Ackerman. 1984. “The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,” 93 Yale Law Journal 1013. For 
Ackerman constitutional politics is the politics of the “national community” wherein the “people sacrifice their private 
interests to pursue the common good.” (Ackerman “Discovering the Constitution,” 1020). See also Paul Kahn. 1989. 
“Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory.” Yale Law Journal. Kahn provides an excellent discussion of the 
theoretical conception and role of “community” in understanding constitutional change.   
153 Akhil Reed Amar also discusses the formation of this national community in America’s Constitution A Biography. (New 
York, NY: Random House. 2005), chapters 10 and 11, describing the effects of the Reconstruction Amendments and 
the Progressive Era reforms, respectively. The Court’s constitutional jurisprudence marked a way in which this national 
community was advanced legally.    
154 Decisions like Lochner v. New York garner most of the scholarly attention, but the Court left much regulation intact in 
the states during this period. Two important law review articles penned by Charles Warren, during the Progressive Era, 
challenged the Progressive interpretation that the Court embodied a “judicial oligarchy.” Warren argued, “The National 
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Of the 388 decisions in the data, 104 decisions were handed down between 1870 and 1920. 
Contrary to the conventional narrative, the Court did not persistently inhibit state development. 
Instead, the Court, as we might expect during a tumultuous time, did both.  Figure 9 reveals that the 
Court, more often than not, affirmed the central state’s authority to govern, showing the difference 
between decisions that expanded authority (61) and the cases that restricted central authority (43).  
In each decade across this fifty-year period, expansion outweighed restriction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Supreme Court, so far from being reactionary, has been steady and consistent in upholding all state legislation of a 
progressive type” (Warren 1913b, 295). He based this conclusion on looking at 560 decisions between 1887 and 1911 
(inclusive), pertaining to the “due process” and “equal protection” clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
invalidated only three state laws (including Lochner) relating to “social justice” questions of the due process clause 
(Warren 1913b, 295). In another article from the same year, Warren found that of a total of 302 cases, only thirty-six 
state and local social and economic regulations were held unconstitutional in forty years. The vast majority of cases in 
Warren’s study were upheld by the Court pertaining to a diverse set of issues:   
anti-lottery laws; anti-trust and corporate monopoly laws; liquor laws; food, game, oleomargarine and other inspection laws; 
regulation of banks, telegraph and insurance companies; cattle, health, and quarantine laws; regulation of business and 
property of water, gas, electric light, railroad (other than interstate trains) and other public service corporations; regulation 
of rates of public service corporations, grain elevators; stockholders’ liability laws; regulation of business of private 
corporations; negro-segregation laws; labor laws; laws as to navigation, marine lines, ferries, bridges, etc., pilots, harbors, 
and immigration. (Warren 1913a, 695)   
One thing Warren’s study revealed was the explosion of law in the early twentieth century; the simple empirical reality 
was that there were more cases being adjudicated, falling under an ever-growing range of legal issues. This explosion led 
to an unprecedented expansion in the Court’s review power, especially concerning federal police power (Novak 2002, 
262). 
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Figure 9: Decisions’ Impact on Central State Authority by Decade, 1870-1920 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. This distribution resembles the larger 
distribution seen above in Figure 6.2. We can see here that the Court persistently 
expanded the federal government’s power but not without also significantly restricting 
central state power. Important to note is that number of decisions that expand relative 
to the number decisions that restrict becomes much larger in the twentieth century, 
which dovetails with the evolving state theories and constitutional treatises discussed in 
the previous section. Thus, Figure 10 represents an important trend of American 
constitutional development—that it generally expanded the powers of the federal 
government. The one neutral decisions was excluded from this figure.  
 
 
Thus far, these results merely suggest that the narrative of constitutional and political development is 
more complicated than previously argued. The data suggests that the Court acted as more of an ally 
with other federal branches during the expansion of the new American state.       
 Looking closer at the central state dimensions, 61 expanded at least one of the seven 
dimensions of the central state; the “centralization” dimension expanded most frequently (in 60 of 
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the 61 decisions that expanded authority). This “centralization” dimension embodies taking 
decision-making authority from subordinate governments and placing it under the purview of the 
national state. 155    
As noted above, the “expansion” category embraces a broader understanding of state-
building, a form of state-building that not only lays foundation for a welfare-state arrangements but 
also advances myriad other structural and substantive apparatuses integral to a powerful central 
state. And this state-building took place primarily in the realm of federalism (economic and 
industrial-related questions). Table 4 arrays the impact constitutional issues had on central state 
authority comprising this period. With 33 decisions, “federalism” is the issue that came before the 
Court most frequently. Individual rights issue areas—due process (procedural and substantive), civil 
rights/liberties, criminal procedure, and First Amendment—comprise another 41 decisions. 
Together, federalism and individual rights issue areas makeup 70 percent of the 104 decisions 
between 1870 and 1920.  Such numbers indicate that the Court was preoccupied with navigating 
between federalism and individual rights questions. Table 4 suggests that Court generally advanced 
state authority within the commerce realm while taking a more moderate approach toward individual 
rights. Of the 40 individual rights decisions, 21 restricted the federal government, meaning that the 
Court either invalidated a Congressional statute or allowed a state-level statute to stand. The 
opposite is true with federalism decisions: 26 of 33 decisions expanded central authority. With 
federalism, the Court often affirmed Congressional statutes, which sought to create a national 
marketplace.  
                                                 
155 As Chapter 2 details, expansion cases advanced any arm of the central state across seven the dimensions of central 
state authority. Two of the seven dimensions—centralization and administrative—are structural, concerning only the 
design of the state and “the process of decision making and its location within the state apparatus” (Bensel, Yankee 
Leviathan, 111). The remaining 5 dimensions—citizenship, property rights, client-group formation, extraction, and 
involvement in the world system—deal with the substantive content of central state policy. See Chapter 2 and the 
Appendix for further discussion. This broader interpretation of the American state captures not only forms of state-
building that lay foundation for welfare-state arrangements but also forms of state-building that advances myriad other 
structural and substantive apparatuses integral to a powerful central state.  
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Table 4: Constitutional Issue by Impact on Authority, 1870-1920 
 
 
                             
Impact on Central State Authority  
   Total Restrict Neutral Expand 
Constitutional 
Issue 
Civil Rights and Liberties 21 1 19 40 
Economic Activity 3 0 4 7 
Judicial Power 3 0 2 5 
Federalism 7 0 26 33 
Taxation 6 0 8 14 
Private Action 2 0 2 4 
Total 42 1 61 104 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. This crosstab indicates that individual rights generally 
restrict while federalism decisions generally expand the federal government. This tables collapses 
twelve issues areas into six. Most importantly, the “individual rights” issues comprise due process, 
criminal procedure, First Amendment, and civil rights/liberties issues. “Federalism” largely deals with 
commerce and economic issues, but the conflict between state-federal spheres of power is central to 
the individual rights issue area, too. 
 
With this descriptive overview, we can now take a closer look at the substantive constitutional and 
political developments of the period.  
 
Emerging Social Consensus: Fashioning Reconciliation   
 
If ever the Court was faced with federal-state relationships as “a new question,” as Woodrow 
Wilson phrased it, then Civil War and Reconstruction years were such a time.156  And on this altar of 
federalism the Court fashioned doctrine that helped fortify an emerging consensus in the country.  
Constitutional development during this period, as it does in any period, largely reflected the broader 
politics of the day. The commitment to a pre-Civil War understanding of federalism, with its 
emphasis on state rights, inhibited the radical Republican agenda to establish full freedom and 
equality for newly freed African-Americans (Les Benedict 1978, 47). For the rest of the nineteenth-
century, historians recognize, protection of citizenship rights (i.e. social control) remained the duty 
                                                 
156 Woodrow Wilson. 1908. The Constitutional Government in the United States. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 
p. 173. 
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of the states not the federal government. 157  Congressional debates indicate the centrality of 
federalism and states right in the construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Republican 
Congressman John Bingham, for example, sought to strengthen Congressional power in the Civil 
Rights Act by allowing Congress power to impose criminal sanctions against state officers, but 
Democrats and moderate Republicans rebuffed him. They “opposed the transfer of sovereignty over 
civil rights to the federal government” (Belz 1976, 171). Essentially, in this period, neither radical 
Republicans nor Democrats steered Congressional policy; it was determined by moderates, which 
created a polity colored by the “interplay between the war-born ideals of strong central government 
and race-blind citizenship, and more traditional American beliefs in localism, limited government, 
and racial inequality” (Keller 1977, 37-38).  
Other political ideas help explain the advancement of commerce and restriction of civil 
rights as well as the push for reconciliation. In particular, New South thought158  and politics made 
known by people like Henry W. Grady159 propelled national reconciliation forward, joining forces 
with southern conservative Redeemers and northern Republicans who favored an end to 
Reconstruction and a return to national prosperity. Economic self-interest pulled the sections 
together, but shared convictions about the mistakes of Reconstruction facilitated this reunion 
(Dennis 2002, 103-104). The New South boosterism of Grady, a well-known Southern orator in the 
late nineteenth century, embodied these convictions that helped advance reunion. This New South 
                                                 
157 Morton Keller Affairs of the State, 31-81 and Herman Belz A New Birth of Freedom (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1976): 113-137, 152-182. 
158 The New South ideology embraced a “creed of regional progress through national reconciliation, industrial growth, 
agricultural diversification, and racial control.” Michael Dennis. 2002. “Looking Backward: Woodrow Wilson, the New 
South, and the Question of Race,” American Nineteenth Century History 3, 1: 77-104, 77. In this way, individuals of the New 
South embraced a strong central state in the area of economic regulation while a weaker central state over issues 
concerning race. See also David Blight’s chapter on “Reconstruction and Reconciliation” in Race and Reunion: The Civil 
War in American Memory. (Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2001). 
159 Henry W. Grady (1850-1889) was a journalist and orator from Athens, Georgia. He was dubbed, “by common 
consent, as the representative Southern orator since the Civil War” (Grady and Shurter 1910, iii). For a sense of the New 
South ethos see Grady’s speech to a banquet of the New England Society, New York City, 21 December 1886 entitled 
“New South” in The Complete Orations and Speeches of Henry W. Grady, ed. Edwin Shurter (New York City: Hinds, Noble, & 
Eldredge, 1910).  
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ethos saw many mistakes with Reconstruction one of which was the enfranchisement of African-
Americans. In an 1889 speech to the Boston Merchants’ Association,160 Grady declared: 
The negro vote can never control in the South, and it would be well if partisans in the North would understand 
this . . . never, sir, will a single State of this Union, North or South, be delivered again to the control of an 
ignorant and inferior race. We wrested our State government from negro supremacy when the Federal 
drumbeat rolled closer to the ballot box . . . but, sir, though the cannon of this Republic thundered in every 
voting district of the South, we still should find in the mercy of God the means and the courage to prevent its 
reestablishment.161 
Woodrow Wilson concurred with Grady’s racial sentiment and the turn away from enforcing the 
Reconstruction Amendments and using the federal government to protect African-Americans. On 
the “return to normal conditions,” Wilson wrote, “The period of reconstruction was past; Congress 
had ceased to exercise extra-constitutional powers; natural legal conditions once more prevailed. 
Negro rule under unscrupulous adventurers had been finally put an end to in the South, and the 
natural, inevitable ascendency of the whites, the responsible class, established” (Wilson and Corwin 
1910, 273).162 The New South sought a state-centered model of federalism for civil and political 
rights, but also simultaneously pressed for advancement in industry and commerce.  
The emerging voices of the post-Reconstruction Era included these New South proponents 
like Wilson and Grady who advocated for localized racial control but also allied with Northerners 
calling for a unified national market. Espousing an ideology that united the North and the South, 
they protested the 15th Amendment enfranchisement of African-Americans because it deviated from 
southern tradition. Instead, Wilson and his New South counterparts, formulated a local vision of 
race control, which stemmed from “a sanitized, clinical doctrine of racial control that echoed 
prevailing assumptions about scientifically verifiable racial distinctions and struggles for existence” 
(Dennis 2002, 97). The New Southerners looked toward the industrializing northern commercial 
                                                 
160 Grady made many of these speeches to various New England organizations. Of a speech Grady made to the New 
England Society of New York, historian Paul M. Gaston notes that the Society wanted a “man who would speak for 
reconciliation and who would, at the same time, command the respect of all parts of the country. Grady was a natural 
choice . . . His record as a spokesman for progressive economic policies and sectional reconciliation was already well 
known, and his oratorical abilities similarly commended him” (Gaston 1970, 87). Paul M. Gaston. The New South Creed: A 
Study in Southern Mythmaking, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).   
161 “The Race Problem in the South” December 1889 (Grady and Shurter 1910, 212–213). 
162 Woodrow Wilson. Division and Reunion: 1829-1909. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910 [1893]).  
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horizon in order to rebuild the south post-Reconstruction. Elites from both north and south 
understood the advancement of industrial capitalism and commercial agriculture as a way to move 
the country forward. But, according to the New South creed, it would be blacks who would 
continue to work the fields, as Wilson wrote: “North and South are becoming daily more alike and 
hourly growing into a closer harmony of sentiment . . . Happily freed from the curse of slavery.”  In 
the largely agricultural south, however, some would have to tend the fields while others produced, 
but as Wilson recognized, there existed a “perfectly natural division of labor” that replaced the 
“unnatural system of slave labor.” 163  After Reconstruction ended and Democratic dominance 
returned to the south, Wilson saw this as the beginning of southern progress: “The South had been 
changed, as if by a marvel, into likeness to the rest of the country. Freed from the incubus of slavery, 
she sprung into new life” and became “one of the chief industrial regions of the Union.” Out of this 
development, New Southerners formed the bonds of reunion with the north.164  
The Court reflected these trends of reconciliation and helped steer a moderate course of 
development. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase (1864-1873), a Lincoln appointee, sought to bring 
about reconciliation.  Chase was aware of the fragility of the Court and attempted to shift away from 
the Court’s “tarnished” “public image” that Taney and Dred Scott produced (Chase and Niven 1993, 
xvii).165 Consequently, Chief Justice Chase expressed his support for an accommodating approach to 
former Confederates. Chase revealed this in a letter to George H. Hill, an Ohio legislative 
representative serving from 1870 to 1872:  
                                                 
163 Wilson quoted in Dennis (2002, 81).  
164 Wilson quoted in Dennis (2002, 98). Dennis recognizes that the northerners realized “the errors of Reconstruction 
and the need for racial management” and thus joined the south in advancing its economic potential while leaving 
regulation of “social affairs” to whites (Dennis 2002, 98). Indeed, part of the New South’s agenda for economic 
advancement required the control of black labor through Slave Codes then later through lien laws, debt peonage, anti-
enticement measures, and urban segregation (Dennis 2002, 80).  
165 This phenomenon—the habit of present Court members looking back on the institutions’ development—is the 
subject of the next chapter. The Court, because of the nature of law and precedent, confronts its historical and 
institutional memory far more often than any other political institution.  
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I have always thought, too, that universal amnesty should be accorded, and the most liberal and generous 
policy should be adopted towards all who, having been enemies during the civil war, were willing to resume in 
good faith the relation of friends and fellow citizens when war was over. Hence, I very early adopted the motto, 
Universal Suffrage and Universal Amnesty. I felt sure that this policy would secure the peace of the whole 
country, and the highest prosperity of all the South.166 
  
Chase, in this same letter, recognized that universal suffrage via the Fifteenth Amendment would 
not expand central state authority, leaving it to state control. He argued that civil rights were to be a 
state-based project: “The Amendment gives no power to Congress to interfere with suffrage in any 
state unless it is denied or abridged by the state . . . The full power of regulation, as it has existed 
heretofore will exist still in the states.”167 This remained the Supreme Court’s interpretation long 
after Chase left the Court, and this sentiment assuaged the feelings of states-rights proponents who 
sought to keep in place the state-based, dual federalism understanding of the relationship between 
the national and state governments, as demonstrated by Chase’s majority opinion in Texas v. White.168  
At the same time, a rapid expansion of federal judicial power enabled the Court, on the one 
hand, to become an outlet for state expansion with respect to Commerce Clause and economic 
questions. The withdrawal of Southern congressional delegations, between 1861 and 1865, enabled 
Congress to make the judiciary the most Republican instrument of the federal government, 
protecting its favored constituencies who called for the rapid expansion of central state power 
(Crowe 2012, 170).169 On the other hand, the expansion of federal authority moved at a slower pace 
                                                 
166 Letter to George Hill 7 January 1870 in the Papers of Salmon P. Chase, vol. V (Chase and Niven 1993, 323). 
167 Letter to George Hill 7 January 1870 in the Papers of Salmon P. Chase, vol. V (Chase and Niven 1993, 324). To be sure, 
Chase was an ardent proponent of suffrage for African-Americans, but he failed to convince President Andrew Johnson 
or his fellow justices that the Thirteenth Amendment incorporated the Declaration of Independence or the Bill of Rights 
against national and state officials as well as private persons. In a letter to his son-in-law, William Sprague, Chase 
explained his “wide divergence” with President Johnson over African-American rights, summarizing his views on these 
rights and his conversation with the president: “the blacks were citizens of the United States & of the States in which 
they live; that under an appeal from the President to the People to reorganize, the blacks as part of the people had a right 
their fair share of  influence & control in the work of reorganization; that the People meant all People without respect to 
the color of the skin.” Letter to William Sprague 6 September 1865, Papers of Salmon P. Chase vol. 5 (Chase and Niven 
1993, 68, emphasis original). 
168 See the discussion of Texas above.  
169 In tracing the Court’s institutional and administrative development, Crowe observes, “With the birth of central state 
authority came the rise of centralized judicial authority.” Between 1870 and 1877 Congressional legislation greatly 
enhanced federal judicial power especially with the passage of the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875. This Act 
granted the circuit courts both original and removal jurisdiction over the vast majority of cases arising under 
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in the individual rights realm in the way Chase outlined.170 Constitutional development, during this 
time, involved an ideological process that constructed a compromise between conceptions of 
federalism. This continued long after the Chase Court. Political scientist Pamela Brandwein 
emphasizes that the Court under Chief Justices Fuller and Waite (1874-1910) aligned at least its civil 
rights decision with a “state-centered federalism” but not the extreme Democratic version. Instead, 
the Court produced a more “moderate version” which allowed states to have local control over 
crime yet still gave Congress the power to punish alleged criminals if states “defaulted in their duty 
to redress wrongs against ‘civil rights’” (Brandwein 2006, 277).171 Doing so helped create a climate of 
reconciliation between northern and southern interests as well as insured the Court’s legitimacy in a 
tumultuous period in American state development (Brandwein 2007, 371). 172  Thus, the Court’s 
doctrine produced an institution that expanded central state authority in some realms and 
constricted authority in others.173  
                                                                                                                                                             
Constitutional and federal law (Crowe 2012, 161-162, emphasis original). For a treatment of the important institutional 
developments that enhanced federal judicial power during this time, see Howard Gillman, “How Political Parties Can 
Use the Courts to Advance Their Agenda: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891,” American Political Science 
Review 96, 3 (September 2002): 511-524.  
170 To be sure, the judiciary did not completely halt the expansion of congressional power in the civil rights realm, which 
is a large focus of Pamela Brandwein’s (2011) Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction. She stresses that Court 
decisions before and after the Civil Rights Cases held that Congress can reach private individuals but only when, what 
Brandwein terms, “state neglect” is present. That is, if “State or local officers . . . refuse to extend to black citizens the 
protection to which they are entitled as citizens” (Brandwein 2011, 168). The Fifteenth Amendment, she argues, led to 
judicial decisions that “provided the federal government with broad possibilities for rights enforcement” in electoral 
rights decisions like Ex Parte Siebold (1880) and Ex Parte Yarbrough (1884) (Brandwein 2011, 12).   
171 Pamela Brandwein (2006) “The Civil Rights Cases and the Lost Language of State Neglect,” in The Supreme Court and 
American State Development, Ronald Kahn and Ken Kersch, eds. Brandwein’s revises the constitutional developmental 
narrative concerning the Court and civil rights, urging us not to view the Waite Court as “racial villains who lost interest 
in Reconstruction” (Brandwein 2006, 276). She offers a nuanced depiction of the Court as it navigated a moderate 
course in the broader political milieu, not fully abandoning blacks yet not fully embracing radical Republican agendas.  
172 Pamela Brandwein, “A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the ‘State Action’ Cases of the Waite Court,” 
Law & Society Review 41, 2 (2007): 343-386. Of the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876), Brandwein speculates 
that the Court’s “modulated expression” was a reflection of the Court’s “sensitivity to the political context and a concern 
for its own institutional influence” (2007, 371). Chapter 6 below examines this kind of Court behavior, that is, how the 
institutional and political context creates the Court’s self-effacing nature.  
173 This conception accords with Kersch’s understanding of constitutional development. Writing against the fallacies of 
“Whig history,” Kersch argues for a non-linear understanding of constitutional development whereby development 
moved along two tracks: institutional and ideological (Kersch 2004, 12).   
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The popular press lauded the Court’s state rights recognition in individual rights cases. 
Regarding the Court’s decisions in upholding state liquor prohibition in Mugler v. Kansas (1877)174 and 
upholding state regulation of oleomargarine in Powell v. Pennsylvania (1888),175 the Washington Post 
wrote, “It is the business of the State, and not of the United States, to determine what is good or 
bad for the people of a State….Our Republican Supreme Court has become the fortress of State 
rights because it finds States rights in the Constitution. The process of centralization by 
interpretation of the fundamental law was, happily, checked in time to the save the Government.”176 
In the same year, the Washington Post also celebrated an end to the “march of centralization” 
following the twenty-years after the Civil War, citing Mugler again.177 The late nineteenth century 
witnessed a number of additional articles praising the Court’s decisions leaving questions of social 
control to the states.178 The steady calls to leave some policy areas—social policies—to the states, 
then, remained an important component in constitutional development during the emergence of the 
modern state. Indeed, the post-Civil War Court took care to establish “reasonably coherent” sets of 
categories to allocate regulatory authority between state and federal governments in order to 
preserve dual sovereignty (Compton 2014, 120).  
The “genius” of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Mugler, John Compton argues, was “that it 
defined the police power broadly enough to establish the constitutionality of liquor prohibition 
while at the same time leaving the door open to future constitutional challenges to industrial 
regulation” (Compton 2014, 115). In so doing, the Court created an avenue for the eventual national 
expansion of the police power seen later in the Progressive era as the noted legal scholar Ernst 
                                                 
174 123 U.S. 623. Mugler concerned the prohibition of alcohol. Here the Court held that Kansas’s prohibition of alcohol 
that led to the arrest of Mugler did not violate the 14th Amendment.  
175 127 U.S. 678. Powell concerned the sale of oleomargarine and the state’s regulation of this product. Again, the Court 
upheld a state statute regulating this sale of a good.  
176 The Washington Post, “State Rights,” 12 April 1888, p. 4.  
177 The Washington Post, “The Supreme Court,” 25 March 1888,  p. 4  
178 The Washington Post, “A Right Decision,” 3 November 1887, p. 2 (concerning criminal law); Washington Post, “An 
Important Result,” 12 December 1887, p. 4 (concerning prohibition). 
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Freund recognized. In his 1904 police power treatise, Freund helped shift the understanding of 
police power from its pre-Civil War, common law definition to one of constitutional doctrine, 
“meaning the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty 
and property” (Freund 1904, iii).179 
Ultimately, Union victory thwarted theories of the Southern separatist movement and thus 
relegated many questions upward to the Supreme Court. Moreover, Union victory put in motion 
many political projects, namely, the development of a national capitalist market,180 the preeminence 
of national sovereignty,181 and the expansion of federal judicial power.182 Consequently, building the 
modern American state became the particular province of the Court.183 
The Court’s tendencies in the post-war era traveled along two tracks, one institutional and 
one policy-substantive, which are discussed in separate sections below. The institutional aspect dealt 
with political institutions that would decide the growing and complicated questions facing an 
industrializing republic. The post-war constitutional order had to reconcile the constitutional ideas 
of the previous state-centered agrarian society and a new rapidly industrializing nation state, which 
was undergoing profound social and economic transformation.184 Negotiating between these two 
                                                 
179 Ernst Freund helped usher in modern state development with his scholarship on legislative and police power. Areas 
of the law that were once left to the states and local governments—business, labor, and police powers—soon came 
under the purview of the national government. Freund recognized that the judiciary was crucial to this upward shift: 
“The consolidation of our nation has proved our allotment of federal powers to be increasingly inadequate; and had it 
not been aided by liberal judicial construction, our situation would be unbearable” (Freund 1920, 181).  
180 “Bottom line,” Bensel argues, the Court, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, “unified the national 
marketplace in order to protect capital accumulation from claims arising within and forwarded by the states” (Bensel 
2000, 347). On the Court’s role in constructing the national market see Bensel, Political Economy, 321-349. 
181 “The Civil War killed State sovereignty,” claims Michael Les Benedict. “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and 
the Waite Court,” The Supreme Court Review (1978): 39-79, 51. Les Benedict’s article provides a nice overview of the 
dilemma between federalism and the security of rights facing the Waite Court immediately following the Civil War (38-
9).  
182 This expansion, embodied best by the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, diverted litigation concerning national 
commercial interests out of state courts and into the more sympathetic (Republican) federal judiciary. Howard Gillman, 
Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington, American Constitutionalism Volume 1: Structures of Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 331.  
183 Generally speaking, “the locus of constitutional power” shifted from the states to the federal government during this 
time. Loren Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, 1877-1911 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 250.  
184 For a list of the major impacts of this transformation see William Wiecek The Lost World, 65-66.  
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constitutional orders required balancing federal versus state authority. 185  The recurring question 
along this institutional track was, where does decision-making authority rest?—the sina qua non of 
Bensel’s centralization of authority dimension. Federalism decisions concerned questions about the 
traditional domain of national power—primarily in the realm of the Commerce Clause.186  
The second track involved the substantive component—individual rights. This track often 
dealt with the “centralization” dimension, too, but also with issues along the “citizenship” 
dimension. By relegating questions of individual rights to the states, the Court gave credence to state 
rights arguments and thus constricted central state development. In this realm, the judiciary often 
inhibited federal enforcement of Reconstruction Amendments with decisions such as United States v. 
Cruikshank (1876),187 the Civil Rights Cases (1893),188 and Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)189 as well as upheld 
state regulations of social behavior. Moreover, then-contemporary commentators agreed with this 
regulation of civil rights questions to the states. For example, when Congress debated the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, a commentator in the Nation was highly skeptical of the validity of legislation 
taking individual rights to the national level:  
It is plainly unconstitutional. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment has twice come before the Supreme Court; and 
on neither of these well-known occasions was the decision of the Court of such a character as to lend much 
encouragement to those who believe the new Amendments to have introduced very revolutionary principles as 
to the relations of the States to the General Government. . . . In the light of these decisions, it may safely be 
                                                 
185 The 33 federalism cases in my database comprise about one-third of the 104 Supreme Court decisions between 1870 
and 1920.  
186 See Table 5 below. The ten most cited federalism cases between 1870 and 1920 all dealt with Commerce Clause 
questions.   
187 92 U.S. 542. Cruikshank constricted Congress’s ability to prosecute individuals under the Enforcement Act of 1870. It 
also dealt with the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, holding that the First Amendment was not intended to limit the 
powers of state governments with respect to their own citizens as well as holding that the Second Amendment only 
restricts the national government not state governments.  
188 109 U.S. 3. Here, the Court held that Congress had no authority under the Reconstruction Amendments to prohibit 
discrimination in privately owned public accommodations. More specifically, argued the Court, the Fourteenth 
Amendment restrained only state action. And the fifth section of the Amendment empowered Congress only to enforce 
the prohibition on state action. 
189 163 U.S. 537. A Louisiana state law requiring separate railway cars for blacks and whites was constitutional. The 
majority, written by Justice Brown, declared: “Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they 
are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been 
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police 
power” (Plessy, 544).  
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inferred that the Supreme Court must look with extreme suspicion upon a law, upsetting the domestic law of 
States . . . In the interest of the negro, we trust that it may never reach the Court.190 
 
Here, we see the endorsement of leaving questions of social control and civil rights within the 
purview of individual rights as opposed to nationalizing these questions via the 14th Amendment. 
Other press outlets echoed the Nation’s arguments over federal civil rights legislation.191 
 Ultimately, the Court settled states’ rights questions by constricting federal authority to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. In doing so, constitutional development moderated 
between those who sympathized with pre-Civil War models of federalism and those who believed 
the Civil War profoundly changed the conception of federalism and central state authority, 
advancing federal power over commerce yet constricting it over individual rights.  Let us now look 
at these legal issue areas of commerce and individual rights to see more specifically what the Court 
did in these realms.  
 
Commerce and Expansion of Central Authority 
 
The dormant commerce clause doctrine enabled the Court to expand central authority, a 
doctrine refined in 1852 then solidified in 1886. This clause prohibited, as implied by the Commerce 
Clause, states from passing legislation, which discriminated against or excessively burdened interstate 
commerce even if Congress had not passed legislation explicitly prohibiting state action. An 1852 
decision, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, laid the foundation for the dormant commerce clause, 
recognizing that the constitutionality of a Philadelphia law requiring all ships entering or leaving the 
port of Philadelphia to hire a local pilot. The Philadelphia law was permissible because, in 1789, 
Congress granted permission for states to govern pilotage laws:  
                                                 
190 The Nation, Sept. 17, 1874 quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in U.S. History Volume II, 601.  
191 The Independent April 6, 1876 quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in U.S. History Volume II, 605:  
To assume State powers as the method of punishing and preventing wrong in the States would be an 
experiment with our political system that had better be omitted. . . . Southern questions . . .  must be left to 
the States themselves, and to those moral influences which finally shape the course of legislation. The General 
Government cannot authoritatively deal with them, without producing more evils than it will remedy. 
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The mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the States of power to regulate 
pilots. And that although Congress has legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention, with a 
single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the several States (Cooley, 320).  
In other words, some subjects demanded a single uniform law for the whole nation, while others, 
like pilotage, demanded local laws, which understood the diverse local conditions. The power of 
Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.192  
The dormant commerce clause, as a tool of central state expansion, took its most powerful 
form in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois193 (1886). Penned by Justice Samuel 
Miller 194 , Wabash involved an Illinois state law that charged companies differing railroad rates, 
depending on distance and cargo, which a railway company claimed was discriminatory. The Court 
concluded that this type of regulation, if established at all, had to be of general and national 
character, and could not be safely regulated by local regulations.195 It declared that the Court could 
strike down state laws that interfered with the dormant (that is, yet-unexpressed) federal authority to 
regulate interstate trade. 196  The Court’s presumption was that the United States was to be an 
                                                 
192 Justice Curtis writing for the majority held, “Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing 
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single 
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in 
question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation” Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens (1852) 53 U.S. 299, 319.  
193 118 U.S. 557 
194 Justice Miller embodied the balance between differing understandings of federalism; he had possessed a strong 
commitment to the Union and used the Commerce Clause to achieve uniformity in federal regulation yet he restricted 
the power of the central state in decisions such as Slaughterhouse v. Louisiana (1873) 83 U.S. 36, which limited the 
effectiveness of the privileges and immunities clause to protect individual rights. In the 1870s and 1880s, then, it was 
Justice Miller whose voice pressed for federal government strength over Commerce Clause issues and a weakness in 
individual rights cases.  
195 As a regulation of commerce, the Illinois law infringed on the central state’s authority to decide rate regulation. 
Wabash, like much of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, was fundamentally about who held decision-making 
authority. Justice Miller concluded for the majority: “And if it be a regulation of commerce, as we think we have 
demonstrated it is, and as the Illinois court concedes it to be, it must be of that national character, and the regulation can 
only appropriately exist by general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the 
United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution” (Wabash, 577).  
196 Writing for the majority, Justice Miller argued the importance of federal authority over state authority in establishing 
uniform laws:  
It would be a very feeble and almost useless provision, but poorly adapted to secure the entire freedom of commerce 
among the States which was deemed essential to a more perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if at every stage 
of the transportation of goods and chattels through the country, the State within whose limits a part of this transportation 
must be done could impose regulations concerning the price, compensation, or taxation, or any other restrictive regulation 
interfering with and seriously embarrassing this commerce (Wabash, 573).   
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internally free trade zone.197 It followed, then, that the states could not obstruct the free flow of 
goods without express permission from Congress.198 The dormant commerce clause allowed the 
Court to be a mouthpiece for central state expansion within the economic and industrial realm, 
constructing the national marketplace by invalidating state regulations and, more importantly, 
denoting who held decision-making authority with respect to commerce. Writing in 1906, the Wall 
Street Journal said that, in the realm of commerce, state expansion was inevitable: “It has been 
inevitable that, with this mighty expansion in business operations and financial power, there should 
be a corresponding accumulation of political power. As our trade and commerce have outgrown 
state lines, so it has been inevitable that the political power of the country should have grown state 
lines and concentrated more and more in the national government.”199  
Looking more broadly and systematically, the Court’s ten most-cited federalism cases 
between 1870 and 1920 largely maintain the patterns found in Cooley and Wabash.200 Table 5 compiles 
these ten cases indicating the Court’s decision overall impact on central state authority, chief justice 
at the time, and the adjusted citation score.201 Here, we see the Court’s decisions overwhelmingly 
expanded central state authority.  These decisions advanced primarily through the centralization 
dimension (the decision-making dimension) by either locating decision-making authority to regulate 
citizens’ behavior with Congress (federal statute) or locating decision-making to invalidate state-level 
laws with the judiciary.  Either way, these judicial decisions bolstered federal governmental power. 
 
                                                 
197 Howard Gillman, Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington, American Constitutionalism, 390.  
198 Gillman et al, 390. 
199 Wall Street Journal, “The Growth of National Unity,” 20 December 1906, p. 1. 
200 Owen Fiss, author of Volume VIII of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise (an immensely thorough collection of Supreme 
Court history)—concurs with my interpretation. Despite the Fuller Court’s reputation for being an inhibitor to state 
development, Fiss notes, “more generally, however, as in railroad regulation cases, the antitrust area, and Debs, the Court 
curbed the powers of state and affirmatively strengthened the power of the national government” Owen Fiss, Troubled 
Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, Volume VIII, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 260. 
201 The adjusted citation score is the number of times a case appeared in each casebook over the number of chances a 
case could have possibly appeared in a casebook. This adjusted score accounts for changes in time. Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), for example, could not appear in the same number the selected casebooks as Marbury v. Madison (1803). 
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Table 5: Most-Cited U.S. Supreme Court Federalism Decisions, 1870-1920 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. These decisions were the most frequently included cases from 1870 and 1920 
in 58 constitutional law treatises and casebooks published between 1822 and 2010. The coding criteria for “restrict,” 
“neutral,” and “expand” is discussed in an Appendix.  
Case Year Impact on 
Authority 
Summary & Dimensions Affected Chief 
Justice 
Adjusted Citation Score 
Hammer v. Daggenhart  
1918 
Restrict Congressional Act of Sept. 1, 1916, which prevented interstate 
commerce in the products of child labor, violated US 
Constitution. The Act tried to regulate property that was 
purely a state-level matter, which exceeded Congress' 
authority  under the Commerce Clause and invaded the states' 
reserved power of 10th Amendment 
 
White 75.00 
Missouri v. Holland 1920 Expand Missouri challenged 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act with 
Great Britain and Canada, claiming the treaty interfered with 
states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment.  The Court upheld 
Congress's authority to make treaties with other nation-states; 
the regulation of migratory birds was not prohibited by the 
10th Amendment  
 
White 69.44 
Champion v. Ames 
 
1903 Expand Defendants arrested and convicted under 1895 Act of 
Congress making it illegal to transport lottery tickets across 
state lines. The Court held that lottery tickets, “tangible 
property,” were indeed "subjects of traffic," and as such, 
Congress had plenary authority to regulate--via Commerce 
Clause--independent carriers of lottery tickets.  
 
Fuller 57.14 
Munn v. Illinois 
 
1877 Restrict Illinois law regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by 
establishing maximum rates for their use. The Court upheld 
Illinois law because defendants were engaged in a public 
business to such an extent that the Illinois had authority to 
regulate. Such authority did not interfere with the Commerce 
Clause because the state's regulation occurred within Illinois’s 
own boundaries. 
 
Waite  54.17 
Leisy v. Hardin  
 
1890 Expand Illinois liquor manufacturer and importer sought to import its 
property into Iowa market, but Iowa state law banned 
importation of liquor. Court held Iowa law violated Commerce 
Clause. Liquor manufacturer had right to sell property in Iowa. 
 
Fuller 50.00 
 
United States v. E.C. 
Knight & Co.  
1895 Restrict  Congressional Act outlawed monopolization of any part of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations. New Jersey corporation acquired Philadelphia sugar 
refineries, but this had no direct relation to commerce 
between the States or with foreign nations. Thus, the 
Congressional Act could not regulate the New Jersey 
corporation’s behavior.  
 
Fuller  44.44 
 
In re Rahrer  1891 Expand Congressional Act declaring liquor traveling into a state are 
subject to the state’s law therein is valid exercise of Congress’s 
authority. Subsequently, Kansas law outlawed sale of liquor 
within state and jailed petitioner for selling liquor. Contrary to 
petitioner’s claim, Kansas law did not violate commerce clause. 
 
Fuller 43.48 
Welton v. Missouri 
 
1876 Expand Missouri statute required those selling property/goods 
manufactured outside Missouri to pay for and obtain a license. 
But, the statute did not extract license fee for those who sold 
goods manufactured within Missouri. Court invalidated 
Missouri law because sellers who manufactured within 
Missouri were not required to pay the license tax, thus the 
statute discriminated against articles of interstate commerce.  
 
Waite 39.58 
The Daniel Ball 1871 Expand Grand River, Michigan is a navigable water of the United 
States, within the meaning of two Congressional Acts of 1838 
and 1852. Those Acts are applicable to a steamer engaged as a 
common carrier between places in the same state, when a 
portion of the merchandise transported by steamer is destined 
to places in other states, or comes from places beyond the 
state   
 
Chase  37.50 
Wabash, St. Louis & 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois  
 
1886 Expand The Court held that Illinois state law regulating railroad rates 
violated the Commerce Clause by placing a direct burden on 
interstate commerce. Court concluded that this type of 
regulation had to be of a general and national character and 
could not be safely instituted by local rules and regulations.  
 
Waite 34.78 
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Individual Rights and Restriction of Central State Authority  
 
While the Court expanded central authority with its nationalistic view of commerce, it 
simultaneously embraced a more state-centered approach with respect to individual rights.  
Beginning with the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873),202 the Court interpreted the new 14th Amendment. 
Over a century’s perspective makes it clear to us that these Reconstruction Amendments did, in fact, 
usher in a new constitutional order whereby the federal government protects the rights of 
individuals, but this new order was far from certain in 1873. Slaughterhouse narrowly interpreted 
citizenship rights (especially the Privileges and Immunities Clause) of the 14th Amendment holding 
that a Louisiana law creating a monopoly over the slaughtering business was constitutional because 
of a state’s police powers to protect health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.  
Justice Miller upheld the validity of this monopoly on a state-centered understanding of 
federalism. He asked rhetorically, “Was it the purpose of the 14th amendment, by the simple 
declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil 
rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government?”(Slaughterhouse, 76). 
Miller further questioned the issue of civil rights in relation to the 14th Amendment: “And where it is 
declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within 
the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the 
States?” (Slaughterhouse, 77).  Miller’s majority decision answered his own questions: if the 14th 
Amendment did mean these things then the Court would become “a perpetual censor upon all 
legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it 
did not approve as consistent with those rights” (Slaughterhouse, 78).  In making this argument, the 
Court created two separate spheres of citizenship: one state-based and one national-based. Making 
                                                 
202 83 U.S. 36 
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such a distinction restricted the central state from enforcing subsequent civil rights legislation on 
state-level citizenship. 
The Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse clung to the state-centered model of federalism thereby 
constricting central state authority. Miller rejected the possibility that the Reconstruction 
Amendments ushered in a new constitutional order:  
[W]hen, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a 
departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State 
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally 
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole 
theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other (Slaughterhouse, 78).  
Ultimately, this decision perpetuated a model of federalism, which limited the ability of the central 
state to monitor state police power.  
This pattern continued, too, in individual rights decision as Table 6 indicates with five of the 
ten most-cited decisions restricting authority.  
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Table 6: Most-Cited U.S. Supreme Court Individual Rights Decisions, 1870-1920 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. These decisions were the most frequently included cases from 1870 and 1920 
in 58 constitutional law treatises and casebooks published between 1822 and 2010. The coding criteria for “restrict,” 
“neutral,” and “expand” is discussed in an Appendix.  
 
Case Year Impact on 
Authority 
Summary & Dimensions Affected Chief 
Justice 
Adjusted Citation Score 
Slaughterhouse 
Cases 
1873 Restrict  Louisiana law declared all butchering of animals in New 
Orleans take place in one facility. Several Louisiana butchers 
claimed this law violated their newly declared 14th 
Amendment rights of due process and privilege and immunity. 
Court held Louisiana law was constitutional—14th 
Amendment meant to apply to national citizenship not state 
citizenship.  
Chase 81.25 
Lochner v. New 
York  
1905 Expand  New York law enacted maximum hours for bakers. A NY 
bakery owner, Lochner, was charged with violating this law. 
He claimed the law infringed on his 14th Amendment rights of 
due process. The Court agreed, invalidating the NY statute. 
The state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty 
of bakers by determining the hours of labor. 
Fuller 71.43 
Civil Rights Cases  1883  Restrict  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all 
persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels 
and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. The 
Court held this Act violated the Constitution because Congress 
did not have the authority under the 14th Amendment 
enforcement provisions to regulate privately owned 
businesses. Equal protection applies only to state action not to 
privately held entities.  
Waite 69.57 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins  
 
1886 Expand The biased enforcement of an 1880 San Francisco ordinance 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th.  San 
Francisco required all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a 
permit issued by the city. Although workers of Chinese 
descent operated 89 percent of the city's laundry businesses, 
the city did not grant a single permit to a Chinese owner.  
Waite 60.87 
Plessy v. Ferguson  1896 Restrict  A  Louisiana law required separate railway cars for blacks and 
whites. Homer Plessy was arrested for sitting in a “whites 
only” car and claimed the state violated his 14th Amendment 
equal protection rights. The Court upheld the law viewing 
segregation, in itself, a form of unequal discrimination.  
Fuller 57.78 
Schneck v. US 1919 Expand Schenck mailed circulars to draftees, which suggested that the 
draft was a wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The 
circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised 
only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the 
Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to 
violate the Espionage Act. The Court held Schenck is not 
protected in this situation because some speech tolerable in 
peacetime can be punished during war time.  
 
White 55.56 
Strauder v. West 
Virginia  
1880 Expand A West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on 
juries. The Court held this law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th because law “is practically a brand upon 
them, affixed by law; an assertion of their inferiority.” 
Waite 55.32 
Hurtado v. California  1884 Restrict  A California constitutional provision allowed prosecutions of 
felonies on information without a grand jury trial—
information is a written set of accusations made by a 
prosecutor. Based on information by the district attorney, 
Hurtado was tried and sentenced to death. He claimed grand 
juries were constitutionally required in capital cases. Supreme 
Court held the California provision was constitutional—any 
legal proceeding that protects liberty and justice is due 
process. 
Waite 43.48 
Twining v. New 
Jersey 
1908 Restrict  Twining, a bank director, was charged with a misdemeanor 
(deceiving a bank examiner). Twining declined to testify at his 
trial. Under New Jersey law, the prosecutor commented upon 
Twining's failure to testify. A jury convicted Twining; he 
appealed. The Court held the NJ law and comment did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.  
Fuller 42.86 
Abrams v. US  1919 Expand   Defendants were convicted under the Espionage Act on the 
basis of two leaflets they printed and distributed, denouncing 
sending American troops to Russia as well as the US war 
efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The Court upheld 
the Espionage Act and the defendants’ 20-year prison 
sentence.  
 
White 41.67 
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But as Table 6 reveals, if there was to be any arm of the central state responsible for monitoring 
state police power it was to be the Supreme Court. Decisions like Lochner v. New York (1905)203 and 
Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)204 actually expanded central state authority in that they invalidated 
state-level laws regulating both the workplace (maximum hours) and the racial makeup of juries, 
respectively.  
Notwithstanding Lochner and Strauder, many other decisions in the database, but not in Table 
6, took a more state-deferential tact than Lochner or Strauder. For example, U.S. v. Cruikshank 
(1876)205 involved federal indictments of conspiracy, which forbade any person “to injure, oppress, 
threaten or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of 
any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution.”206 In this case, a white mob 
people attacked a peaceful assembly of blacks outside a Louisiana courthouse and killed between 60 
and 100 of them.207 But, here, the Court took a state-centered approach. The central state, according 
to the judiciary, did not have the authority to indict under these pretenses because: 
the right of the people to peaceably assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adoption of the 
Constitution of the United States. . . . The government of the United States when established found it in 
existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it protection. As no direct power over it was 
granted to Congress, it remains, according to the ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden, subject to State jurisdiction 
(Cruikshank, 552).   
The bottom line is that constitutional development in the individual rights realm often constricted 
central state authority either by an explicit invalidation of Congressional statutes208 or leaving state-
level police power laws intact.209  
 
                                                 
203 198 U.S. 45 
204 100 U.S. 303 
205 92 U.S. 542 
206 Section 6 Enforcement Act of 1870 
207 Gillman et al, American Constitutionalism, 347.  
208 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923); Civil Rights Cases (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson (1896); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898); U.S. 
v. Lee (1882)  
209 Mugler v. Kansas (1887); Muller v. Oregon (1908); Holden v. Hardy (1898); Barbier v. Connolly (1885); Powell v. Pennsylvania 
(1888); Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 
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Conclusion  
 
Across American history, the Court’s most salient constitutional decisions have shaped the 
contours of the American central state. Through its constitutional decisions, the judiciary both 
expands and restricts this state. This chapter has endeavored, first, to explain why the Court does 
this and, second, to show that the Court has done much to build the American state, contrary to the 
prevailing narratives. The restrict-expand patterns of development are deeply rooted in the dual 
sovereign design of American federalism that has come under continual scrutiny throughout 
American political development. Ultimately, this chapter was built on the understanding that while 
the substantive impact of other major federal branches on the expansion of central state authority 
has been studied, the Supreme Court’s precise relationship to state authority remains considerably 
less well-charted.  
 In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Court helped chart a moderate course that pivoted on 
debates about varying conceptions of federalism, enhancing national power in commerce realms 
while leaving questions of social control to the states. More specifically, with a sample of 104 
landmark Supreme Court decisions, state-building, in this era, took a non-linear path, generally 
expanding some policy areas while generally restricting others. The Court’s role toward state 
expansion rested largely within the procedural and structural dimensions of central state authority 
addressing, essentially, the question of who has the ultimate decision-making authority. Throughout 
this era, the Court’s answer to this question was that it had the decision-making authority in 
federalism cases, and in citizenship cases, states have that authority.   
What is still left to be explored, however, is the Court’s own institutional development and 
its relationship to the other branches. While this chapter has focused largely on constitutional and 
doctrinal developments, chapter 6 explores the Court’s position in the broader state ensemble. The 
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Court’s institutional mission and placement within the central state ensemble requires that it to 
operate more diffidently than the political branches, which we will be the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Supreme Court Diffidence 
 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having 
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully demonstrated by 
the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the 
substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
There should be therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses.   
 –Justice Byron White, 1986210  
 
Introduction  
 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Byron captures two important themes of this chapter. First, 
Byron demonstrates the Court’s cognizance of its legitimacy not just among the coequal branches 
but also among the broader public. A second theme is the constitutional reticence the Court uses to 
guard this legitimacy. These themes stem from the Court’s institutional mission and from an 
historical understanding of the development of its own review powers.211 
 As the previous chapters demonstrate, the Court’s decisions do much to extend federal 
government authority. Nevertheless, a major difficulty in conceptualizing the Court’s role in this 
state expansion rests on its unique position within the central state ensemble. That is, the Court is 
simultaneously inside and outside of the central state because the Court’s institutional mission 
necessitates that it remain “independent” and review the powers of coordinate branches. Because of 
these features, the Court helps determine the boundaries of central state authority as well as 
occupies a place within it. Thus, at times, the Court has opposed the expansion of the coordinate 
branches and, at other times, consolidated national power over state power. The judiciary’s 
                                                 
210 Writing for the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 195-196.  
211 On the importance of historical memory and narratives to institutions, see Charlotte Linde. 2009. Working the Past: 
Narrative and Institutional Memory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Linde’s sociological study looks not at 
political institutions but at an insurance company. Her use of “institution,” however, is theoretically useful far beyond 
the scope of her study (Linde 2009, 7-8). Especially helpful to understanding Supreme Court development is her fourth 
chapter, “Retold Tales: Repeated Narratives as a Resource for Institutional Remembering.” Here she argues that these 
retold tales “are important because they represent a mechanism for continuing the past into the present; by developing 
new tellers who were not present” (Linde 2009, 86). This behavior is ubiquitous on the Supreme Court both from its 
own members as well as from scholars, politicians, and the broader public.  
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institutional mission within the central state places it in a precarious position, and this chapter 
illuminates how the Court walks this fine line and what can happen when it does not.  
 While Chapters 4 and 5 focused on substantive legal developments that contributed to the 
advancement of the central state, this chapter centers on the Court itself, that is, the institution of 
the Court and its relationship within the broader central state ensemble. This chapter is based on 
two principles. First, what makes something an institution is its mission—some definable purpose or 
shared normative endeavor that becomes indoctrinated within the institution as a result of its 
participants (Smith 1988; Gillman 1999; Keck 2007b).212 Second, institutions are deliberate about 
protecting their legitimacy and, as such, they will adapt to changing contexts and the actions of other 
institutions to achieve this end (Gillman 1999, 79-81).   
 Taking these principles as our starting point, the main purpose of this chapter shows that the 
Supreme Court has often deployed a strategy of diffidence to help maintain its legitimacy and to 
advance its constitutional authority. Diffidence is the Court’s refusal to maximize power for itself 
and instead allocate central state power to the other national branches, which has roots in the 
broader institutional context and in the Court’s institutional mission. Ultimately, diffidence helps the 
Court balance the important state-building projects of consolidating broader central state authority 
and maintaining its ideological legitimacy. Within these two projects, the Court’s reluctance to assert 
the judiciary’s primacy has developed through three channels: jurisdiction, federalism, and the rules 
                                                 
212 Rogers Smith (1988) recognizes that distinctive institutional missions might help explain the behavior of judges. He 
argues, “Political institutions appear to be ‘more than simply mirrors of social forces.’” Instead, they often take on “a 
kind of life of their own,” influencing “the self-conception of those who occupy roles defined by them in ways that can 
give those persons distinctively ‘institutional’ perspectives” (Smith 1988, 95). Rogers Smith. 1988. “Political 
Jurisprudence, the ‘New Institutionalism,’ and the Future of Public Law. American Political Science Review 82 (1): 89-108. 
See also Thomas M. Keck. 2007. “Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes.” 
American Political Science Review 101 (2): 321-338. Building on Smith’s ideas, Keck finds that “institutional missions” and 
“judicial motivations” help explain the judicial coalitions in the twenty out of fifty-three federal statutes invalided by the 
Supreme Court between 1981 and 2005 (Keck 2007, 331–336).  
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of constitutional interpretation. Thus, the centerpiece of Chapter 6 is on judicial authority—how the 
Court builds, protects, and maintains this authority.213  
 Diffidence is a curious behavior given that the Court remains relatively insulated from 
electoral pressures and exercises broad discretion over the size and content of its docket. Still, 
national political institutions have historically seen the Court as a convenient place for dealing with 
controversial policy questions that political branches seek to avoid (Graber 1993) 214  mainly because 
the public sees the judiciary as the most legitimate national institution (Gibson and Caldeira 2009).215 
The bottom line is that the Court often decides opinions that cause great controversy and, as a 
result, the justices consider how they construct Court opinions in order to maintain the institution’s 
legitimacy (Farganis 2012). Yet much of this literature focuses on the influence of political branches 
                                                 
213 There is a vast literature on judicial power. Judicial power literature largely concerns the Court’s implementation 
ability. See Matthew Hall’s (2011) The Nature of Supreme Court Power who frames his study as a counterargument to Gerald 
Rosenberg’s (1991) thesis that the Court “can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform” (Hall 
2011, 160 quoting Rosenberg’s 2008 edition, 422). Relevant to reasons the Court might be diffident, Hall posits that “the 
Supreme Court’s ability to alter the behavior of state and private actors is dependent on two factors: the institutional 
context of the Court’s ruling and the popularity of the ruling” (Hall 2011, 4-5). Contrary to Rosenberg, Hall concludes, 
“the Court possesses remarkable power to alter the behavior of state and private actors in a wide range of policy issues” 
(Hall 2011, 160).  
 Constitutional diffidence, however, is not concerned with the implementation effects of the Court. Instead, this 
chapter characterizes the Court’s institutional behavior and its effect on central state expansion. Moreover, scholarship 
on judicial power examines the virtual opposite of diffidence: it examines decisions in which the Court desired to 
produce great social change. In other words, the judicial power literature does not pinpoint moments when the Court 
attempted to preserve political capital or enhance its legitimacy—that is, when the Court acted diffidently (Hall admits 
this characterization in his conclusion, p. 159).  
214 This growing historical institutionalist literature, often dubbed the “regime politics” approach, examines the 
circumstances and conditions concerning the maintenance and changes of judicial authority, and it offers strategic 
explanations of how and why political institutions decide to share, surrender, and grant power to other institutions. 
Broadly speaking, the regime politics approach is concerned with pinpointing external (usually national party) political 
influences on judicial behavior at various points in American history. In doing so, this literature focuses primarily on the 
political foundations required for judicial review. Examples of this scholarship include Mark Graber (1993, 1998); Keith 
Whittington (2005, 2007) and J. Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell W. Clayton (2004).  
215 The literature on court legitimacy is primarily econometrics-based and has long recognized that the Supreme Court 
attends to its institutional legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Hausegger and Baum 1999; Caldeira and 
Gibson 1992; and Caldeira 1987). The main takeaway in this literature is that the Court has preferences to maintain and 
shape its legitimacy. Beyond that, however, it does not tell us how the Court does this, save showing us that the Court 
will issue decisions that are acceptable to the “public mood” (McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 
2011). Additionally, Caldeira (1987) argues that the justices—with well-timed Court decisions—are able to shape public 
support in order to bolster institutional legitimacy. In sum, this literature analyzes how public opinion affects judicial 
outcomes and how the Court attempts to garner public support as a means to remaining legitimate.    
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wield over the judiciary rather than on how the Court’s own institutional mission produces 
distinctive legal innovations to deal with broader politics.216    
 The rest of this chapter discusses the unique institutional placement and mission of the 
Court and how these institutional features enable diffidence. Then it uses some of these data to 
demonstrate Court diffidence as well as explores some of the legal mechanisms through diffidence 
occurs.  
 
Judicial Authority and Court Mythology  
 
 The Court’s mythological and autonomous image puts it in a different position in the polity 
than the democratically elected branches, and maintaining this image has been a reason for Supreme 
Court diffidence. In discussing a number of Court decisions that evoked the ire of Congress in the 
late nineteenth century, James Bryce noticed that, still, “the credit and dignity of the Supreme Court 
stand very high” because few justices allowed “their political sympathies to disturb their official 
judgment” (Bryce 1891, volume 1, 264). In the late nineteenth-century, Bryce observed that the 
“new-made judge has left partisanship behind him” (Bryce 1891, 264). By embracing these judicial 
norms, the Court has cultivated an image that its legitimacy was “derived from the public’s belief 
that the justices are vested with the special legal knowledge and expertise that enabled them to 
discover the true meaning of the Constitution” (Bassok 2009, 245-6).” In doing so, the Court helped 
perpetuate a judicial mythology. C. Herman Pritchett argues, “Every Court prior to the Roosevelt 
Court had enjoyed the protection of perhaps the most potent myth in American political life—the 
                                                 
216 For a summary and a critical discussion of the “regime politics” approach to judicial decision making, see Thomas 
Keck’s (2007a) review article, “Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law 
Schools,” Law & Social Inquiry 32, 2: 511-544. This chapter sympathizes with Keck’s view by examining the behavior of 
the Court as it considers its institutional context as opposed to viewing the Court—as the regime politics literature often 
does—as being acted on by the other federal branches. Mark Miller’s (2009) The View of the Courts from the Hill criticizes 
the regime politics approach along similar lines: “the regime politics approach can be seen as underemphasizing the 
unique legal voice that the courts bring to the constitutional dialogue” (Miller 2009, 33). For a longer and more heavy-
handed criticism of the regime approach, see Matthew Hall. 2012. “Rethinking Regime Politics.” Law & Social Inquiry 
37(4): 878–907.    
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myth that the Court is a non-political body, a sacred institution” (Pritchett 1963, 14-5).217 More 
recently, legal scholars like Lawrence Friedman, note, “Over time, the aura of the high courts has 
gotten thicker and more mystical. The Supreme Court in particular seems to be protected by a kind 
of magic barrier of myth and mystery” (Friedman 2003, 147).  
 Scholars and justices alike employ religious metaphors when describing the Court’s 
mythology. Justice Flex Frankfurter likened the justices to “legal monks” and said, “When a priest 
enters a monastery, he must leave—or ought to leave—all sorts of worldly desires behind him. And 
this Court has no excuse for being unless it’s a monastery” (Frankfurter quoted in O’Brien 2003, 87). 
Similarly, in describing the justices robes, Chief Justice Howard Taft said, “It is well that judges 
should be clothed in robes…in order to impress the judge himself with the constant consciousness 
that he is a high priest of the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations of a sacred 
character that he cannot escape” (Taft quoted in Segal et al. 2005, 17)218. Political scientist Walter 
Murphy also observed, “Much of the sacred, mysterious character of the Constitution has been 
caught by the Justices in the performance of their priestly duty of expounding the meaning of the 
holy writ” (Murphy 1964, 16). In a similar vein, Max Lerner wrote, “The judges become, thus, not 
ordinary men, subject to ordinary passion, but ‘discovers’ of final truth, priests in service of a god 
                                                 
217 Scholars in various disciplines and of various methodological persuasions have recognized this mythology. 
Institutionalist like David O’Brien and John Brigham have discussed the “myth of the cult of the robe (O’Brien 2003, 
87). See Chapter 2 in David O’Brien’s Storm Center for further depiction of “the cult of the robe.” See also John Brigham. 
1987. The Cult of the Court. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Brigham argues that the public has “come to speak 
of the Constitution as ‘what the justices say it is’ and we look for ‘it’ in their opinions.” Their words are no longer 
authoritative gloss on the thing itself; they have become the thing itself” (Brigham 1987, 31). He contends that this has 
arisen because of the “cult” of the Court, that is, in “the way we see the institution” (Brigham 1987, 9). Quantitative 
political scientists, too, Jeffrey Segal, Harold Spaeth, and Sara Bensh see that “judicial mythology blunts criticisms and 
insulates judges” thereby allowing them to “do as they wish” (Segal et al. 2005, 17). See also legal scholars like Alpheus 
Thomas Mason. 1962. “Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions,” University of Virginia Law Review 48 (8): 1385-
1406, 1387.  
218 The justices did not always wear robes. Not coincidentally, wearing judges’ robes became more common at the turn 
of the twentieth century when the Court came under heavy criticism for aggrandizing power (Mason 1962, 1392). Taft 
believed the robes helped enforce the theory that “judges are mere instruments of the law and can will nothing” (Mason 
1962, 1395-1394).    
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head” (Lerner 1937, 1312). Judicial mythology bestows a popular reverence and legitimacy on the 
Court not experienced by the other federal branches.  
 Given its vaunted image, the Court holds a unique position in the central state, balancing the 
“myth of judicial aloofness” to protect its autonomy with “the reality of profound political power” 
(Mason 1962, 1385). In this way, the Court is simultaneously part of and outside of the central state. 
If the Court—as an institution—commands broad public support and possesses this mythological 
image, then the judiciary might be in a privileged position to expand its own power.   
 The consistent historical criticism of the Court might also lead one to believe that the 
judiciary persistently expanded its own power. Indeed, William Ross notes, “During every period of 
the Republic’s history, critics of the courts have assailed the judiciary with invective and have 
proposed measures to curtail the institutional prerogatives of the courts” (Ross 1994, 1). For most 
of American history, liberal critics have criticized the federal courts for stymieing social progress by 
protecting a powerful minority (Miller 2009, 35).219 The recurrence of these criticisms might suggest 
that the Court has been active in garnering power for itself, but this is far from the case as this 
chapter details below.  
 Moreover, beyond judicial mythology and criticisms, the separation of powers design is 
premised on the theory that national institutions will aggrandize power for their respective branch 
because, as historical institutionalist scholars have noted, institutions have a “will.”220 In Federalist no. 
51, Madison applied the idea of institutional will to the separation of powers system: “In order to lay 
a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, 
which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is 
evident that each department should have a will of its own.” By each branch maximizing its own 
                                                 
219 Miller’s The View of the Courts from the Hill offers a detailed overview of “the more tense” conflicts the Court has had 
with the president and Congress throughout American history (Miller 2009, 38-76). 
220 See footnote 232 above.  
 
 
133 
 
power independent of the others, Madison’s theory held that it would provide “the great security 
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department.” He continued on to 
say that the Constitution must give each branch “the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
motives, to resist encroachments of the others” (Federalist no. 51, 319). In this sense, Madison and 
the Federalists, at least, saw the separation of powers as not only dividing power but also creating a 
form of competition among the branches to restrain each other. Notwithstanding this constitutional 
design, the judiciary resisted encroachment not by maximizing its power but by refraining to do so. 
Indeed, these data below portrays a different story of the central state ensemble rooted in the 
precarious position held by the judiciary.  
 
 
The Precarious Position of Independence   
 
 The judiciary’s position within the federal government places it in a paradoxical role and its 
diffidence is a product of this institutional placement. On the on hand, courts are supposed to be 
“independent” from the controversial politics of the day so as to make their decisions appear 
legitimate to the polity. In Federalist no. 78, Hamilton argued that the “complete independence of the 
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.” Without independent courts, 
Hamilton contended, “all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
nothing” (Federalist no. 78, 438). Yet, on the other hand, this independence leaves the judiciary highly 
susceptible to the criticism of pursuing its own ideological interest under the guise of impartial 
adjudication. Thus, Anti-federalists objected to Hamilton’s claims, fearing the power of an insulated 
judiciary: “There is no power above [judges] to controul any of their decisions…In short, they are 
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this 
situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself” (Letters of Brutus XV, 525). 
Keith Bybee has called this paradox the “two faces of judicial power” (Bybee 2007, 1). Moreover, 
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this paradoxical position is not an historical artifact; a 2005 nationwide poll showed that the public 
understanding of judicial independence as a protection for citizens’ rights “is locked in close 
competition” with the conception that judicial independence is a mechanism through which courts 
pursues their own political objectives (Bybee 2007, 2).221  
 To protect itself from such criticism and to ensure its autonomy, the judiciary embraces to a 
macro-institutional mission rooted in legal reasoning and analysis, which is distinct from the 
decision-making processes of the legislative and executive branches. Thus a person is likely to reach 
different conclusions as a justice than he or she would as a legislator or executive.222   
 A brief historical example from a decision in the dataset will illuminate this institutional 
phenomenon. In Hepburn v. Griswold (1870)—a case concerning the use of federally issued paper 
currency—the Supreme Court declared an 1862 federal statute (the Legal Tender Act) 
unconstitutional by a vote of 4-3, a statute that required creditors to accept paper money not backed 
by gold as payment for debts owed by the United States. President Lincoln’s administration 
considered the Legal Tender Act as necessary to sustain the Civil War effort. The irony of Hepburn 
was that former-Lincoln cabinet member Chief Justice Chase penned the opinion, and Lincoln 
appointed Chase to the Court because he had been the Secretary of the Treasury in 1862 and helped 
write the Legal Tender Act in the first place. Thus, we can conclude that Chase believed the act be 
constitutional when he was a cabinet member but unconstitutional when he became Chief Justice 
(Miller 2009, 21-22). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “Chase’s vote in the Legal Tender cases is a 
textbook example of the proposition that one may look at a legal question differently as a judge 
                                                 
221 Maxwell Poll conducted by the Campbell Public Affairs Institute at Syracuse University available at 
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/data_sources/Law%20and%20Courts%20Questions%20from
%202005%20Poll.pdf accessed 5 April 2014.  
222 See Mark Graber (2006, 59) “Legal, Strategic, or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction,” in Ronald Kahn and Ken Kersch, eds. Graber argues that “legal norms” explain Justice Miller’s 
opinion in Roosevelt v. Meyer (1863) and Chief Justice Chase’s opinion in Ex Parte McCardle (1868), but “had Justice Miller 
or Chief Justice Chase been in the executive or legislative branches of the national government, they probably would 
have behaved differently” (Graber 2006, 59).  
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from the way one did as a member of the executive branch” (Rehnquist quoted in Miller 2009, 22). 
Recent examples exist, too, of justices saying they reach different conclusions as a judge than they 
would if they were in another branch of the government.223 
 The institutional mission of the Court, then, rests on its judicial duty and legal reasoning. 
Whittington sums up these differences in institutional settings: 
The justices may adhere to the law because, in an important sense, that is what justices do. Litigants and justices 
make references to statutory text, legislative intent, or judicial precedent in part because they expect judges to 
be responsive to such considerations, to recognize their authority within the institutional context of the 
judiciary. Legislators and lobbyists, by contrast, are relatively unlikely to employ such argumentative tools 
because their intended audiences see such things neither as particular important parts of their normative 
environment. . .nor as familiar cognitive heuristics that facilitate decision making (Whittington 2000, 624) 
Thus the institutional setting of the Court pushes the justices toward “maintaining coherent and 
defensible jurisprudential traditions” distinct from “conventional partisan or ideological preferences” 
(Gillman 1993, 79-80).224 
 The judiciary’s institutional setting includes three primary constraints that contribute to 
diffidence or what Judge John M. Walker Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
called “judicial modesty” (Walker 2007, 123). These constraints include, first, that judges make legal 
decisions based on a limited set of sources, giving primacy to language used by the litigants’ 
representatives. Second, the judiciary is constrained by the requirement that judges pronounce and 
explain their decisions in writing unlike political actors who can often make a decision without 
explaining its justification. Last, judges are keenly aware of the reactive nature of their decision-
making (Walker 2007, 124).  He thus concludes, “Respect for the authority of the law depends on 
                                                 
223 See Miller’s View of the Courts from the Hill (2009, 22-24) for additional examples. One such example includes Justice 
Potter Stewart’s dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)—Griswold invalidated a Connecticut law, which banned a doctor 
from counseling married couples on birth control and from prescribing contraceptives to these couples. Justice Stewart, 
while politically sympathetic to the invalidation of this law, refused to the join the Court’s opinion. He wrote, “I think 
this is an uncommonly silly law. . . .As a philosophical matter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of 
marriage should be left to personal and private choice. . . .But we are not asked in this case to say whether we think this 
law is unwise, or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the United States Constitution. And that I cannot do” 
(Stewart quoted in Miller 2009, 22-23).   
224 For an econometrics-based approach reaching a similar conclusion, see Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer. 
2002. “Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making.” American Political Science Review 96 (2): 305-320. They 
conclude, “The Supreme Court is not simply a small legislature. Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in ways 
that are specifically jurisprudential” (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 315).  
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judicial modesty—judges performing their proper role within the judiciary’s institutional limitations. 
Yet judicial modesty does not engender respect for the rule of law unless the public is aware of that 
constraint and realizes its significance in shaping judicial behavior” (Walker 2007, 123). Therefore 
the judiciary’s institutional culture and context gives rise to a tempered form of behavior. 
 Legal scholars have also recognized other general institutional norms, which promote 
diffidence. More specifically, norms against justices speaking publicly—especially when the Court’s 
under heavy criticism—makes them a generally “cautious lot” of political actors.  The judiciary’s 
capital is intellectual and reputational, based on effective job performance, and this capital “wears 
thin in the face of persistent criticism” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 167). Prolonged criticism affects 
courts because “no judge likes to be criticized,” Lawrence Friedman writes. Consequently, “judges 
will hesitate before making a decision, or a statement, that is likely to end up in the newspaper and 
make them look bad” (Friedman 2006, 145). Courts often avoid the center of controversy, at least 
considering their relative institutional autonomy, and they do this by employing a “politically astute” 
form of “self-abnegation” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 167). At bottom, then, the Court’s 
institutional position within the central state requires the use of diffidence, a claim developed in the 
next section.  
 In sum, the precarious position of independence gives rise to a paradox facing the Court that 
the democratically accountable branches do not face:  
In order to protect its image as a neutral, independent decision-making body, the Court must in fact pay close 
attention to what will be deemed acceptable by the populace and sometimes yield from any neutral perspective 
to avoid overstepping the bounds imposed by perceptions of what is legitimate. . . . In order to guard its image 
as an apolitical decision-maker, and with it its institutional legitimacy, the Court must engage in deeply political 
behavior (Clark 2011, 22).225 
Constitutional diffidence helps solve this problem by maintaining institutional legitimacy and thus 
constitutional authority. Moreover, as demonstrated in chapters 3-5, the Court persistently expands 
                                                 
225 Tom S. Clark. 2011. Limits of Judicial Independence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Clark calls this the 
“politics-legitimacy” paradox. By examining the ideological direction of Court decisions from 1953 to the present, Clark 
demonstrates that, “as more conservative (or liberal) members of Congress engage in Court-curbing attacks on the 
judiciary, the justices move in a conservative (or liberal) direction (at least in statutory cases)” (Clark 2011, 237).  
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and constricts central state authority, and while this in and of itself is not diffidence, it does 
demonstrate that the Court does not aggrandize national power (for itself or for the other national 
branches) too aggressively. The Supreme Court’s constitutional development, then, stands in 
contrast to the trajectory of its own institutional development, which “has been consistently and 
undeniably upward” (Crowe 2012, fn. 32 on p. 9).226 
 
 
Why Judicial Diffidence? 
 
 The Court’s diffidence is rooted in two institutionally-based reasons. First, the design of the 
federal political system encourages Court diffidence, a system typified by the interdependence 
among the branches.227 Indeed, the Court has never been “truly independent” of the other national 
branches of government (Pickerill 2011, 106). Terri Peretti has gone even further, claiming that 
judicial independence is a “myth,” and that she is not “particularly troubled by this state of affairs” 
(Peretti 1999, 2002, 103).228 As Richard Neustadt recognizes in his study of the American presidency, 
the United States is a system of separate institution sharing power: “The Constitutional Convention 
of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of ‘separate powers.’ It did nothing of the sort. 
                                                 
226 That is, the Court’s institutional power has grown exponentially while its constitutional impact on central state 
authority does vary a great deal between growth and restriction. Crowe emphasizes that the Court was a “partner in, and 
enforcer of, national policy-making”—a theme he stresses in each historical period examined, a finding bolstered by the 
data below (Crowe 2012, 133).  
227 The contributions to Bruce Peabody’s edited volume The Politics of Judicial Independence all espouse this interdependent 
characterization, seeing judicial “independence” as essentially a shibboleth. Peabody’s volume seeks to understand 
judicial independence in the wake of growing Court criticisms occurring over the last fifty years: “how does the current 
era of court criticism help us to understand the circumstances under which judicial independence can be compromised 
by ‘improper’ political influences?” (Peabody 2011, 17). Bruce Peabody, ed. 2011. The Politics of Judicial Independence. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. See also Louis Fisher’s (1988) Constitutional Dialogues, which 
recognizes the multi-institutional context of Supreme Court decision-making. Constitutional meaning, for Fisher, is the 
product of ongoing discursive negotiations among the three national branches. Louis Fisher. 1988. Constitutional 
Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
228 Terri Peretti. 2002. “Does Judicial Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science Research,” in Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman, eds. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. See also Terri Peretti. 1999. In Defense of a Political Court. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. In both pieces, Peretti contends that scholarship on judicial independence—with its presumption that 
independence produces impartial, law-based decisions—belies the empirical reality of how federal judges operate within 
the political system.  
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Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing power” (Neustadt 1980, 29, 
emphasis original). Accordingly, the checks and balances creates a federal government based not 
upon obstruction but upon interdependence, cooperation, compromise, and conflict (Pickerill 2011, 
109). In this sense, viewing the judiciary as an obstacle to state development misses the more 
intricate ways that the federal branches interact with each other. The “governance as dialogue 
movement,” as Mark Miller notes, rejects “the notion of either total legislative supremacy or total 
judicial supremacy in favor of a much more complicated and nuanced, continuous process of 
interaction among the institutions” (Miller 2009, 9).229 Such an institutional setting requires that the 
Court, at times, persuade other political actors of the validity of its decisions, a form of “modified 
departmentalism” whereby all branches contribute to the constitutional understanding of particular 
issues (Murphy 1986, 417). In this kind of interdependent context, the Court exercises caution with 
regard to its judicial pronouncements.  
 Second, the Court fears reprisal from the other branches if its rulings impinge too much on 
the prevailing regime’s preferences (Harvey and Friedman 2003, 2006, 2009; Lindquist and Solberg 
2007). Aware of its fragility among the national branches, the Court behaves in ways that protects its 
authority because it remains vulnerable to political retaliation (Ferejohn 1999). 230  Throughout 
American history, public officials have often threatened to curb the Court’s power either by 
constitutional amendment, statute,  impeachment, jurisdiction stripping, or holding judicial salaries 
constant, and these threats have frequently altered the Court’s behavior (Epstein and Knight 1998; 
Pickerill and Clayton 2004, 236; Clayton and Pickerill 2006, 1392; Rosen 2006, 7 ). To be sure, 
                                                 
229 See Miller’s section “The Governance as Dialogue Movement” for an overview of this perspective (Miller 2009, 5-
12). Mark C. Miller 2009. The View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions between Congress and the Federal Judiciary. 
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.  
230 Much of the judicial behavior literature attempts to explain what occurs when a court does not maintain public 
support. As public support for the Court decreases, the public is more likely to approve of ways to curtail the 
institution’s power (Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Gibson and Caldeira 1995, 2003; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998). 
Indeed, Dahl’s seminal article finds, “By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy,” but 
the Court maintains public support by “confer[ring] legitimacy on the fundamental policies” of the dominant political 
alliance (Dahl 1957, 581). This kind of institutional behavior can be seen as diffident.   
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Congress does not often deploy these methods, but the mere threat of them alters judicial behavior 
(Clark 2009; Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 167).231 The justices thus restrain their behavior to actions 
believed institutionally appropriate otherwise they may produce backlash from the public (Rosen 
2006, 30; Klarman 1994). More than that, the federal government can limit the judiciary’s power all 
together by avoiding its decisions because, as Hamilton stressed in Federalist no. 78, the Court has 
neither power of the sword nor the purse (Rosenberg 1991; Vanberg 2001). Some scholars have 
even suggested non-implementation of judicial decisions occurs frequently (Baum 2003, 177).232  
 Court reprisal can happen through various devices available to the executive and the 
Congress. In particular, three types of control loom largest. The first type is enforcement-related: the 
political branches could simply ignore Court mandates.233 Certainly presidents rarely fully ignore 
Supreme Court orders, but there are plenty of examples of politically unpopular decisions receiving 
lackluster support. The failure of the desegregation cases to accomplish any substantive social 
change until the political branches joined the fight for civil rights is well-known (Rosenberg 1991, 
42-82). Even today, the Court’s school prayer decisions are ignored in some parts of the country 
(Alley 1996, 21-24; Ravitch 1999), and states still continue to push the limits on abortion rights 
promulgated in Roe v. Wade (Hadley 1996, 1-17). Certainly these challenges to judicial decisions 
impacts the posture of the Court.  
 Examples of executives defying Court decisions are also well-known. State governors, more 
than presidents, have demonstrated a willingness to defy Court decisions (Goldstein 1997). But 
President Andrew Jackson ignored Chief Justice Marshall’s mandates in two cases involving the 
Cherokee Indians, producing a story where Jackson allegedly said Marshall should enforce his own 
                                                 
231 Some political scientists, however, see the Court as not particularly worried by other institutional actors. The 
paradigmatic example is Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. They primarily understand judicial outcomes as the product of a justice’s ideology.  
232 Matthew Hall’s (2011) The Nature of Supreme Court Power persuasively challenges this non-implementation thesis.  
233 Former Chief Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, Harry T. Edwards, finds this mechanism the most effective 
in encouraging the judiciary to exercise restraint (Edwards 2006, 231).  
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decisions. 234  Though most subsequent presidents have not followed Jackson, President Lincoln 
ignored Chief Justice Taney’s order to release a prisoner in Ex Parte Merryman,235 and Lincoln’s 
cabinet also paid little attention to the Court’s decision in Ex Parte Milligan, which called for the end 
of military trials when civilian courts were in session.236 The important fact is that the judiciary can 
accomplish very little if the executive does not enforce its orders, which is something that “has not 
been lost on the federal executive or on the states and their executives” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 
168).  
 A second form of control concerns judicial administration: Congress can not only cut the 
federal judiciary’s budget, which now comprises over 30,000 non-judicial employees, but it also can 
regulate court rules and procedures. For example, in the early 1980s, Congress grew frustrated with 
how the courts handled criminal sentencing, which led to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984237—an 
act that stipulated mandatory sentencing guidelines. Federal judges “almost uniformly abhorred” the 
Act, yet it is an example of how the political branches might curtail judicial power (Ferejohn and 
Kramer 2006, 176).238 
 The last form of political control relates to the scope of judicial power. Congress has the 
power to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Notwithstanding repeated failures 
to divest federal court jurisdiction via Article III, Congress has created a host of Article I courts to 
hear a variety of federal claims and interpret federal law. Examples of Article I courts include old 
                                                 
234 Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 31 U.S. 515 and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) 30 U.S. 1. Whether Jackson actually made 
his now oft-cited remark has been the subject of scholarly investigation, see Richard P. Longaker. 1956. “Andrew 
Jackson and the Judiciary.” Political Science Quarterly 71: 341-364, 349. Longaker finds that Jackson’s attitude toward the 
Supreme Court was more than sole defiance, but nevertheless, as descendants of Jeffersonian Republicans, Jacksonians 
were unabashed critics of the Court (Longaker 1956, 341-343). 
235 Ex Parte Merryman (1861) 17 F. Cas. 144. Merryman was a federal circuit court decision where Chief Justice Taney, 
riding circuit, issued the opinion for the court.  
236 Ex Parte Milligan (1866) 71 U.S. 2. Mark Neely, Jr. writes, “The Milligan decision had little practical effect. It was 
written in thunderously quotable language . . . [but d]espite unmistakable condemnation, trials by military commission 
continued (Neely 1991, 176).  
237 Public Law No. 98-473. 
238 In United States v. Booker 543 U.S. (2005), the Supreme Court struck down mandatory sentencing guidelines as 
stipulated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.   
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territorial courts, which heard claims in federal territories before statehood, and the Court of 
Custom Appeals, which monopolized conflicts over tariffs and trade questions. More recently, the 
Tax Court, the Claims Court, the Court of International Trade, and the courts of District of 
Columbia represent non-Article III courts, courts that are “subject only to the most limited sort of 
appellate review in an Article III tribunal” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 175). These kinds of courts 
represents ways Congress limits Court power.  
 The interdependent nature of the branches and the political control over judicial power 
helps produce a Court that will act diffidently in its adjudication. Because “congressional attacks 
against the courts can turn into threats to judicial independence” (Miller 2009, 16) and because 
constitutional meaning does not end with the Supreme Court’s decision (Whittington 1999; Murphy 
1986), the Court engages in behavior that protects its institutional mission. With the reasons for 
diffidence outlined, let us now turn to some the mechanism that allow the Court to engage in 
diffidence.239  
 
Mechanisms for Diffidence  
 
 Over time the federal judiciary has imposed a set of doctrinal constraints, which limit its 
authority. These constraints have facilitated diffidence, and in this way they act as mechanisms for 
the Court to maximize power of the other branches while avoiding aggrandizing too much power 
for itself. This section will discuss three such mechanism:  jurisdiction and justiciability, federalism, 
                                                 
239 Some might argue that the Court is rarely concerned with the range of its own authority because it is largely 
impervious to the structural constraints cited above. The precarious nature of the Court, however, does not necessitate 
that the political branches retaliate against the judiciary. Moreover, even if the Court is largely impervious to structural 
constraints, that does not mean it will ignore them when promulgating decisions. The Court’s precarious nature stems 
from broader issues than formal structural constraints. Its precarious nature has roots in the counter-majoritarian 
problem of the Supreme Court (i.e. the democratic illegitimacy of judicial review), which a subfield of constitutional 
theory has attempted to address ever since Alexander Bickel’s (1962) The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics. The point here is that an amalgamation of forces—structural constraints, public opinion, institutional 
legitimacy—create an institution that cannot do whatever it desires. This is a modest claim endorsed by a diverse set of 
scholars in the “new institutionalist” school. See Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, eds. 1999. The Supreme Court in 
American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.   
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and the rules of constitutional interpretation.240 The mechanisms discussed below are by no means 
an exhaustive list of the ways the Court may act diffidently. Instead, this section seeks to chart some 
of the mechanisms evident in these data, which serve to illuminate some of the major lines of 
institutionalized Court diffidence developed over time.  
 
Jurisdiction and Justiciability 
 
 The Court grounds its federal jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution with its language 
of “cases” and “controversies.”241 This has led the Supreme Court to hold that federal courts may 
take jurisdiction only in “justiciable” disputes, that is, those “appropriate for judicial 
determination.” 242  The limitations produced by this mechanism, however, have always been 
considered “a judicially-invented gloss on the Constitution” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 185). That 
is, the Court’s diffidence over its own jurisdiction is a consciously imposed limitation on its 
authority.243 This jurisdiction section will first present some of the data on judicial power and then 
will discuss some of the case history to illuminate the ways diffidence has manifested in these 
decisions and in response to the broader political setting.   
 The invocation of constitutional mythology and lore is especially prominent in cases over 
judicial power because it is in these cases that the Court weighs in on its precise powers. In one such 
                                                 
240 In chronicling the causes of judicial restraint, John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer see these three legal innovations as 
Court-imposed “doctrinal limitations” that amount to “judicial abstinence” (2006, 183-184). 
241 Article III, Section 2 reads, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to 
controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states…” 
242 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth (1937), 240. Justiciability is a broad conceptual umbrella encompassing several 
interrelated doctrines, including standing, mootness, and ripeness. For the purposes of these data, any decision dealing 
with these doctrines were all coded under the “jurisdiction/judicial power” legal issue area, and thus they are not 
discussed as separate doctrine below.  
243 There is an important pragmatic side to jurisdictional denials, too. For much of the Court’s history, the Court has 
advocated for reductions or stasis in federal rights because of their impact on federal court caseloads. Control over its 
own docket, and thus a reduction in caseload, was an impetus behind Chief Justice William Taft’s efforts. See Justin 
Crowe. 2007. “The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard 
Taft,” The Journal of Politics, 69 (1): 73-87.  
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decision from these data, Osborn v. Bank of United States (1824),244 Chief Justice Marshall invoked this 
mythology: “Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 
judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the 
will of the law” (Osborn, 866). With this decision, legal scholar Alpheus Mason observes, “the myth 
was born and consecrated” (Mason 1962, 1388).   
 Looking at the thirty-eight decisions in the data concerning judicial power and jurisdiction 
reveals a Court reluctant to aggrandize power for itself or to controvert Congress’s authority.245 In 
just over 55% of these decisions, the Court refused to expand its jurisdictional power or to entertain 
challenges to a federal statute. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 display the impact judicial power decisions had -
on the Supreme Court’s authority—both the total distribution between 1789 and 2000 (Figure 10.1) 
and the distribution across quarter-century eras (Figure 10.2). Figures 10.1 and 10.2 support the 
claim that the Court exercises great care with respect to advancing its own authority.246  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
244 Osborn v. United States (1824) 22 U.S. 738. At issue in Osborn was an Ohio state tax levied on the United States Bank. 
Despite McCulloch, Ohio insisted in enforcing the tax, which defied a federal circuit court injunction. The circuit court 
then asserted jurisdiction to require the Ohio State Auditor, Ralph Osborn, to repay the amount seized. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower federal courts jurisdiction and invalidated the Ohio law.  
245 “Judicial power” decisions are ones in which the Court is asked to specifically rule on its own authority to hear a case. 
This category pertains to questions about judicial jurisdiction and justiciability, which includes the political question 
doctrines, mootness, ripeness, and standing of the case at bar.  
246 For an historical discussion of the Court’s jurisdictional power, see Louis Fisher’s Constitutional Dialogues (1988, 85-
118). Fisher argues, “Even when courts have jurisdiction, they may decide not to accept a case for reasons of equity and 
prudence” (Fisher 1988, 85).  
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Figure 10.1: Pie Chart of Judicial Power Decisions Impact on Central State Authority 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. The neutral decision was not a case heard 
by the Supreme Court; Eakin v. Raub (1825) was a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 
and, as such, could not possibly impact central state authority. Nevertheless, by my 
selection design (see Chapter 2), Eakin made the cut into the database. In Eakin, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Marshall’s theory of judicial review 
from Marbury to the state level, invalidating a state legislative act which violated the 
Pennsylvania constitution. The Pennsylvania act regulated the rules regarding those 
who could bring an “action of ejectment,” a lawsuit brought to remove a party 
who is occupying real property. Figure 10.1 makes clear that the Court is careful with 
respect to allotting itself greater jurisdictional authority.   
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Figure 10.2: Stacked Bar Chart of Judicial Power Decisions’ Impact on Central State Authority by 
Quarter-Century 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. From this graphic, we can see a pattern of the 
Court refusing rather than accepting jurisdiction more often than not. Questions of judicial 
authority were most abundant during the founding and early republic years where the Court 
was especially diffident in its pronouncements (see the discussion of Marbury and Stuart v. 
Laird below).  
 
 To be sure, the Figures above still demonstrate expansion of judicial authority, but almost 
half of these expansions occurred when state-level questions were before the bench, as Figure 10. 3 
shows. While there are too few cases disaggregated across the levels of government to draw 
definitive conclusion, Figure 10. 3 suggests a pattern of diffidence whereby the Court expands 
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review power over the federal branches less often, proportionally-speaking, and instead consolidates 
judicial power (and thus expands the central state) over state-level issues.247  
 
Figure 10.3: Judicial Power Decisions Disaggregated Across Levels of Government Review 
 Impact on Court Authority  
         Total Restrict Neutral Expand 
Level of 
Government 
State 2 0 7 9 
Federal 19 0 9 28 
n/a 0 1 0 1 
Total 21 1 16 38 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. Proportionally, the Court expands its 
authority more often through overturning state-level actions (i.e. 7 in the 
“expand” category) rather than through federal ones. There are too few cases at 
the state-level to draw any definitive conclusions, but further evidence below in 
the “federalism” and “constitutional interpretation” sections bolsters the 
suggestions of this Figure. The “n/a” level of government is a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case, Eakin v. Raub (1825), which could not possibly affect 
Supreme Court authority.  
 
 Take Cohens v. Virginia (1824) 248  for example, which illuminates both Supreme Court 
diffidence and an expansion of Court authority over state-level actions. Cohens held that individuals 
convicted of state crimes had the right to appeal judgments in federal courts. 249  The political 
environment of the day necessitated Court diffidence. Indeed, simply declaring that the Court would 
even hear the case ignited a “political firestorm” in Virginia. In response, the Virginia legislature 
maintained that the Marshall Court had “no rightful authority under the Constitution to examine 
                                                 
247 See Table 7 below for further evidence of this pattern.  
248 19 U.S. 264 
249 Cohens dealt with a Virginia state law that prohibited the sale of lottery tickets. But after a congressional statute 
authorizing the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia, the Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery 
tickets in Virginia. Virginia tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of 
disputes between the states and the national government. Thus, the Marshall Court addressed this question: did the 
Supreme Court have the power to review the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling? Marshall answered in the affirmative, 
noting that Court had jurisdiction to hear state supreme court cases on appeal. But, after establishing the Court’s 
jurisdiction, he deftly held that the state law over the lottery was a local issue and thus upheld the Virginia Supreme 
Court’s conviction of the Cohens brothers. For an extended discussion of the Court’s diffidence and careful avoidance 
of political controversy with Virginia, see Mark Graber. 1995. “The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the 
Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power.” Constitutional Commentary, 12 (67): 67-92, 86-87, 90. 
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and correct the judgment for which the Commonwealth has been cited” (quoted in Graber 1995, 
75).  
 In this case, the crime was selling out of state lottery tickets in Virginia. Congress had 
delegated to the Corporation of Washington the power to hold lotteries, the “Grand National 
Lottery,” in order to generate funds to build a canal between Maryland and Washington, a common 
political practice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Marshall’s assertion that the 
Grand National Lottery was local in scope—confined only to the District of Columbia—belied the 
common usage of lotteries; government officials often used proceeds from these lotteries to fund 
federal projects. More than that, anyone familiar with the nation’s capital at this time knew 
Washington D.C. could not make good on the Grand National Lottery’s $50,000 worth of prizes 
(Graber 1995, 73-81). Nevertheless, the justices adhered to a “highly implausible reading” of the 
congressional legislation creating the Grand National Lottery that concluded Congress did not 
intend to authorize the sale of tickets outside of D.C. (Graber 1995, 69). 
 At the same time, however, the Marshall Court affirmed central state authority (both of the 
Congress and the Court) without actually exercising this power. More specifically, Marshall held that 
the Court had appellate jurisdiction to hear cases of individuals convicted of state crimes. He also 
ruled that the Supremacy Clause prevented states from impinging on Congress’s authority to govern 
the nation’s capital. Despite these affirmations of central state authority, the Court still held that the 
Grand National Lottery did not prevent Virginia’s ban of out-of-state lottery sales and thus, after all 
that, Marshall upheld Virginia’s conviction of the Cohen brothers.  
 The Court’s implausible reading of the congressional and Virginia statutes, Mark Graber 
argues, resulted from having no reason to believe that “Virginians would respect a decision in favor 
of the Cohen brothers” (Graber 1995, 86). One prominent Ohio attorney at the time said ruling in 
favor of Virginia’s law was an attempt to “allay the apprehensions” that the Court’s assertion of 
 
 
148 
 
jurisdictional authority would generate in Virginia (quoted in Graber 1995, 87). Fundamentally, the 
Marshall Court recognized its inability to declare laws—even state laws—unconstitutional if it lacked 
the support of the national political branches as it did in Cohens because of Virginia’s vigorous 
objections. Notwithstanding this inability, the Court still expounded on broad constitutional issues 
pertaining to supremacy and jurisdiction before it issued its much narrower edict on the 
constitutionality of Virginia’s ban on lotteries. Ultimately, Cohens demonstrated not only Supreme 
Court diffidence but also the way in which this diffidence helped lay the foundations for expansions 
of national authority.  
 Even earlier than in Cohens, the Marshall Court demonstrated the utility of judicial diffidence 
in protecting itself when faced with a hostile political environment during President Jefferson’s 
tenure.250 The Jeffersonian Republicans vigorous assault251 on the judiciary produced diffidence in 
many of the Court’s decisions, but particularly illuminating is the jurisdiction decision Stuart v. 
Laird,252  which reviewed the Judiciary Act of 1802. Despite an exchange of letters in which a 
majority of the justices questioned the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress had authority to alter judicial jurisdiction as it did in in the 1802 Act (Haskins 1981 168-
180). Stuart demonstrated the need for constitutional diffidence in the face of criticism from the 
political branches. Stuart revealed the Court—not as a power grabber that invented its judicial review 
                                                 
250 In these hostile political (i.e. “reconstructive”) environments, political scientists have long recognized that the 
Marshall Court maintained its legitimacy and built its judicial review authority through calculated diffidence in decisions 
like Marbury v. Madison, Stuart v. Laird, Schooner Peggy, and Cohens v. Virginia (Whittington 2007, 75; Graber 1998, 90; 
Graber, 1995, 235-236).  
251 President Jefferson removed all Federalist attorneys and marshals, no matter how legitimate their appointments or 
how impartially they executed their duties, and replaced them with Republicans (Ellis 1971, 33). More than that, the 
impeachments of federal court Judge John Pickering and Associate Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase demonstrated 
to the Court the vigor with which the Republicans would use to attack the judiciary. Congressional Republicans also 
repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 and replaced it with Judiciary Act of 1802, further limiting Federalist control over the 
federal judiciary. See Richard Ellis (1971, 16–35), The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic. Author of 
one of the collections in The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, George Lee Haskins concludes, “The managers in charge of the 
1802 legislation had more in mind than merely setting back the clock and ridding the judiciary of Federalist judges. The 
attack on the Supreme Court was part of an identifiable policy on the part of Republicans to reduce and confine the 
power of the federal courts generally” (Haskins et al. 1981, 162). 
252  5 U.S. 299 (1803) 
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authority—but, instead, as a cautious institution cognizant of its vulnerability and therefore open to 
compromise (Crowe 2012, 75-77).253 A pattern of judicial deference, too, endured for many decades 
after Stuart and helped put in place “relatively stable” interbranch relations (Ferejohn and Kramer 
2006, 179). Stuart demonstrated an example of the Court restricting itself and thus expanding the 
power of Congress, a behavior that continued in other judicial power cases.  
 We see this diffident behavior again in other jurisdictional cases like American Insurance Co. v. 
Canter (1828).254 This case concerned admiralty jurisdiction over shipwrecked goods in the then-
territory of Florida. In this case, Chief Justice Marshall held that the Florida territorial courts were 
constitutional, contrasting these “legislative” courts (created by Article I and IV) with the more 
typical “constitutional” courts (created by Article III). The Court found that the plenary 
congressional power over the territories (in Article IV) justified Congress’ creation of non-Article III 
courts in the territories. Marshall held that while admiralty jurisdiction is typically a power vested 
only in Article III constitutional courts in the states, this same limitation does not extend to the 
territories. In the territories, Marshall declared, “Congress exercises the combined powers of the 
general and of a state government” so the jurisdiction of Article I courts in the territories “is not a 
part of that judicial power” defined by Article III constitutional courts like the Supreme Court 
(American Insurance, 546). Thus, in American Insurance, the Marshall Court facilitated the growth of 
Article I “legislative” courts, which remain outside the reach of Article III constitutional courts’ 
appellate review powers (a restriction of Supreme Court authority) yet, simultaneously, advanced the 
plenary powers of Congress to acquire and govern territory.255  
                                                 
253 This argument is consistent with some studies of post-communist constitutional courts, which also find that avoiding 
confrontation with political branches solidifies judicial authority in burgeoning democracies. See Lee Epstein, Olga 
Shvetsova, and Jack Knight. 2001. “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of 
Democratic Systems of Government.” Law and Society Review 35 (1): 117-164.  
254 26 U.S. 511 
255 This behavior is not simply a phenomenon of the Court’s early history. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 
(1992), the Defenders of Wildlife sought a declaratory judgment on a 1986 Congressional amendment to the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, an amendment which limited the Act’s scope. The Court ruled that the Defenders of 
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 The Court’s reluctance to issue advisory opinions is another method by which the judiciary 
limits its authority under this justiciability rubric. For example, in 1793, as the war between France 
and England grew more intense, President Washington’s administration wondered what, if any, 
obligations it had to France and its treaty of alliance with her. Washington asked the Supreme Court 
for an advisory opinion on the French ambassador’s outfitting of both French privateers in 
American ports and enthusiastic American volunteers. But, in August 1793, the Court unanimously 
refused Washington’s request to issue an advisory opinion, referencing the separation of powers as 
well as the “strong arguments against the propriety of” answering questions extrajudicially (Holt 
1998, 178-179).256 The Court’s refusal in this instance was odd given the fact that the Court did not 
rule advisory opinions unconstitutional257 and that advisory opinions were common in the English 
tradition (Holt 1998, 179). It was this particular advisory opinion that the Court rejected and for the 
calculated political reason that it would pull the Court into a hotly debated issue, an issue that pitted 
Washington’s very administration against itself with Secretary of State Jefferson supporting French 
and Secretary of Treasury Hamilton supporting the British (Holt 1998, 178). Thus, Washington’s 
decision to remain neutral in the war “provoked the first open attacks on his previously untouchable 
character and judgment” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 186). Determined early in the Court’s history, 
the norm of refusing to issue advisory opinions provided an avenue for constitutional diffidence and 
thus the maintenance of its own legitimacy and political capital.  
 Finally, the political questions doctrine is one of the most prominent ways the Court can 
refuse power for itself and instead leave power with the political branches. This doctrine has 
emerged as a way for the Court to duck potential cases that might make them vulnerable, removing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wildlife did not have standing to sue and thus—through this jurisdictional limitation—the Court left authority with 
Congress while simultaneously limiting judicial authority.  
256 The quote is from a letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President Washington. 8 August 1793. Access here: 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s34.html 
257 Hayburn’s Case (1792) 
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constitutional law questions from judicial consideration because the Court deems it is beyond their 
constitutional authority to decide. The doctrine is as old as Marbury v. Madison (1803) where Chief 
Justice Marshall said, “The province of the Court is solely to decide on the rights of individuals, not 
to inquire how the Executive or Executive officers perform duties in which they have a discretion. 
Questions, in their nature political or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the 
Executive, can never be made in this court” (Marbury, 170). Certainly, there has been little 
consistency with which the Court applies this doctrine (Pacelle 2002, 88), but the important point is 
that “political questions,” and jurisdiction questions more broadly, present the Court with an avenue 
for constitutional diffidence.  
 Over time, the Court has refined and advanced this doctrine. Luther v. Borden (1849) declared 
that the Court did not have the constitutional authority to determine which group—after a small 
civil war in Rhode Island—constituted the official government of that state.258 In the realm of 
foreign policy, the Court has also refused authority in multiple areas: to decide when a war has 
begun or ended,259 whether treaty obligations survive the fall of a foreign state,260 and whether the 
conduct of foreign relations is the sole responsibility of the executive branch.261 Similarly, the Court 
has avoided some questions that relate to important aspects of political parties.262 And, last, but by 
                                                 
258 48 U.S. 1. Chief Justice Taney held, “[T]he inquiry proposed to be made belonged to the political power, and not to 
the judicial; that it rested with the political power to decide whether the charter government had been displaced or not” 
(Luther, 39). 
259 Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller (1923) 262 U.S. 51. Justice McKenna held for the Court, “[T]he power which declared 
the necessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what the cessation requires. The power is legislative. A court 
cannot estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination at a particular moment of time” (Commercial 
Trust, 57).  
260 Terlinden v. Ames 184 U.S. 270 (1903), holding “We concur in the view that the question whether power remains in a 
foreign state to carry out its treaty obligations is in its nature political, and not judicial, and that the courts ought not to 
interfere with the conclusions of the political department in that regard” (Terlinden, 288).  
261 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 246 U.S. 297 (1918) declaring, “The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is 
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—‘the political’—departments of the government, and the 
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision” (Oetjen, 
302). 
262 O’Brien v. Brown 409 U.S. 1 (1972). Here the Court refused to issue a decision on the merits concerning a challenge to 
the seating of delegates at the 1972 Democratic National Convention. In a per curiam decision, the Court noted that no 
precedent existed for interjecting into national convention deliberations: “No case is cited to us in which any federal 
court has undertaken to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political convention; no holding of 
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no means exhausting this list, the Court has found challenges to impeachment nonjusticiable.263 The 
Court’s invocation of the political question doctrine—or, really, any justiciable principle—is self-
enforcing; it is the arbiter of its own rules and thus can ignore or invoke them (O’Brien 2003, 171).  
While the application of these jurisdictional principles can be sporadic, the bottom line is that the 
Court relies on them when its legitimacy is at risk and when its decision would have little effect and, 
consequently, undermine its authority (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 193). Using these jurisdictional 
methods is but one channel where Court diffidence can manifest.  
 Jurisdiction-related issues also bleed into questions of federalism focused on defining state 
court versus federal court jurisdiction. Take the examples of diversity 264  and federal question 
jurisdiction.265 Diversity jurisdiction gives a federal court authority to hear civil actions that meet a 
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement and when no plaintiff shares a state of citizenship with 
any defendant. Federal question jurisdiction is even more broadly defined, allowing the filing of a 
lawsuit in federal court based on “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States.”266 The statutory language could easily be construed to confer broad authority on 
federal courts, but fears over the federal judiciary’s control over state courts in early republic made 
federal judges sensitive to jurisdictional conflicts between federal and state courts (Ellis 1971 10-
16).267   
 As a consequence of these conflicts, the Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity and 
federal questions jurisdictional language narrowly, which curtails its authority over state courts. 
Despite the fact that the Constitution only requires there must be a plaintiff who is from a different 
                                                                                                                                                             
this Court up to now gives support for judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here, involving as they do 
relationships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature” (O’Brien, 4).  
263 Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Not President Nixon, but federal District Court Judge Walter Nixon 
challenged a Senate rule used during his impeachment.    
264 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
265 28 U.S. C.§ 1331 
266 28 U.S. C.§ 1331 
267 Between 1776 to 1801, important questions regarding the national judiciary arose, which even went as far as asking if 
the national judiciary was actually necessary (Ellis 1971, 16).  
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state than a defendant to permit federal court jurisdiction, the Court has held, very early in its 
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction that every plaintiff must be from a different state than every 
defendant.268 In so holding, the Court precludes an enormous number of multiparty cases from 
reaching the federal courts. With respect to federal question jurisdiction, the Court has recognized 
Congress’s broad authority to confer such jurisdiction as it did in Osborn v. Bank of the United States 
(1824).269 Yet the Court has not interpreted federal statues concerning federal questions nearly this 
broadly, but has instead limited its constitutional authority to hear such cases. In Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad v. Mottley (1908),270 for example, the Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a 
case in federal court based on the anticipation that the defendant would raise a federal law in defense 
of the plaintiff’s suit. In other words, the plaintiff’s case, in and of itself, must raise a federal 
question in order for federal courts to hear the case: 
A suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his 
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the 
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the defense is invalidated by 
some provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the 
course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit—that is, 
the plaintiff's original cause of action—arises under the Constitution (Mottley, 153) 
This interpretation of federal questions is crucial because, since 1887, defendants can only remove a 
case to federal court if the plaintiff could have filed it in federal court originally (Ferejohn and 
Kramer 2006, 194). Thus, the Court’s self-imposed limitations over its own authority diminishes the 
number and kinds of cases it can expect to hear, leaving many of these cases to be addressed by state 
courts.  
 The Court’s abstention doctrine also leaves jurisdiction with state courts and demonstrates 
the Court’s reluctance to entangle federal courts in controversies that will likely create conflict with 
state governments. For example, federal courts often abstain if the case presents unresolved 
                                                 
268 Strawbridge v. Curtiss 7 U.S. 267 (1806) 
269 Chief Justice Marshall construed the federal question doctrine very broadly, finding that federal courts can hear any 
case in which there is a federal “ingredient:” “We think, then that when a question to which the judicial power of the 
Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give 
the circuit court’s jurisdiction of that cause” (Osborn, 823).  
270 211 U.S. 149 
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questions pertaining to state law and the federal constitution. In an effort not to misinterpret the 
state law in question, the court often waits until a state court resolved the question.271 The judiciary 
bases its abstention doctrine on a principle in advanced in one such case: that it should avoid 
“needless federal conflict with state policy.”272  
 In sum, avoidance of needless conflict rests at the heart of Court diffidence. This avoidance 
should make the Court more likely to expand the powers of the other branches rather than expand 
its own jurisdictional judicial power. By the same logic, if the Court should aggrandize power for 
itself, it should do so through state governments rather than through restricting the federal 
government. In Table 7, when we remove “judicial power” decisions and look at the remaining 
constitutional issue areas, we see just that—the Court supports the expansion of federal actions 
(mainly congressional actions via federal statutes) at a greater rate than the “judicial power” rate of 
expansion portrayed in Figures 11.1 and 11.2 above.  
 Indeed, Table 7 reveals that the Court’s decisions expand the power of the two political 
branches while expanding power for itself mainly through actions restricting state governments. We 
find that 76 decisions expand the political branches while 33 decisions restrict the broader central 
state (more than 2:1 ratio contrasted to the Court’s judicial power decisions, which expand authority 
at a 1:1 ratio). Of course, the Court has aggrandized substantial power for itself over time but that 
has usually occurred vis-à-vis the state governments. Indeed, the Court invalidated (and thus expand 
its own review power) state level actions in 95 decisions while upholding state level actions in 61 
decisions. These findings affirm our understanding that the Court, apart from its early beginnings, 
                                                 
271 The Court promulgated this idea—what has become known as the “Pullman abstention”—in Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Pullman Co. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  
272 Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943). Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux  360 U.S. 25 (1959) also 
advanced a similar abstention doctrine in the name of federalism Here the Court called upon federal courts to recognize 
“the respective competence of the state” court system on questions like eminent domain because these matters are 
“close to the political interests of a State.” Doing so, Justice Felix Frankfurter held, would advance “the maintenance of 
harmonious federal-state relations” (Thibodaux, 29).  
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has always viewed itself as supreme over the states.273 Table 7 also supports the idea that the Court, 
for the most part, has acted as an important facet of the central state, extending the control of the 
political branches across the polity.  
 
Table 7:  Impact on State Authority by the Level of Government Action Reviewed 1789-1971 
(N=288) 
 
 
   
Impact on Central State Authority           
       Total     Restrict       Neutral      Expand 
 Level of Govt. 
Local 7 0 13 20 
State 61 0 95 156 
Federal 33 1 76 111 
                    Total 101 1 184 288 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. These data include all constitutional 
issue areas except “judicial power” because this category was displayed above in 
Figures 11.1 and 11.2. This Table shows us that the Court more frequently reviews 
state laws than local or federal ones. More than that, the Court expands its own 
power most often by invalidating state actions rather than by invalidating federal 
ones (95 state laws to 33 federal laws). We also see that the Court expands federal 
government action at more than a 2:1 ratio (76 upheld to 33 invalidated). Per the 
coding instructions (see the Appendix below), expanding decisions at the state-level 
are ones in which the Court—as a member of the central state—invalidated a state-
level action. By contrast, expanding decisions at the federal level means that the 
Court upheld a federal statute. 
 
Ultimately, Table 7 indicates the importance of federal-state relations to the expansion of national 
authority, which we will see further in the next section. 
 
Federalism 
  
 In addition to principles of jurisdiction embodied in “judicial power” decisions, federalism 
provides another mechanism for diffidence. As Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated, federalism is often 
                                                 
273 See Gillman et al. 2013 for a chart graphing the rate in which the Court has invalidated state versus federal laws per 
year between 1850 and 1950 (Gillman et al. 2012, 331). For a line chart graphing the same thing but between 1930 and 
1980 see Gillman et al. 2013 (427). Thomas Keck (2002) also provides the number of decisions and annual average of 
Supreme Court decisions striking down federal, state, and local statutes on constitutional grounds (Keck 2002, 128-129). 
All this scholarship makes clear that the judiciary has always been far more reluctant to invalidate federal laws than state 
laws.  
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the battle ground over which the expansion of central state authority has been fought. Beyond the 
thirty-eight “judicial power” decisions, the remaining decisions in the data depict an even fuller 
picture of the Court’s diffidence. While “judicial power” deals specifically with cases that concern the 
Court’s jurisdiction, every decision in the data is a commentary on judicial power, broadly construed, 
because whenever the Court rules on a case it implicitly acknowledges its power to do so. In other 
words, we can look beyond pure jurisdictional decisions to uncover how the Court expands the 
central state with its penchant for diffidence.   
 Since its inception, the Court has reviewed state laws to determine if they impinged on 
federal interests. When it comes to federal-state issues, the Court has deferred to this diffident 
posture—protecting the federal government from the states by affirming national supremacy against 
nullification (Kramer 2000, 228).274 In these federal-state relations, the Supreme Court, has done 
very little to constrict Congress’s attempts to expand its power over the states until the turn of the 
twentieth century (Kramer 2000, 228). 275  For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), the Court 
affirmed a congressional statute regulating fugitive slaves despite the fact that no explicit authority to 
do so existed. In cases like this and many others that “presented close, controversial legal questions” 
where the Court “easily could have gone either way,” it affirmed congressional authority and left 
states to protect themselves (Kramer 2000, 229).  
                                                 
274 Of this depiction of the Court’s role, Larry Kramer writes, “This claim may sound jarring to lawyers today, who have 
for decades been fed a story about the Supreme Court’s uncompromising stand against federal growth until Justice 
Roberts spinelessly caved to pressure from the Roosevelt Administration. Yet [this] account is, in fact, the more accurate 
rendition of events” (Kramer 2000, 228). Larry Kramer. 2000. “Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism.” Columbia Law Review, 100: 215-293. 
275 The one instance where the Court attempted to protect state sovereignty against Congress’s power was Dred Scott v. 
Sandford (1857), holding that Congress did not have the authority to naturalize slaves or regulate slavery in territories 
acquired after the adoption of the Constitution. As all Court commentators agree, Dred Scott was an utter disaster from 
which the Court sought to escape for at least the subsequent generation.  
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 When the Court did develop constitutional limits on central state authority, it often did so in 
relatively obscure cases involving property and land transfers (Graber 2000).276 While the Court 
began to restrict Congress more openly in the early twentieth century with a cluster of well-known 
cases like E.C. Knight Co. (1895) and Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), it still supported federal expansion 
with decisions like the Swift & Co. (1905) and the Lottery Case (1903). At best, then, constitutional 
doctrine remained “unsettled” and provided authority “available both to support and to oppose 
further federal innovation and expansion” (Kramer 2000, 231). The paneled chart  in Figure 11 
supports Kramer’s interpretation, showing the Court’s tendency to persistently support the federal 
political branches as revealed by the dotted line (expansion) almost always remaining above the solid 
line (restriction) in the federal panel. In the state panel, central state expansion occurs at a slower 
rate than in the federal panel, which is indicated by the dotted and solid lines following each other 
more closely in the state panel than in the federal panel. Each panel represents the level of 
government that passed the law that was under review by the Supreme Court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
276 Mark Graber. 2000. “Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development: The Consensual Foundation 
of Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence.” Vanderbilt Law Review.  
 
 
158 
 
Figure 11: Paneled Line Chart of the Impact on State Authority by Level of Government 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. This figure includes all constitutional issue areas, 
including “judicial power.” When “judicial power” is removed from these data, the patterns 
look largely the same. The main takeaway from this figure is that, over time, the Court’s 
decisions support the vast majority of federal laws, as represented by the dotted line 
expanding (i.e. affirming) federal statutes. At the state-level, the story is much more varied 
with the Court leaving many decisions to state governments thus restricting the central state 
(represented by the solid line) until around 1945 when the Court invalidated state-level laws 
at a higher frequency, which expanded judicial power (represented by the dotted line). The 
six neutral decisions are not presented; they all occurred at the federal level.   
 
  Looking specifically at the federalism decisions in these data also affirms the idea that the 
Court is an important instrument in extending central state authority. Figure 12 disaggregates 74 
federalism decisions across three levels of government, and we can see both the Court’s proclivity to 
support the federal government (in the federal panel) as well as its penchant to overturn state-level 
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action that infringes on federal governmental power (in the state panel), as shown by the striped 
columns in both panels  
 
Figure 12: Paneled Distribution of Federalism Decisions by Level of Government  
 
 
Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. The distribution presented in this  paneled graphic (with 
a bin size of 10) shows that federalism has been one of the primary avenues in which central state 
authority has expanded over time. See also chapter 5.     
 
Figures 11 and 12 show that the Court has done very little to restrict Congress. In most cases 
concerning the federal government, the Court acquiesced to Congress’s legislation, and along the 
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state level, the Court aggrandized additional review power by expanding the application of the 
Constitution.     
 
Rules of Constitutional Interpretation  
 
 One last mechanism of diffidence is the Court’s constitutional interpretation. A reason for 
the vacillation presented in these data rests on what Lawrence Sager has called “underenforced 
constitutional norms” (Sager 1978, 1213). “Because of institutional concerns”—which Sager defines 
as “judicial construct[s]…based upon questions of propriety or capacity”—the Court restrains itself 
from fully enforcing constitutional norms like equal protection and, in turn, this slows the expansion 
and reach of central state authority (Sager 1978, 1213, 1217). Indeed, constitutional development has 
witnessed many issues placed beyond the reach of the judiciary:  
Constitutional case law is thin in this important sense: the range of those matters that are plausible candidates 
for judicial engagement and enforcement in the name of the Constitution is considerably smaller than the range 
of those matters that are plausibly understood to implicate serious questions of political justice. . . .The scope 
of the domain thus put beyond the reach of constitutional case law is considerable (Sager 1993, 410).  
Sager’s concerns deal largely with normative questions about individual rights claims to equal 
protection, the Takings Clause, and the Court’s reluctance to repair “the harms of historic injustice” 
(Sager 1993, 411). The fact remains, however, that the Court’s reticence to fix these “harms” results 
in it leaving many of these issues to the states thereby constricting national authority, as Table 7 
shows above.   
 Beyond individual rights, many decisions that deal simply with the structure of the federal 
state (e.g. the separation of powers) reveal the Court’s reluctance to exercise its power, often leaving 
the political branches broad discretion. The Court’s reluctance helps explain the support seen for the 
federal government witness in Figure 12. More specifically, judicial invalidation of express powers of 
the political branches has been relatively rare, contributing to an expansion of central state power in 
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important areas such as war, treaty (and foreign affairs more generally), and the powers to tax and 
spend, which will all be discussed in turn.  
 There is no single case dealing with war powers, but the Court has historically been reluctant 
to assert itself. During Reconstruction, for example, the Chase Court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction over Reconstruction Act enforcement in the military-occupied South thus leaving power 
with President Johnson. Legal historian David Hughes has called the Court’s interpretation of the 
Reconstruction Act a “tactical retreat” whereby the Court “transformed its stance from one of 
belligerent assertiveness to one of retiring prudence” (Hughes 1964, 588).277 Similarly, Martin Sheffer 
has recognized the Court’s deference to political branches in this realm: “One must constantly 
remember that executive-legislative conflicts regarding questions of emergency, war, and peace, 
although raising many constitutional controversies, rarely find their way to the judiciary and, when 
they do, are rarely decided according to proper constitutional interpretation. For the most part, they 
are resolved…through political settlements agreed to by Congress and the President” (Sheffer 1999, 
ix).278  
 Likewise, in the area of treaty and foreign affairs, the Court has upheld the power of 
Congress to delegate broad authority to the president to regulate arms shipment to South American 
countries.279 In Missouri v. Holland (1920) the Court also affirmed Congress’s treaty power over states 
that claimed Congress’s treaty with Canada regulating the hunting of protected migratory birds was 
unconstitutional. The judiciary has also advanced Congress’s taxing and spending powers with 
                                                 
277 The case to which Hughes and I refer is Mississippi v. Johnson 71 U.S. 475 (1867). The Court followed this diffident 
pattern in two other decisions pertaining to the Reconstruction Act,  holding that questions surrounding Reconstruction 
enforcement were political questions: Georgia v. Stanton 73 U.S. 50 (1868) and Mississippi v. Stanton 154 U. S. 554 (1868). 
See Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker. 1995. “The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the 
Reconstruction Game,” in Contemplating Courts, Lee Epstein, ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, p. 334-335.  
278 Louis Fisher challenges this interpretation while also offering a detailed history of the Court’s interpretation of war 
powers. See Louis Fisher. 2005. “The Judicial Review of War Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35 (3): 466-495. Still, 
Fisher finds that from the Vietnam War on, the Court has acted diffident in its interpretation of war powers, often 
avoiding reviewing cases on the merits (Fisher 2005, 479). And, he also finds that leading up to the Vietnam War, the 
Court very rarely inhibited the political branches war powers behavior. At most, the Court allocated war power to one or 
the other branches thereby expanding central state authority.    
279 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) 
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respect to the Social Security Act,280 for example, as well as Congress’s authority to withhold federal 
highway funds in order to coerce states to change the drinking age.281 Thus, again, the Court did 
relatively little to assert its own review authority but, instead, facilitated the growth of congressional 
power.  
 A final area of constitutional interpretation that demonstrates diffidence is the area in which 
it the Court is expected to be most active: individual rights. Nevertheless, the rules the Court applies 
here leave much authority to the states, which constricts central state power. The Equal Protection 
Clause, for example, is theoretically applicable to all the federal government does because all laws 
create boundaries and categories. But instead of exercising potent judicial authority, the Court has 
developed three levels of scrutiny—strict, intermediate, and rational basis. The first two categories 
contain a small subset of laws while the vast majority of the government’s laws fall under the 
“rational basis test,” a test that often leaves statutes intact.282  Moreover, the Court has partially 
withdrawn its once robust judicial authority from areas like criminal procedure283 and retreated from 
difficult issues concerning gerrymandering.284  
 In questions of democratic representation, for example, legal scholars like James A. Gardner 
have recognized that the Supreme Court’s initial consolidation of power over questions of 
apportionment of state legislatures285 has been met with subsequent “constitutional diffidence”—or 
                                                 
280 Helvering v. Davis 301 U.S. 619 (1937) and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis 301 U.S. 548 (1937)  
281 South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 
282 Ferejohn and Kramer note, “[T]he use of rational basis scrutiny is ubiquitous in constitutional law, liberating most of 
what government does from serious judicial oversight whether it be under the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, 
the Contract Clause, or the Necessary and Proper Clause” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 205). They recognized, however, 
that there are notable exceptions such as the right to privacy, race and gender, and First Amendment doctrine. 
283 See Clayton and Pickerill “The Politics of Criminal Justice (2006, 1415-1418). In this section, Clayton and Pickerill 
discuss how the Court withdrew some of its judicial authority in realm of capital punishment and the exclusionary rule, 
in the wake of the rise of the “New Right Regime.”  
284 On political gerrymandering, see Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  Here the Court held that while claims of 
partisan gerrymandering were within the judiciary's authority to review, it still eschewed a great deal of review power. 
The plurality opinion concluded that the judiciary has authority to hear gerrymandering cases but only where there is 
“continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or a denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to 
influence the political process” (Davis, 133). 
285 Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
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a reluctance to promulgate a coherent theory to deal with apportionment (Gardner 2013, 20, 1). The 
Supreme Court’s consolidation of power was seen in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), which struck down 
Alabama’s apportionment scheme, holding that Alabama’s state districts (which created population 
disparities of 41 to 1) violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Equal 
Protection Clause required states to make “honest and good faith” efforts to draw districts of nearly 
equal population (Reynolds, 577). Despite Reynold’s far-reaching impact on political representation, the 
Court has remained reluctant to promulgate a theory of democratic practice and participation 
desperately needed to guide the application of the Equal Protection Clause in these political 
representation cases (Gardner 2013, 20-21).286 Indeed, while Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) left room for the Court to act more assertively in gerrymandering cases, he 
still recognized the Court’s reluctance to develop a constitutional standard under the Equal 
Protection Clause for adjudicating these difficult political representation questions:  
There are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to 
define clear, manageable, and political neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan 
classification imposes on representation rights…That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be 
taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. Where important rights are involved, the impossibility of 
full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side of caution.287 
Instead the Court has avoided thrusting itself further into these types of cases by falling “back on 
[the] habit” of continually subdividing electoral districts 288  as well as on the deployment of 
justiciability principles, as the Court did in Vieth (Gardner 2013, 4). On balance, then, “if one 
                                                 
286 Justice Harlan’s dissent in Reynolds makes this point. He argued that the Court did not specify—likely because these 
type of cases “are not amenable to the development of judicial standards”—either how much influence citizens should 
have in a democracy, what such influence might reasonably be, or a proper framework to address such questions 
(Reynolds, 621, 620-625). Harlan’s dissent suggests that the difficulty in adjudicating political representation might be a 
symptom of constitutional diffidence.  
287 Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Kennedy dissenting at p. 308, 311.  
288 Gardner also calls the subdivision of the electorate, “partitioning” the districts. He describe the Court’s practice of 
partitioning in this way:  
Where members of some group complain that their desire to become full participants in the political life of their 
community has been thwarted by some officially created obstacle, the Court has preferred not to dwell on ways in which 
the complaining group might be more fully integrated into existing democratic structures and practices. Instead, it has 
tended to solve these problems by portioning the jurisdiction in such a way as to make the complaining minority into a local 
majority (Gardner 2013, 22).  
Whether one accepts Gardner’s normative implications does not change the fact that the Court has exercised much 
constitutional diffidence in the realm of political representation and democratic process, more generally.  
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considers how easily the Justices could make their presence felt over a much broader range of 
governmental activity,” it is not difficult to see that Court has acted diffidently with its potentially 
vast power (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006, 205). 
 Although tiered scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause was introduced in 1938,289 the Court 
has exercised diffidence with respect to civil rights questions dating back much further than this. 
During the Waite Court era (1874-1888), for example, the judiciary acted diffidently toward 
congressional legislation advancing African-American rights. Rather than affirm Congress’s 
Enforcement Act (1870), the Court promulgated a “modulated expression” of central state authority 
in U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876) and in its civil rights cases more generally between 1870 and 1880 
(Brandwein 2007, 370-372). With the return of Democratic control to the House in 1874 and a 
decade-long economic depression beginning in 1873, enforcing civil rights “became a dicey affair 
and rights enforcement became unsteady” (Brandwein 2007, 371). In this unstable political 
environment, the Court did not have the ability to take the lead and assert racial egalitarianism, but 
instead, charted a “middle path” based on state neglect concepts, concepts that were fundamental to 
Republicans’ agenda–rights to property, contract, and physical security. The Court’s interpretation of 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment followed a “middle path,” 
which only permitted federal prosecution of private individuals in strictly defined circumstances 
(Brandwein 2006, 276-277). The Court took this approach because a broader interpretation of civil 
rights would pressure “Republican political elites to act strongly and bring more prosecutions, which 
were expensive in both dollars and political capital” (Brandwein 2006, 303). Most importantly, the 
Court realized that the executive “would not have undertaken broad prosecutorial efforts to remedy 
the inaction the Court had highlighted,” and thus in an effort to guard its prestige and legitimacy, the 
                                                 
289 United States v. Carolene Products 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Carolene Products suggested two levels of judicial scrutiny: a 
“heightened” form (now known as strict scrutiny) for the three areas it lists in the footnote and the more lenient rational 
bases test. The third tier—intermediate scrutiny –was introduced later for gender discrimination in Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 
190 (1976).  
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Court took a more diffident approach in construing congressional power to enforce civil rights 
(Brandwein 2006, 303).  
 In the end, constitutional interpretation shows how the Court limits its own power. These 
limitations can expand the political branches (as seen in the Court’s rulings on separation of powers) 
while at other times, with individual rights, constitutional interpretation constricts the reach of the 
federal Constitution as well as guards the Court’s legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 At least since the Warren Court, the judiciary has been perceived as more active (and less 
diffident) in policy and politics than ever before. Empirically, too, the Court, on average, has struck 
down more state and local statutes on constitutional grounds in the late Warren (1963-1969) and 
Burger (1969-1986) Courts than in previous Court eras (Keck 2002, 129). Some scholars have 
contended this activism has tarnished its mythological reputation that diffidence helps protect and 
few would disagree.290  
 The erosion of the Court’s myth of legal expertise led to a decline in its legitimacy and given 
rise to widespread Court criticism. Indeed, political criticism of the Court has grown sharply since 
the mid-twentieth century as witnessed both in national party platforms291 and in court-curbing 
                                                 
290 Reflecting on the New Deal crisis, Robert McCloskey wrote in 1956 that the crisis “shred” the mythical-naïve view 
“beyond any reasonable hope of mending” (McCloskey 1956, 736). Similarly, Martin Shapiro in 1964 noted that the 
principal basis upon which the Court’s legitimacy rests—“the judicial myth of impartiality and nondiscretionary 
application”—“has lost much of its force in the United States” (Shapiro 1964, 26). 
291 Looking at national party platforms between 1948 and 1976, both Democratic and Republican party platforms have 
been deferential to the courts, in official party statements (Peabody 2011, 5). By the 1976 platforms, however, 
Republicans began to take a more critical tact and reacted to the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) and the curtailing 
effect this decision had on “public dialogue on abortion.” Between 1976 and 2008 (save for 1984), all Republican 
platforms made at least some negative reference to the judiciary either singling out individual decisions (on topics like 
abortion, parental rights, religion, rights of the accused, and gay marriage), or calling for specific actions to counter the 
judiciary (such as the 1988 pledge supporting congressional restriction of federal court jurisdiction) (Peabody 2011, 5-6). 
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legislative proposals,292 and these criticisms have come from both the left and the right (Keck 2002, 
135-136; Peabody 2011, 9-10).293 In fact, the public and political criticism of the Court has produced 
the judiciary’s hyper-sensitivity to its own legitimacy. Indeed, since Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
the Court, in its decisions, has specifically referenced its “legitimacy” 71 times compared to just nine 
references to “legitimacy” in the 164 years leading up to Brown (Farganis 2012, 207).294 And since 
Brown, the Court has paid especially close attention to the construction of its arguments as a means 
to maintaining legitimacy (Farganis 2012, 213).  
 Thus in an age of heightened judicial activism with its erosion of the Court’s mythology, 
diffidence might be on the decline. And to be sure, diffidence cannot insulate the Court from 
criticism; the Court has always, like any branch of government, received persistent criticism and 
scrutiny. But the vociferous criticism that has resulted from judicial activism reveals the importance 
diffidence can serve as a politicking tool for the federal judiciary.295  
 American constitutional development reflects the Supreme Court’s efforts—in order to 
guard its institutional legitimacy—to support the continued expansion of the political branches. This 
behavior, which I have dubbed as diffident, embraces the Court’s reluctance to aggrandize its own 
power in favor of permitting expansion by the other federal branches. When judicial power expands, 
                                                 
292 Data on court-curbing legislation indicates the rise in attacks on the judiciary (Clark 2009, 2011). The legislative 
proposals comprising Clark’s data represent an “institutional assault on the Court rather than a case-specific effort to 
reverse a Court decision” (Clark 2009, 979). From 1946 to 1966 he finds that Congress averaged just under five court-
curbing proposals a year, but from 1967 to 1983, this average jumped to about nineteen proposals a year, and in the 
twenty-first century from 2003 to 2008, Congress has averaged thirteen proposals a year (Clark cited in Peabody 2011, 
7). 
293 In 2005, for example, thirty-nine Democrats joined over two hundred Republicans in approving the Pledge 
Protection Act, which—if it had passed the Senate—would have limited the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases 
pertaining the Pledge of Allegiance (Peabody 2011, 9-10).  
294 Farganis generated these results from a LexisNexis search for “legitimacy” (N=17,255) and a subsequent content 
analysis of those results. Search conducted 10 April 2009. See Dion Farganis. 2012. “Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of 
Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (1): 206-216, fn. 1.  
295 The use of diffidence fluctuates across Court eras. In particular, there are two dimensions to consider when 
conceptualizing the Court’s relationship to the other branches. The first dimension uncovers the Court’s legitimacy and 
prestige within the central state ensemble and among popular opinion. The second dimension concerns the assertiveness 
with which the Court exercises its own authority. These two dimensions wax and wane over time and produce differing 
levels of judicial diffidence and deference. Presently, however, this dissertation’s unitary treatment of the Court does not 
account for the ebb and flow of these dimensions. To correct this, it would be useful to take two moments in the 
Court’s history that vary on both dimensions and see how this influences national state expansion.   
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it typically does so over state governments, but, still, this happens at a slower rate than its supports 
for the federal branches. In sum, reticent to assert itself over the federal branches, the Court’s 
decisions often affirm federal laws, leading to support and expansion of the political branches. 
Similarly, the Court’s reluctance to expand the reach and scope of the Constitution over state 
governments helps contribute to the restriction of the authority of the federal government. 
  From this chapter, we see that the Court has been reluctant to expand its review power over 
the federal government because this helps reduce the political branches’ criticism of the Court and 
thus preserves the Court’s own authority. Supreme Court diffidence manifests itself in many ways 
but of particular note are the Court’s justiciability, federalism, and constitutional interpretation 
principles. These principles help the Court avoid aggrandizing power and instead defer to the other 
federal branches or state governments, producing the expansion-restriction pattern we see in these 
data across time.  Thus, chapter 6 has underscored an important takeaway of this dissertation: that 
the Court, throughout American history, has acted as an important instrument of the central state, 
enabling the expansion of the national government.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
The findings of this project rest upon a systematic examination of constitutional 
development. The research design first uncovered the most important constitutional decisions 
across U.S. history. And, second, by applying a central state authority framework to hundreds of 
these decisions, it determined the Supreme Court’s relationship toward national authority. These 
decisions were collected from fifty-eight constitutional law casebooks and treatises published 
between 1822 and 2010. The data were arranged to construct the arc of American constitutional 
development without contemporary biases as to what constitutional decisions are most worthy of 
study. It also aimed to consistently apply this central state authority framework to all judicial 
decisions in the data, a framework that would not bias against the evolving aims of the central state 
seen from the founding to the present day.  
Patterns were identified concerning the Supreme Court’s role in expanding the central 
state.296 While constitutional development has been the subject of countless scholarly investigations 
across many disciplines, we have yet to see a study that examines the trajectory of constitutional law 
with an eye toward effects on national governing authority. This project, then, represents an account 
of the Court’s impact on its own powers as well as the powers of the broader central state. Two 
research questions underlie this project. First, how has the Court affected central state authority over 
time? Second, when and in what areas has the Court facilitated or restricted the federal government?   
In asking these questions, this project positioned itself against the traditional accounts of 
state-building in two ways: first, by looking not just at critical junctures and, second, by defining the 
                                                 
296 Certainly there are myriad ways to understand American constitutional development and change. This project has 
taken a top-down perspective, but political scientists like Emily Zackin have offered a more bottom-up perspective of 
changes in constitutional rights and the concomitant effects on state development. Her dissertation examines how social 
movements and interest groups at the state-level, with their focus on positivist rights, helped build a more activist, 
welfare state. Emily Zackin. 2010. Positive Constitutional Rights in the United States. Princeton Dissertation. Ann Arbor, MI: 
ProQuest LLC.  
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“state” not just as developments that build welfare and administrative apparatuses. The American 
state is a legal entity, and while not every aspect of state development has a significant legal 
component, much is lost when scholars view law and courts as they have been traditionally depicted: 
as outside the state, limiting and checking the broader political system. The rest of this chapter will 
summarize the main findings, discuss the implication of these findings, and overview some 
limitations of this project. 
 
 
Overview of Findings  
By coding hundreds of decisions along seven dimensions of the federal government, this 
study has underscored the persistent expansive impact of the Court on the American state. Based on 
analyses of these decisions, it was concluded that the Supreme Court, as a member of the national 
government, has supported the development and expansion of national governmental power about 
twice as often as not, and it has supported this expansion across almost every legal issue area in 
these data.  
 The project’s main findings, discussed in chapter 3, revealed several interrelated features of 
constitutional development that can be summarized as follows: the Court remains biased toward 
national state expansion and, yet there remains considerable variation, over time, between decisions 
that expand and restrict federal government authority. However, since around 1900, the Court’s 
decisions have affected the rate of central state expansion at a relatively steady rate. Chapters 4 to 6 
framed and interpreted chapter 3’s findings, examining the importance of federalism to state 
expansion (chapter 4 and 5) and characterizing the Court’s institutional behavior as deferential to 
national political authority (chapter 6).  
These findings indicate a few things about how the Supreme Court influenced the American 
state. First, the steady rate of expansion seen after 1900 is an important finding for the periodization 
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put forth in the American constitutional development literature. Scholars typically focus on three 
“moments” of major constitutional change—the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal eras 
(Ackerman 1991, 1998; Orren 2012). While these are important moments in American history, this 
study finds great similarities across watershed moments of constitutional change—at least in terms 
of the rate in which the central state grew during the twentieth century.297 With respect to the 
Court’s disposition toward federal state power, some constitutional moments look quite alike, which 
problematizes theories of constitutional change resting on critical junctures. Other scholars have 
also stressed how the growth of the judiciary creates issues for understanding constitutional 
development through these moments.298  
Second, this study also found that the Court—through time and regardless of its ideological 
composition—has persistently acted as an important instrument of the broader central state, 
expanding federal power over society. This finding supports a broad swath of literature holding on 
the role of judicial systems in extending national governing authority; for example, some of 
“Brutus’s” suspicions about the federal judiciary promulgated during the founding era: that the 
judiciary would continually expand the powers of the national government and usurp state rights.299 
More recently, comparative judicial scholars like Martin Shapiro have detailed how judicial systems 
outside the U.S. extended national state power to hold the countryside and to facilitate control of 
conquered territories (Shapiro 1981, 22-23). Focusing on the U.S., some historical institutionalists 
have found that federal courts are crucial to enhancing the dominant regime’s power (Gillman 2002, 
                                                 
297 Work in political development has questioned the periodization employed by Ackerman. A number of authors argue 
that the standard periodization overemphasizes temporal discontinuities and overlooks continuities (Kersh, 2005; Orren 
and Skowronek, 2004; Thelen, 2003).  
298 Legal historian David Strauss underscores the empirical reality of the growth of constitutional law. Consider, as 
Strauss says, “expansive federal power; expansive presidential power, particularly in foreign affairs; the current contours 
of freedom of expression; the federalization of criminal procedure; a conception of racial equality that disapproves de 
jure distinctions and intentional discrimination; the rule of one person, one vote; a (somewhat formal) principle of 
gender equality; and reproductive freedom protected against criminalization” (Strauss, 1996, 929). None of these changes 
map onto an obvious “‘moment’ at which a strong popular consensus crystallized behind them” (Strauss, 1996, 929). 
299 Brutus detailed his opposition to the federal judiciary in Letters XI-XV. See, The Federalist with Letters of “Brutus,” 
Terence Ball, ed. (2006): New York: Cambridge University Press.  
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Whittington 2005). Chapters 4 and 5 buttress these literatures by showing the Court’s proclivity to 
expand its power and congressional power over state governments via federalism issues.  
The third finding pertaining to how the Court has affected central state authority dealt with 
its tendency to support actions of the political branches rather than supporting persistent judicial 
review power, and this pattern was the focus of the final chapter on Court diffidence. Chapter 6 
revealed that the Court has both consolidated central state power and maintained its ideological 
legitimacy by supporting the coordinate branches and by acting reluctant to assert judicial primacy—
a form of institutional behavior that I termed diffident. Diffidence helped describe the empirical 
reality of American constitutional development presented in chapter 3. In particular, the Court’s 
hesitance to assert itself over the federal branches has led to the affirmation of federal laws and thus 
an expansion of the political branches. Similarly, the Court’s reluctance to expand the reach and 
scope of some portions of the Constitution over state governments has helped contribute to the 
restriction of the national authority. The pattern of diffidence joins institutionalist, behavioralist, and 
legal studies of the judiciary. These studies find that federal courts often act in calculated ways to 
protect their legitimacy among the citizenry and the federal branches (Graber 1995; 1998b, Clark 
2009, Ferejohn and Kramer 2006). Most fundamentally, diffidence underscored a primary finding of 
this dissertation: that the Court, throughout American history, has acted as an important instrument 
of the central state, enabling the expansion of the national government. The bottom line of these 
three findings is that the Court has influenced central state authority steadily, persistently, and with 
diffidence.  
 To the question when and in what areas has the Court facilitated American state expansion, 
this project also revealed important patterns. As noted above, the Court facilitated American state 
expansion more often than not, but more precisely, it did so most rapidly during the early republic, a 
finding that dovetails with historical accounts of the importance of the Marshall Court (Newmyer 
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1986; White 1990). It stymied central state authority most frequently not during the Lochner era, as 
much of the APD narrative assumes, but instead between 1825 and 1849 during the end of 
Marshall’s and most of Chief Justice Taney’s tenures. Yet, even in this most-restrictive period, the 
Court expanded national authority more often than not.  
 With regard to the policy areas that experienced the greatest state expansion, the 
centralization and citizenship dimensions of the central state were most implicated by constitutional 
development, as chapter 3 indicated. The persistent expansion of the centralization dimension 
buttresses the idea that navigating a federal constitutional design will produce inevitable political 
conflict, a point made in chapters 4 and 5 and in literature on the American state and federalism 
(Wilson 1908, 173; Robertson 2012). Surprisingly, the emergence of greater “administrative 
capacity” dimension was little affected by the Court, which is surprising because APD studies 
typically focus on the emergence of the administrative state—a hallmark of a “modern” central state 
(Skowronek 1982). That the administrative capacity dimension was little affected certainly does not 
mean the Court did not influence bureaucratic development, but instead, that the focus on 
constitutional law used here does not capture this dimension well. Nevertheless, I expected to see 
more of the administrative dimension since some of these administrative judicial decisions do make 
it into constitutional law casebooks. Additionally, chapter 6 also showed us an important legal issue 
area that often inhibits central state expansion—Court jurisdiction questions. Here we saw that 
throughout the years the Court was less likely to expand the central state through jurisdictional 
questions, and instead it was more likely to expand the state when the case involved questions about 
the powers of the other two branches of government.   
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Theoretical Implications 
 
 The central state authority framework used in this dissertation has implications for how we 
define and conceptualize the central state. Typically, scholars have recognized “development” as the 
accretion of social welfare rights and the concomitant ability of the federal government to provide 
and protect these positive rights. Compared with Western Europe, the U.S. has been described as 
deeply suspicious of government and devoted to protecting private property rather than building its 
welfare-state (Hartz 1955). Hartz’s work inspired much of the APD movement, and its proclivity to 
see the U.S. as comparatively weak, a finding that pivots on the distinction between negative and 
positive rights.300 Part of the reason scholars define the U.S as relatively “stateless” is because most 
public officials see the American federal constitution as Judge Richard Posner declared, as “a charter 
of negative rather than positive liberties” (Posner quoted in Zackin 2010, 15).301 While this project 
has no measure of overall central state “strength” and “weakness,” from the vantage point of 
constitutional law, nevertheless, we have seen here that the Court consistently bolstered the federal 
government’s coercive powers. In this way, arguments about the weakness of the central state in the 
U.S. miss the very real and consistent affirmation the federal government has received from the 
Supreme Court.  
 Contrary to Hartz and early APD scholars, revisionists like Brian Balogh (2009) have found 
strength in the early American state, providing social goods primarily through state and local 
intermediaries.302 Measuring central state strength in this non-European state way, he dispels a belief 
held by both progressives and conservatives: that “the national government only began to exercise 
significant influence over the lives of most Americans in the early twentieth century” (Balogh 2009, 
                                                 
300 Positive rights identify activities that the government must do while negative rights identify activities the government 
cannot do.  
301 Zackin provides an excellent overview of the legal and APD literature concerning the negative rights tradition in the 
U.S. (Zackin 2010, 23-36). Her work uncovers the positive rights tradition in American constitutional development, but 
nevertheless, she admits that at the federal level a negative rights tradition prevails (Zackin 2010, 36).  
302 For an examination of how national and state governments worked together to expand the modern state, see 
Kimberly Johnson (2007) Governing the American State, in particular her concept of “intergovernmental policy” (2007, 4-6).   
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8). But even Balogh and other revisionist accounts of the state (John 1997; Adler 2012; Novak 2002; 
Zackin 2010) define state capacity in the same terms as the scholars whose accounts they oppose— 
the delivery of welfare-state goods and positive rights through an autonomy bureaucracy. Not even 
the revisionist accounts deny that, on balance, “the Supreme Court has adopted an almost 
exclusively negative reading of the federal Constitution, consistently expressing the view that its 
purpose is to limit the government’s scope and restrain its actions” (Zackin 2010, 34).  
 There is something unsatisfying about debates over “strong” and “weak” central states. 
Namely, it discourages scholars from studying the central state before the Progressive era and forces 
us to define the central state in terms of its social-welfare provisions, rather than through regulatory 
and citizenship dimensions. Moreover, older conceptions of the central state lead scholars to look 
primarily at the development of individual rights rather than the development of central state 
powers. This dissertation complicates these prevailing depictions of the Constitution and the state 
because it finds that the Court has done less to limit the federal government than assumed. To be 
sure, the findings here do not dispute that in terms of welfare-state rights the Court has been 
reluctant to embrace a positive rights reading of the Constitution.303  
 This project has conceptualized the central state as an entity that has been in development 
since the founding. It has not pivoted on the typical negative versus positive rights distinction in 
depicting constitutional development; rather, positive expansions of the federal government often 
do not include the federal government’s capacity to provide social welfare goods. Instead, expansion 
of national government power encompass a far broader meaning: any new power of the federal 
government sustained by the Court. Whether the federal government uses this authority to deliver 
welfare-state goods or some other form of governance has not been the central focus. Seen in this 
                                                 
303 In the last fifty years, for example, the Court has denied the right to decent housing (Lindsey v. Normet 405 U.S. 56 
(1972)), the right to public education (San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (1973)), and the right to welfare 
(397 U.S. 471 (1970)).  
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agnostic way, the Court, has from the beginning, done much to develop the federal government, a 
pattern lost when we fixate on the time when the “modern” state emerged, and when we use a 
welfare centered understanding to define this state.  
 Another important implication of this work pertains to periodization. As noted above, 
scholars of constitutional development usually focus on watershed moments of history to 
understand change. In terms of their impact on the rate of central state expansion, though, these 
watershed moments expand federal power at roughly the same rate, underscoring some of the 
continuity in development over time. 304  Why, despite changing conceptions of the national 
government and the rights afforded to citizens during these moments, has the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation actually expanded national authority at a relatively stable rate since 1900? A reason for 
this might be that studies of constitutional development often center less on state power and more 
on constitutional law’s impact on the rights afforded to citizens (Ackerman 1991, 1998; Zackin 2010; 
Brandwein 2011). So while political scientists have “brought the state back in” to studies of political 
institutions, the Supreme Court’s relationship to the central state remains relatively less well known.  
 
Improvements and Future Research  
 
 This dissertation has a number of limitations worth considering. First, because this project 
rests on governing authority, it has not examined the implementation efficacy of all the decisions in 
these data. Some constitutional decisions are ignored by the government and public, and, in this 
sense, have little effect on national authority. This research design attempted to mitigate that 
problem by collecting the Court’s most salient constitutional decisions, the decisions likely followed 
by the public and the government.305  
                                                 
304 See footnote 289 above for scholars who call for examining continuity over time.  
305 To be sure, some decisions were salient because they were not followed, but they are few and far between. Dred Scott 
typifies this kind of decision.  
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 A second limitation is the focus on constitutional law. Much of the state development 
literature pivots on the creation of the administrative state. Looking at changes in administrative law, 
then, might be a fruitful area to uncover additional ways that the judiciary contributed to state 
expansion. The casebook research design employed here could also apply to administrative 
casebooks but with an important caveat: administrative casebooks probably do not reach as far back 
in time as constitutional textbooks and treatises do. Along these same lines, additional constitutional 
casebooks and decisions might bolster and add more depth to this study’s findings. More decisions 
in the database would allow us to build on the number of decisions falling into the less abundant 
legal issue areas.  
 Third, this dissertation uses a top-down perspective of constitutional development. But it 
would certainly be worth examining the bottom-up perspective to see what segments of society 
sought an enlarged central state. In what ways do litigants and social groups generate cases that 
enhance or constrict central state authority? Given that judicial decisions lean toward state 
expansion, it might be the case that all segments of society call for a stronger state, but for very 
different ends.  
 A final limitation of my study might be its application of the central state authority 
framework. Certainly, some of these study’s findings resulted from a reinterpretation of what state 
authority means. Like any interpretation of constitutional law, there is much room for debate and 
subjectivity. That said, the advantage of my application is that it seeks to be transparent and 
consistent.   
 An extension of this study might look at the broader federal—not just Supreme Court—
judicial system. The focus on the Supreme Court follows the APD tradition, but examining lower 
federal courts would reveal additional decisions and ways in which the courts affect state authority. 
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For the purposes of this study, however, the Supreme Court was the logical starting point because, 
as the highest court in the land, its decisions have the greatest impact on state development.306  
 
Conclusion  
 
The reach and scope of the federal government remain contentious for all Americans. On 
the one hand, Americans have had an ambivalent attitude toward the government and its exercise of 
power. On the other, central state power has grown exponentially across time. American anxieties 
and questions surrounding state power have often ended up before the Supreme Court because of 
the pervasive litigiousness in American society as well as its proclivity to mythologize law and the 
Constitution. These attributes make the Court one of the best venues for understanding changes in 
the national state.  
In spite of the scores of legal histories on constitutional development and accounts of the 
American state, a single study of the Court’s hand in state development across U.S. history has not 
been written. This dissertation contributes a rigorous and empirical depiction of constitutional 
development with a focus on the changes in national authority spanning American history. Most 
studies see the Constitution and the Court as bastions of negative rights, limiting the powers of the 
federal government. Instead, this study has shown that no matter the period or ideological 
                                                 
306 Throughout this dissertation, the Supreme Court is treated as a relatively unitary actor, which some legal scholars 
might especially resist. Political scientists use this unitary actor model to study Congress and the executive branch, but it 
is less accepted for the study of the Court. This scholarly norm, however, is curious given that the Court has acted more 
uniformly than any of the other branches. In fact, for the vast majority of the Court’s history (from when Marshall took 
office in 1801 until around 1935), the institutional norm was to speak in one voice through an opinion of the Court. 
Opinions of the Court accounted for 80-90 percent of all the Court’s decisions between 1801 and the New Deal 
(O’Brien 1999, 93-94). Individual opinions concurring or dissenting in part only proliferated after the New Deal with the 
advent of legal realism (O’Brien 1999, 111).  
 Nevertheless, individual justices and their politics have contributed a great amount to the institutional and 
administrative development of the Supreme Court, and consequently, to central state expansion. To ascertain these 
micro-level developments, it would be prudent to narrow the period under study. One place to begin would be the 
emergence of the modern American state, uncovering how individual judges’ voting records and philosophies interacted 
to build a central state strong some areas and weak in others.    
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composition, the Court consistently allies itself with the broader central state, expanding the powers 
of the federal government in myriad ways.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Coding Manual and Application of Coding Scheme  
 
A.) Introduction:  
This document outlines the coding instructions for the variables to be coded for each judicial 
decision. Seven variables comprise the seven dimensions of the central state (the “central state” and 
“federal government” are interchangeable terms) that the Court might possibly expand or restrict in 
any judicial decision. Additionally, I provided four sample cases to illustrate how I analyzed each 
decision—one expanded, two restricted, and one that did not alter central state authority.  
  
B.) Coding Rules:   
When state and local-level laws/actions are before the Supreme Court:  
1. If a Supreme Court decisions invalidates/overturns any law or action of a local or state-
level government then this is an expansion of central state authority.  
2. If a Supreme Court decisions upholds/sustains any law or action of local or state-level 
governments then this is restriction (state-level law does not infringe on a federal 
constitutional right).  
When federal-level laws/actions are before the Supreme Court:  
3. If the Supreme Court invalidates a federal law or action then the decision restricts central 
state authority.  
4. If the Supreme Court upholds/sustains a federal law or action then this decision expands 
central state authority.  
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The chart below illustrates the coding process:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
If yes,                         If no,   If yes,   If no,         If yes,                                   If no,  
then expansion         then restriction                   then expansion          then restriction                  then restriction                   then expansion  
  
 If decision only shifts 
 power in differing 
 directions within central 
 state, then neutral   
 
When a case reaches 
the Supreme Court, the 
Court can do 1 of 3 
things:  
1.) Deny federal 
jurisdiction and refuse 
to decide the case (very 
rare). 
2.) Acknowledge 
jurisdiction but state it is 
not the appropriate 
institution to decide case 
(very rare) 
1.) Local 
law/ordinance 
3.) Accept 
jurisdiction and 
decide case 
2.) State law 
If deny, then 
restriction If inappropriate, 
then restriction 
 
If the Court accepts 
jurisdiction, ask this 
question: 
3.) Federal law 
What level of government does the law or behavior in 
question emanate from? 
Does the Court invalidate 
the law? 
Does the Court 
invalidate the law? 
Does the Court 
invalidate the law? 
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C.) Seven Dimensions of Central State Authority Variables307: 
1. Centralization of authority (Variable Name: Centralization): Measures involving the transfer 
of decision-making authority from subordinate governments and the citizenry to the central state; in 
the case of individual citizens, such measures do not involve a substantive expansion of central state 
activity but, only, the allocation of influence and control over that activity. In the case of subordinate 
governments, such measures include the review of subordinate government decisions by central 
state institutions and the form of subordinate government participation in central state decision 
making.  
 When decision-making power/authority is vested in the federal government and 
not in lower-levels of government (states, municipalities i.e. “subordinate 
governments”) this is an expansion of central state authority= “1.” Any decision 
that concentrates decision-making in various branches of the federal government 
is an expansion of central state authority.  
Some of the following will signal that this dimension was considered by the Court: 
a. discussion of an individual state law infringes on the power of Congress.  
b. discussion of national unity, uniformity, paramount authority, sustaining federal 
power—all of these are possible indications of an affirmation and expansion of 
central state authority. 
c. Discussion of the “justiciability” or jurisdiction of a case—in other words, does 
the Supreme Court have the right to hear the case? 
d. Any reference to “revising power,” “review,” or “violation of”  
 
2. Administrative Capacity (Variable Name: Admin_Cap):  measures involving a broadening or 
narrowing of bureaucratic discretion and long-term planning capacity within the central state; these 
measures affect only institutions within the central state itself; in analyzing policy, reference is made 
to a hierarchy based on relative insulation from societal or outside political influence.  
 This dimension is about locating decision-making authority among the national 
branches (and the bureaucracy). An expansion of central state authority occurs 
when a Court decision further insulates decision-making authority from societal 
influence. The least insulated to most insulated federal branches: 
CongressPresidentCourtsBureaucracy. Taking decision-making, for 
example, from Congress and giving it to president is an expansion while taking 
decision-making from bureaucracy and giving it to Congress is a restriction. 
 When the Court sustains the federal administrative/bureaucratic authority (i.e. 
the power to administer and execute procedure and rules) the decision expands 
central state authority= “1.” A decision that affirms the creation of an agency or 
                                                 
307 The following section is taken directly from Richard Bensel. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority, 
1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 114.   
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any other administrative structure design of the central state is an expansion of 
authority.   
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
a. Discussion of commissions, agencies, validation of a federal commission’s 
findings may indicate that administrative capacity is implicated.   
b. Administrative procedure or procedural rules, any decision that pertains to 
allocating authority between federal branches of government and possibly 
insulating decisions from the more political branches of government (e.g. 
Congress).  
c. Discussion of the interior design of the state—who gets to make decisions 
over procedural question.  
3. Citizenship (Variable Name: Citizen): measures involving the religious practices, political 
beliefs, ethnic identity, and rights and duties of citizens in their relations with the state; this category 
excludes measures affecting property but includes all measures concerning the physical movement 
and labor of citizens (such as conscription). 
 When the Court sustains the federal government’s authority/power to control 
civil liberties or rights—either to curtail or provide further rights 308 —this 
decision expands central authority= “1” 
 When the Court strikes the federal government’s authority/power to control 
civil liberties or rights—either to curtail or provide further rights—this decision 
expands central authority= “1” 
 When the Court strikes down state-level laws/power (often through the 14th 
Amendment) that either curtail or provide further civil rights/liberties, this 
decision expands central authority = “1” 
 When the Court sustains state-level laws/power (brought to the Court often 
via the 14th) this decision is a restriction= “-1” 
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
a.) Discussion of a person’s individual rights with respect to the federal government 
authority.  
b.) Discussion of a person’s right to “standing” to assert claims in a federal court.  
 
4. Control of property (Variable Name: Property): measures involving the control or use of 
property by individuals or institutions other than the central state itself, including expropriation, 
regulation of the marketplace, and labor contracts between private parties.  
 When the Court upholds federal authority to use and own property this is an 
expansion of the central state.  
                                                 
308 The coding application does not distinguish the purpose of a federal law—whether it expands or restricts the rights of 
citizens. The coding application only concerns whether the central state has the power to control citizens—whether the 
central state uses that control to give more civil rights or to take civil rights away does not affect the coding.  
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 When the Court upholds federal authority regulate private contracts involving 
property and the use of property (including, for example, environmental 
regulations) 
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
a. Discussion of contracts, infrastructure, land use, property (even intangible 
property such as stocks and bonds), and so forth.  
b. Discussion of federal government regulation of private economic activity and 
marketplace relations.  
 
5. Creation of client groups (Variable Name: Client_Group): measures that increase the 
dependence of groups within society upon the continued existence and viability of the central state; 
includes only measures that provide income or income substitutes to individuals (pensions, 
employment by central state institutions, welfare, and price-control programs for specific groups in 
society), that establish future-oriented obligations that depend on state viability (the issuance of 
long-term debt), and that control the value of the currency (the gold standard and redemption of 
paper money).  
 When the Court validates federal programs, statutes, and/or agencies that ensure 
the viability of the groups that depend on these parts of the federal government 
this is an expansion of central state authority.  
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
 Discussion of 1.) pension and welfare systems; 2.) salaries from government 
employment, 3.) income substitutes (such as price controls on commodities sold 
to targeted groups), and 4.) currency, federal debt  
 
6. Extraction (Variable Name: Extract): the coercive extraction of material resources from 
society into the central state apparatus; extraction measures skim wealth and resources from the flow 
of commerce and marketplace transaction without significantly redirecting or influence the volume 
of these transactions (unlike otherwise similar measures falling under the property, client-group, or 
world system dimensions); primarily forms of light taxation or manipulations of the financial system 
such as gradual inflation of the currency.  
 When the Court enables the federal government to skim resources from citizens, 
businesses, and other aspects of society this is an expansion of central state 
authority.  
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
a.) Discussion of any measures that support federal government operations 
within society   
b.) Discussion of taxation, duty, tonnage, fees, charges, and the like.  
 
7. The central state in the world system (Variable Name: World_Sys): measures concerning the 
relationship of the central state and nation with other states and the world economy; these include 
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access to foreign markets (licensing, import quotas, export subsidies, and tariffs), diplomatic 
relations (membership in international organizations, treaties, and military conflict), immigration 
restrictions, and broadly conceived polices of internal development (the construction of a railroad to 
the Pacific Ocean, the Homestead Act, and administration of territorial possessions).  
 When the Court enables the federal government to control its relations with 
other central states in the international arena, this decision expands central state 
authority.  
Indications that this dimension is implicated in a decision:  
a.) Discussion of trade relations between national and world economics (tariffs, 
import quotas export subsidies) 
b.) Discussion of diplomatic relations with foreign nations (treaty negotiations, 
military conflict, formal international alliances).  
c.) Discussion of settlement/annexing of territory, territorial expansion, or the 
administration of territorial possess.  
d.) Discussion on the manipulation of immigration restriction and quotas.  
 
Other Variables:  
8.) “Total Dimension:” This is a simple count of the total number of the 7 
dimensions expanded or restricted in any one decision. The number can range from 
0 to 7.  
9.) “Impact on State Authority:” This refers to the overall impact on central state 
authority. When coding for this variable consider the following: what is the main 
question the Court is addressing? Does this question implicate the powers of the 
federal government? Does the Court’s ruling on this question enhance the 
authority/power on the federal government with respect to any one of the seven 
dimensions? Or does the ruling keep power in the hands of subordinate 
governments and/or the citizens?  
If the decision:  
i. expanded federal/central authority= “1” 
ii. restricted federal/central authority= “-1” 
iii. neutral federal/central to authority= “0” 
 
D.) Example Cases for “Impact on Authority” Coding: 
Below, I apply my coding scheme for the overall “impact on state authority” variable to four cases 
that are part of the dataset. Chronologically, the cases are as follows:  
     
Julliaird v. Greenman (1884) 110 U.S. 421 
Hurtado v. California (1884) 110 U.S. 516 
Monongahela Navigation v. United States (1893) 148 U.S. 312 
Coyle v. Smith (1911) 221 U.S. 559 
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Case 1: Juilliard v. Greenman (1884): 
Expansion  
 
Step 1: Identify the background and context of case 
Juilliard made a contract with Greenman to sell 100 bales of cotton at a price agreed upon by both 
parties: $5,122.90. Greenman, the defendant, agreed to pay that sum upon delivery of the cotton. 
Upon delivery of the cotton, Greenman paid Juilliard $22.90 in gold and silver coins and the 
remaining $5100 in U.S. currency, one note of $5000 and one note of $100. Juilliard demanded the 
$5100 be paid in coin, too. Greenman refused. He claimed the U.S. paper currency provided were as 
good as coin, and the notes should be taken for their respective face value for all debts, public and 
private.         
   
Step 2: Identify the central legal claims 
Juilliard claimed Greenman’s payment was a breach of their original contract because the U.S. notes 
were not equivalent to gold and silver coin.  
 
Step 3: Identify the central legal questions  
Are U.S. treasury notes a tender of lawful money in payment of Greenman’s debt? 
 
Step 4: Identify the Supreme Court’s outcome 
Yes. The Court held U.S. treasury notes were a tender of lawful money in payment of debt. Because 
the Congressional Act of May 31, 1878, under which the treasury notes were issued, was 
constitutional. The majority opinion argued, “The constitutional authority of Congress to provide a 
currency for the whole country is now firmly established” (445). And it went on to say,  
The power of making the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of 
private debts, being included in the power to borrow money and to provide a 
national currency, is not defeated or restricted by the fact that its exercise may affect 
the value of private contracts. If . . .  a particular power or authority appears to be 
vested in Congress, it is no constitutional objection to its existence, or to its exercise, 
that the property or the contracts of individuals may be incidentally affected (448). 
Finally, the Court concluded that the issuance of treasury notes for payment of private debts is 
“conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress” and within 
the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause (450).  
 
Step 5: Code Decision for Impact on State Authority  
What, if anything, does this Court case say about the central government’s authority? The answer is 
that a federal statute allowed Greenman to repay his debt, lawfully, in cash. This congressional act, 
the Court maintained, fell within the scope of Congress’s authority under the Constitution. In 
validating the act, the Supreme Court affirmed (or expanded) the purview of the central state’s 
authority, the authority in this case, of course, being the ability to make treasury notes legal tender 
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for debt repayment. The impact on central state authority is coded a “1,” an expansion of 
state authority because the Court sustained federal statute vis-à-vis the property dimension.             
 
 
Case 2: Hurtado v. California (1884) 
Restriction by allowing a state law to stand  
 
Step 1: Identify the background and context of case.  
The State of California accused Joseph Hurtado, the defendant, of murder in the first degree. The 
District Attorney of Sacramento County, in particular, made and filed an information against 
Hurtado, charging him with the murder of Jose Antonio Stuardo. Accordingly, Hurtado was 
arraigned and tried. After the trial, the jury found Hurtado guilty of murder in the first degree.  On 
conviction of murder in the first degree, the Supreme Court of California sentenced Hurtado to 
death. However, Hurtado appealed his conviction claiming that it was unlawful to send him to trial 
based solely on the information provided by the district attorney; Hurtado said he first needed to 
appear before a grand jury (23 of his peers) before California could try him for murder. The 
defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court claiming his death sentence was void because he was 
not indicted by a grand jury.   
 
Step 2: Identify the central legal claims 
Joseph Hurtado claimed the following State of California Penal Code violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment right of due process:  
When a defendant has been examined and committed, as provided in section 872 of this Code, it shall 
be the duty of the district attorney, within thirty days thereafter, to file in the Superior Court of the 
county in which the offence is triable, an information charging the defendant with such offence. The 
information shall be in the name of the people of the State of California, and subscribed by the 
district attorney, and shall be in form like an indictment for the same offence.  
This section of the Penal Code enabled the district attorney to avoid grand jury proceedings and to 
charge Hurtado based solely upon information. On appeal, Hurtado argued that proceeding by 
information only in capital cases violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, claiming 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth incorporated his Fifth Amendment right to a grand 
jury indictment in federal capital cases. 
  
Step 3: Identify the central legal question 
Does a state trial based on information from a district attorney rather than on a grand jury 
proceeding violate Hurtado’s 14th Amendment right of Due Process?     
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Step 4: Identify the Supreme Court’s outcome  
No. The Court found Hurtado’s Due Process rights were upheld in both receiving counsel and a fair 
trial by his peers.  
 
Step 5: Code Decision for Impact on State Authority  
What, if anything, does this Supreme Court decision say about the limits of federal authority? What 
questions, if any, about the authority of the federal government did the Court decide? Hurtado 
prevents federal law from affecting a state-level law. Therefore, I code a “-1” for this case.   The 
case is a restriction on central state authority because the Court allowed the State of California’s 
interpretation prevail thereby leaving power in state government hands and preventing federal 
authority from altering California law.309  
 
 
Case 3: Monongahela Navigation v. United States (1893) 
Neutral  
Step 1: Identify the background and context  
A federal statute passed on August 11, 1888 authorized the Secretary of War to seize a dam in 
Pennsylvania at a cost of no more than $161,733.13: 
The Secretary of War be, and is hereby, authorized and directed to negotiate for and purchase, at a 
cost not to exceed one hundred and sixty-one thousand, seven hundred and thirty-three dollars, and 
thirteen cents, lock and dam number seven, otherwise known as 'the Upper Lock and Dam,' and its 
appurtenances, of the Monongahela Navigation Company, a corporation organized under the laws of 
Pennsylvania, which lock and dam number seven and its appurtenances constitute a part of the 
improvements in water communication in the Monongahela River, between Pittsburgh, in the State of 
Pennsylvania, and a point at or near Morgantown, in the State of West Virginia. And the sum of one 
hundred and sixty-one thousand, seven hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirteen cents, or so 
much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury. 
The Monongahela Navigation Company protested the amount offered by Congress was too small, 
claiming that the value of the lock and dam number seven was really $209,393.52. The lower amount 
in the statute, the Company claimed, did not did not take into consideration the right of the 
company to collect tolls granted by Pennsylvania.  
 
Step 2: Identify the Central Legal Claims   
The Monongahela Navigation Company asserted that the Fifth Amendment required the 
government to pay the entire value of the property taken from the company, including the value of 
the right to collect tolls.  
                                                 
309 In 14th Amendment (or any Amendment) cases, where the Court strikes down one or more state-level laws this 
constitutes an expansion of central state authority because the Court has asserted national power in declaring that its 
interpretation overrules state-level authority. Conversely, when the Court upholds a state or local-level law the decision is 
restricts national authority because the Court has declared that a federal constitutional right does not apply to the 
subordinate government’s authority in question. 
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Step 3: Identify the Central Question  
Does the Congressional Act of August 11, 1888 violate the Navigation Company’s Fifth 
Amendment right to just compensation? Is the Navigation Company entitled to additional monies?    
 
Step 4: Identify the Supreme Court’s Outcome 
 
Yes. The majority opinion declared that Congress does not have the authority to determine the 
amount of compensation:  
By this legislation, Congress seems to have assumed the right to determine what shall be the measure 
of compensation. But this is a judicial and not a legislative question. The legislature may determine 
what private property is needed for public purposes—that is a question of a political and legislative 
character; but when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial (327). 
The Court found the taking of the Navigation Company’s property unconstitutional because the 
central state owed more money to the Navigation Company. The Court held:  
the right of the national government, under its grant of power to regulate commerce, to condemn and 
appropriate this lock and dam belonging to the navigation company, is subject to the limitations 
imposed by the Fifth Amendment that private property shall not be taken for public uses without just 
compensation, that just compensation requires payment for the franchise to take tolls, as well as for 
the value of the tangible property, and that the assertion by Congress of its purpose to take the 
property does not destroy the state franchise (345).    
 
Step 5: Code Decision for Impact on State Authority  
 
What, if anything, does this Court case say about the central government’s authority? The Court’s 
decision restricted the authority of the central state from acquiring lock and dam number seven 
under the existing congressional act. The Court’s decision determined that Congress and the 
Secretary of War did not offer just compensation to the Navigation Company. Moreover, Congress, 
the Court held, did not have the authority to determine the amount of compensation. As a result, 
the Court inhibited the Congress and the Secretary of War from taking the property under the 
original congressional act. However, I coded this “0” overall because the decision merely said 
that the Courts (not Congress) have the authority to determine compensation, therefore the 
overall central state (as a single entity) did not lose power. For the same reason, the decision 
expanded the administrative capacity dimension because it left power with the more statist 
branch—the Court.  
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Case 4: Coyle v. Smith (1911) 
Restriction by invalidating federal statute 
 
Step 1: Identify the background and context of case: 
In 1910, Oklahoma enacted a law (Oklahoma Act) moving its state capital from Guthrie to 
Oklahoma City. In admitting Oklahoma to the Union, the Congressional statue (Enabling Act of 
1906) declared the temporary capital to be Briscoe and that a change to some other location would 
not occur until 1913. Citizens of Oklahoma attempted to prevent the enforcement of the act.  The 
citizens seeking to prevent enforcement of the Oklahoma Act were owners of property interests in 
the former location of the state capital.  
Step 2: Identify the central legal claims:  
According to petitioner citizens, the act, which provided for the immediate relocation of the state 
capital, violated a Congressional Act—Enabling Act of Congress of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267, ch. 
3335, under which the State was admitted to the Union 
 
Step 3: Identify the central legal question:  
Does Oklahoma have the power to locate its seat of government when Congress has imposed 
conditions limiting that location?  
 
Step 4: Identify the Supreme Court’s outcome  
Yes. This was congressional overreaching. States are on an equal footing to determine their own 
location for the seat of government. The constitutional duty of Congress of guaranteeing to each 
State a republican form of government does not give Congress the authority to impose upon a new 
State, as a condition to its admission to the Union, restrictions which render that state unequal to the 
other States, such as limitations upon its power to locate or change its seat of government. 
 
Step 5: Code Decision for Impact on State Authority  
What, if anything, does this Supreme Court decision say about the boundaries of federal authority? 
What questions, if any, about the authority of the federal government did the Court decide? The 
Court’s decision determined that Congress did not have the authority to mandate the location of a 
state’s capital because this decision falls within the scope of the individual state’s authority. 
Moreover, the Constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government does not necessitate the 
central state to determine lower states’ capitals.  Therefore, this case is a restriction, “-1,” on 
central state authority because the Court invalidated a Congressional statute.   
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E.) Descriptive Variables: Definitions 
 
1.)  Variable Name: Con_Issue (Constitutional Issue Area) 
This variable indicates the central constitutional issue/subject matter of the case at hand. It is a broad 
variable, and although multiple issues may exist in an individual case, we must choose the issue that 
is most central according to the LexisNexis “headnotes” and summary. 
 
“Criminal procedure” encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due 
process rights of prisoners. Such as: involuntary confession, habeas corpus, plea bargaining, search 
and seizure, self-incrimination, contempt of court, Miranda warnings, right to counsel, cruel and 
unusual punishment, double jeopardy, retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted 
constitutional or statutory rights). Often includes: Amendments 4, 5, 6, 8, and 14. 
 
“Civil rights/liberties” includes non-First Amendment freedom and non-criminal cases which 
pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, 
residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. Often includes: Amendments 13, 14, 
15, and 19. Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, 1875, and 1964.   
 
“First Amendment” encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision:  
First amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
 
“Due Process” is limited to civil guarantees (but does include criminal due process). Such 
as:  prisoners' rights and defendants' rights,  government taking of property for public use (takings 
clause), impartial decision maker,  Due process rights as written in the 5th and/or 14th Amendments:  
5th Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, 
when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.   
14th Amendment, Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
“Privacy” non-criminal privacy, abortion, use of contraceptives/birth control, right to die, Freedom 
of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations 
 
“Unions” encompass those issues involving labor union activity.  
 
“Economic Activity” is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions (suing 
business entities) and employee actions in relation to employers.  
 
“Judicial Power/Jurisdiction” concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. To the extent 
that a number of these issues concern federal-state court relationships, I include them in the 
federalism category. This variable pertains to the reach and scope of the judiciary’s power, namely, 
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the extent of its jurisdiction and the justiciability of the case before them.   
 
“Federalism” pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the 
states, except for those between the federal and state courts, often includes interstate commerce 
clause, Amendments 10 and 11:   
 
“Interstate relations” not relating to interstate commerce, but including boundary disputes 
between states, miscellaneous interstate conflicts, and non-real property disputes (anything that is 
non-real property is personal property and personal property is anything that isn't nailed down, dug 
into or built onto the land. A house is real property, but a dining room set is not). 
 
“Federal/State Taxation” concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes and the 
general extraction of material resources from citizens. Often includes: Amendment 16 
 
“Miscellaneous” contains cases that do not fit into any other category.  
 
“Private law” relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, 
contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the 
passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much -- arguably most -- of the Court's cases concerned such 
issues. The Judges' Bill gave the Court control of its docket, as a result of which such cases have 
disappeared from the Court's docket in preference to litigation of more general applicability.  
 
“Administrative Agency” power includes issues that pertain the ability of bureaucratic agencies of 
the government to regulate/control facets of governance.  
 
“President Power” pertains to the authority of the president to execute his/her office. Often 
includes Article II  
 
 
 
2.) Variable Name: Chief 
This is variable indicating who the chief justice was during the time the Court decided a case.  
 
Dates of Chief Justices’ Tenure:  
 Name Term start (oath) Term end 
1 John Jay October 19, 1789 June 29, 1795 
2 John Rutledge  August 12, 1795 December 28, 1795 
3 Oliver Ellsworth March 8, 1796 December 15, 1800 
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4 John Marshall February 4, 1801 July 6, 1835† 
5 Roger B. Taney March 28, 1836 October 12, 1864 
6 Salmon P. Chase December 15, 1864 May 7, 1873 
7 Morrison Waite March 4, 1874 March 23, 1888† 
8 Melville Fuller October 8, 1888 July 4, 1910† 
9 Edward Douglass White  December 19, 1910 May 19, 1921† 
10 William Howard Taft  July 11, 1921 February 3, 1930 
11 Charles Evans Hughes  February 24, 1930 July 1, 1941 
12 Harlan F. Stone  July 3, 1941 April 22, 1946† 
13 Fred M. Vinson June 24, 1946 September 8, 1953† 
14 Earl Warren October 5, 1953 June 23, 1969 
15 Warren E. Burger June 23, 1969 September 26, 1986 
16 William Rehnquist  September 26, 1986 September 3, 2005† 
17 John G. Roberts, Jr. September 29, 2005 present 
 
 
3.) Variable Name: War_Time 
This variable indicates if the US was engaged in war when the Court handed down its decision.  
 
0=US is not in war 
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1=US is in war 
 
List of Major Wars in US History:  
1. War of 1812: June 18, 1812 – February 18, 1815 
 
2. Mexican-American War: April 25, 1846 – February 2, 1848 
 
3. Civil War: April 12, 1861- May 9, 1865 
 
4. Spanish-American War:  April 25, 1898- December 10, 1898 
 
5. Philippine War:  June 2, 1899 – July 4, 1902 
 
6. World War I: April 6, 1917-November 11, 1918 
 
7. World War II: December 7, 1941-September 2, 1945 
 
8. Korean War: 25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953 
 
9. Vietnam War: August 2, 1964- April 30, 1975. 
 
10. Persian Gulf: 2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991 
 
11. War in Afghanistan and War on Terror: 7 October 2001-Present 
 
12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: 20 March 2003 – 18 December 2011 
 
4.) State=what state was the case first heard in?  
5.) Org_Court=where is the case on appeal from? Who decided the case last?  
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Additional Tables and Figures  
 
Constitutional Casebooks and Treatises List:  
In chronological order, these are the books that comprise the database and from which I drew my 
cases.  
1. Sergeant, Thomas. 1822. Constitutional law: Being a Collection of Points Arising upon the Constitution and 
Jurisprudence of the United States. Philadelphia, PA: A. Small. 
 
2. DuPonceau, Stephen. 1824. A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United 
States. Philadelphia: Abraham Small. 
  
3. Rawle, William. 1825. A view of the Constitution of the United States of America. Philadelphia, PA: H.C. Carey & I. 
Lea.  
 
4. Kent, James. 1826. Commentaries on American Law. New York, NY: O. Halstead.   
 
5. Gordon, Thomas. 1827. A Digest of the Laws of the United States: Including an Abstract of the Judicial Decisions 
Relating to the Constitutional and Statutory Law. Philadelphia, PA.   
 
6. Story, Joseph. 1833. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Boston, MA: Hilliard, Gray and 
Company.   
 
7. Baldwin, Henry. 1837. A General View of the Origin and Nature of the Constitution and Government of the United 
States.  Philadelphia, PA: J.C. Clark. 
 
8. Curtis, George Ticknor.1854. Commentaries on the jurisdiction, practice, and peculiar jurisprudence of the courts of the 
United States. Philadelphia, PA: T. & J.W. Johnson  
 
9. Pomeroy, John and Edmund Bennett. 1868. An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press.   
 
10. Cooley, Thomas. 1868. Treatise on Constitutional Limitations. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co. 
 
11. Cooley, Thomas and Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin. 1880. General Principles of Constitutional Law in the 
United States of America. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co. 
 
12. Lawson, John 1882. Leading Cases Simplified: A Collection of Leading Cases of the Common Law. St. Louis : F.H. 
Thomas. 
 
13. Thayer, James Bradley. 1895. Cases on Constitutional Law Vol. 1-2. Cambridge, MA: Charles W. Sever.   
 
14. Boyd, Carl Evans. 1898. Cases on American Constitutional Law. Chicago, IL: Callaghan and Co.    
 
15. Tucker, John Randolph. 1899. The Constitution of the United States: A Critical Discussion of its Genesis, Development, 
and Interpretation Vol. 1-2. Chicago, IL: Callaghan and Co.    
 
16. McClain, Emlin. 1900. A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law. Boston: Little Brown 
 
17. Barnes, Edgar. 1910. Selected Cases in Constitutional Law. Philadelphia: Lyon & Amor.   
 
18. Willoughby, Westel. 1912. Principles of the Constitutional Law of the United States. New York, NY: Baker, 
Voorhis and Company.  
 
19. Hall, James Parker. 1913. Cases on Constitutional Law. St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co. 
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20. Wambaugh, Eugene. 1914. A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
21. Evans, Lawrence. 1916. Leading Cases on American Constitutional Law. Chicago, IL: Callaghan and Co. 
 
22. Baker, Fred. 1916. The Fundamental Law of American Constitutions. Washington, DC: J. Byrne  
 
23. Gerstenberg, Charles. 1926. Constitutional Law: A Brief Text with Leading and Illustrative Cases. NY: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.  
 
24. Long, Joseph. 1926. Cases on Constitutional Law. Rochester, NY: Lawyers Cooperative, Co.     
 
25. Field, Oliver Field. 1930. A Selection of cases and Authorities on Constitutional Law. Chicago, IL: Callaghan and 
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28. Dowling, Noel. 1937. (Now Sullivan, Kathleen and Gerald Gunther). Cases on Constitutional Law. Mineola, 
NY: Foundation Press.  
 
29. Peirce, Joseph and Harry Cook. 1938. A Manual to the Constitution of the United States. Charlottesville, Va. : 
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Figure 13: Impact on Central State Authority Line Chart, 1789-2000, N=388 
 
Notes and Sources: Compile by author. This graph shows the ebb and flow of expansion 
and restriction across all of the data. After around 1860, we see little overlap between 
expansion and restriction, and the shape and trajectory of both outcomes take similar paths 
of development after 1860, too.  
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Figure 14: Frequency Charts of Central State Authority Dimensions:310  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
310 The “client group” dimension is not displayed because it comprises just 16 of 388 decisions in the data. 
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Notes and Sources: Compiled by author. These frequency charts represent the ebb 
and flow of decisions along the remaining central state dimensions not discussed in 
Figure 7.1 in Chapter 3.  Notably, the Court’s decisions expand and restrict the 
administrative dimension at about the same frequency; the same holds for the 
property dimension.  
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Figure 15: Top 25 Most-Cited Cases  
Notes and Sources: Compiled by the author. These are the twenty-five most frequently cited decisions in the database 
listed in descending order by “citation score.” This score is the proportion of a decision’s casebook appearance over the 
total number of casebooks (from the casebook list) that the decision could possibly appear in. Each decision (except 
US v. Nixon) implicates at least two, and often three dimensions, of the central state. No decision in this list affected 
more than three dimensions. Eleven decision restricted, thirteen expanded, and one remained neutral to central state 
authority.  
 
 
 
 
 
Court Case Year 
Citation 
Score 
Impact on 
Authority Dimensions Affected 
INS v. Chadha  1983 100.00 restrict 
Administrative; Citizen; World 
System 
Morrison v. Olson  1988 100.00 expand Administrative; Citizen  
Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer  1952 96.00 restrict Administrative; Property 
Darby, United States v.,  1941 92.86 expand Centralization; Property 
Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey  1992 92.31 expand Centralization; Citizen 
Marbury v. Madison  1803 91.38 expand 
Centralization; Administrative; 
Citizenship  
McCulloch v. Maryland  1819 91.38 expand Centralization; Extraction 
Boerne, City of v. 
Flores  1997 88.89 restrict Centralization; Citizen; Property 
Washington v. 
Glucksberg  1997 88.89 restrict Centralization; Citizen 
Gibbons v. Ogden  1824 87.50 expand Centralization; Property 
Brown v. Board of  
Education 1954 86.96 expand Centralization; Citizen 
South Dakota v. Dole  1987 85.71 expand Centralization; Extraction 
Nixon, United States v.,  1974 85.00 neutral Administrative 
Slaughterhouse Cases  1873 81.25 restrict Centralization; Citizen; Property 
Baker v. Carr 1962 80.95 expand Centralization; Citizen 
Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens  1852 80.39 restrict Centralization; Property; Extraction 
Griswold v. Connecticut  1965 80.00 expand Centralization; Citizen 
Katzenbach v. Morgan  1966 80.00 expand 
Centralization; Citizen; World 
System 
Roe v. Wade  1973 80.00 expand Centralization; Citizen 
Buckley v. Valeo  1976 78.95 restrict 
Centralization; Administrative; 
Citizen 
Wickard v. Filburn  1942 78.57 expand Centralization; Property 
Bowers v. Hardwick  1986 78.57 restrict Centralization; Citizen 
Green v. Neal's Lessee  1832 77.78 restrict Centralization; Property 
Fox v. Ohio 1847 77.78 restrict Centralization; Citizen 
Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918 75.00 restrict Centralization; Citizen; Property 
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Cases Selected for the Database: 
 
Below is a chronological list of the decisions in the database:  
 
 
Hayburn's Case  1792 2us409 
Chisholm v. Georgia  1793 2us419 
Ravara, United States v.,  1793 2us297 
Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators  1795 3us54 
Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance  1795 2us304 
Hylton v. United States 1796 3us171 
Ware v. Hylton  1796 3us199 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia  1798 3us378 
Calder v. Bull 1798 3us386 
Cooper v. Telfair 1800 4us14 
Marbury v. Madison  1803 5us107 
Stuart v. Laird  1803 5us299 
Hepburn v. Ellzey  1805 6us445 
Moore, United States v.,  1805 7us159 
Bollman, Ex parte  1807 8us75 
Burr, US v., (VA Circuit Court)  1807 25 F Cas 55 
Bank of United States v. Deveaux 1809 9us61 
Fletcher v. Peck  1810 10us87 
Durousseau v. United States  1810 10us307 
New Jersey v. Wilson  1812 11us164 
Hudson, United States v.,  1812 11us32 
Terrett v. Taylor 1815 13us43 
Pawlet v. Clark  1815 13us292 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee  1816 14us304 
Coolidge, United States v.,  1816 14us415 
Palmer, United States v.,  1818 16us610 
Bevans, United States v.,  1818 16us336 
McCulloch v. Maryland  1819 17us316 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward  1819 17us518 
Sturges v. Crownshield  1819 17us122 
Houston v. Moore  1820 18us1 
Loughborough v. Blake  1820 18us317 
Smith, United States v., 1820 18us153 
Cohens v. Virginia  1821 19us264 
Anderson v. Dunn 1821 19us204 
Corfield v. Coryell  1823 6 Fed Cas. 546 
Green v. Biddle  1823 21us1 
Gibbons v. Ogden  1824 22us1 
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Osborn v. Bank of the United States  1824 22us738 
Eakin v. Raub (SC of PA Case) 1825 
12 Serg. & 
Rawle 330 
Wayman v. Southard  1825 23us1 
Brown v. Maryland 1827 25us419 
Ogden v. Saunders  1827 25us213 
Martin v. Mott 1827 25us19 
American Insurance Co. v. Canter  1828 26us511 
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.  1829 27us245 
Weston v. Charleston  1829 27us449 
Foster v. Neilson  1829 27us253 
Satterlee v. Mathewson 1829 27us380  
Craig v. Missouri  1830 29us410 
Providence Bank v. Billings  1830 29us514 
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia  1831 30us1 
Worcester v. State of Georgia 1832 31us515 
Green v. Neal's Lessee  1832 31us291 
Gassies v. Ballon  1832 31us761 
Barron v. Baltimore  1833 32us243 
Watson v. Mercer  1834 33us88 
Wheaton v. Peters  1834 33us591 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 1837 36us420 
New York, City of v. Miln  1837 36us102 
Briscoe v. Bank, etc.  1837 36us257 
Kendall v. United States  1838 37us524 
Bank of Augusta v. Earle 1839 38us519 
Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie County 1842 41us435 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania  1842 41us539 
Swift v. Tyson  1842 41us1 
Bronson v. Kinzie  1843 42us311 
McCracken v. Hayward  1844 43us608 
License Cases, The 1847 46us504 
Fox v. Ohio 1847 46us410 
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix  1848 47us507 
Luther v. Borden  1849 48us1 
Passenger Cases, The  1849 48us283 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 1850 50us647 
Butler v. Pennsylvania  1851 51us402 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens  1852 53us299 
Ferreira, United States v.,  1852 54us40  
Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop 1853 57us369 
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.  1856 59us272 
Wynehammer v. People  1856 13ny378 
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Dred Scott v. Sandford  1857 60us393 
Ableman v. Booth  1859 62us506 
Kentucky v. Dennison  1861 65us66 
Almy v. California  1861 65us169 
Prize Cases  1863 67us635 
Gelpcke v. Dubuque  1864 68us175 
Milligan, Ex parte 1866 71us2 
Crandall v. Nevada  1867 73us35 
Mississippi v. Johnson  1867 71us475 
Garland, Ex parte  1867 71us333 
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy  1867 71us535 
Cummings v. Missouri  1867 71us277  
License Tax Cases  1867 72us462 
Woodruff v. Parham  1868 75us123 
Georgia v. Stanton  1868 73us50 
McCardle, Ex parte 1869 74us506 
Paul v. Virginia  1869 75us168 
Veazie Bank v. Fenno  1869 75us533 
Texas v. White   1869 74us700 
Dewitt, United States v.,  1869 76us41 
Hepburn v. Griswold 1870 75us603 
Collector v. Day  1871 78us113 
Daniel Ball, The  1871 77us557 
Legal Tender Cases  1871 79us457 
Ward v. Maryland  1871 79us418 
Tarble's Case 1871 80us397 
Slaughterhouse Cases  1873 83us36  
State Freight Tax Case  1873 82us232 
Railroad Co. v. Peniston  1873 85us5 
Loan Ass'n v. City of Topeka  1874 87us655 
Minor v. Happersett  1875 88us162 
Welton v. Missouri  1876 91us275 
Kohl v. United States  1876 91us367 
Cruikshanks, United States v., 1876 92us542 
Munn v. Illinois  1877 94us113 
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.  1877 96us1 
Railroad Co. v. Husen  1877 95us465 
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts  1878 97us25 
Davidson v. New Orleans 1878 96us97 
Hall v. De Cuir  1878 95us485 
Reynolds v. United States 1879 98us145 
Siebold, Ex parte  1879 100us371 
Trade-Mark Cases  1879 100us82 
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Tennessee v. Davis  1879 100us257 
Strauder v. West Virginia  1880 100us303  
Stone v. Mississippi  1880 101us814 
Virginia, Ex parte 1880 100us339 
Hauenstein v. Lynham  1880 100us483 
Kilbourn v. Thompson  1881 103us168 
Lee, United States v.,  1882 106us196 
Civil Rights Cases 1883 109us3 
Hurtado v. California  1884 110us516 
Juilliard v. Greenman 1884 110us421 
Head Money Cases 1884 112us580 
Yarbrough, Ex parte  1884 110us651 
Barbier v. Connolly 1885 113us27 
Brown v. Houston 1885 114us622 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins  1886 118us356 
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois  1886 118us557 
Coe v. Town of Errol  1886 116us517 
Mugler v. Kansas  1887 123us623 
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist  1887 120us489 
Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.  1888 125us465 
Powell v. Pennsylvania  1888 127us678 
Leisy v. Hardin  1890 135us100 
Neagle, In re  1890 135us1 
Minnesota v. Barber  1890 136us313 
Hans v. State of Louisana  1890 134us1 
Rahrer, In re   1891 140us545 
Crutcher v. Kentucky  1891 141us47 
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania  1891 141us18 
Field v. Clark  1892 143us649 
Texas, United States v.,  1892 143us621 
Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Wellman  1892 143us339 
Rapier, In re  1892 143us110 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States  1893 149us698 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States 1893 148us312 
Plumley v. Massachusetts  1894 155us461 
Lawton v. Steele  1894 152us133 
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.  1894 153us525 
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.  1894 154us362 
Debs, In re  1895 158us564 
Knight Co, E.C., United States v.,  1895 156us1 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.  1895 157us429 
Plessy v. Ferguson  1896 163us537 
Allegeyer v. Louisiana  1897 165us578 
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Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago  1897 166us226 
Robertson v. Baldwin  1897 165us275 
Holden v. Hardy  1898 169us366 
Wong Kim Ark, United States v.,  1898 169us649 
Thompson v. Utah 1898 170us343 
Blake v. McClung  1898 172us239 
Hawker v. New York  1898 170us189 
Thompson v. Missouri  1898 171us380 
Knowlton v. Moore  1900 178us41 
Downes v. Bidwell  1901 182us244 
Champion v. Ames 1903 188us321 
McCray v. United States  1904 195us27 
Northern Securities Co. v. United States  1904 193us197 
Lochner v. New York 1905 198us45 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts 1905 197us11 
South Carolina v. United States  1905 199us437 
Kansas v. Colorado 1907 206us46 
Twining v. New Jersey  1908 211us78 
Muller v. Oregon  1908 208us412 
Young, Ex parte  1908 209us123 
Adair v. United States  1908 208us161 
Muskrat v. United States  1911 219us346 
Noble State Bank v. Haskell 1911 219us104 
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.  1911 220us107 
Coyle v. Smith 1911 221us559 
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon  1912 223us118 
McDermott v. Wisconsin  1913 228us115 
Shreveport Rate Cases (Houston etc R. co. v. United States)  1914 234us342 
Coppage v. Kansas  1915 236us1 
Truax v. Raich  1915 239us33 
Buchanan v. Warley  1917 245us60 
Bunting v. Oregon  1917 243us426 
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co  1917 242us311 
Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child Labor Case)  1918 247us251 
Schenck v. United States  1919 249us47 
Abrams v. US  1919 250us616 
Missouri v. Holland  1920 252us416 
Johnson v. Maryland  1920 254us51 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.  1922 259us20 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon  1922 260us393 
Stafford v. Wallace  1922 258us495 
Massachusetts v. Mellon  1923 262us447  
Adkins v. Children's Hospital  1923 261us525 
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Meyer v. Nebraska  1923 262us390 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia  1923 262us553 
Gitlow v. New York  1925 268us652 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters  1925 268us510 
Grossman, Ex parte  1925 267us87 
Buck v. Kuykendall 1925 267us307 
Euclid, Village of v. Ambler Realty Co.  1926 272us365 
Myers v. United States  1926 272us52 
Whitney v. California  1927 274us357 
Buck v. Bell  1927 274us200 
McGrain v. Daugherty  1927 273us135 
Tumey v. Ohio  1927 273us510  
Miller v. Schoene  1928 276us272 
Near v. Minnesota  1931 283us697 
Nebbia v. New York 1934 291us502 
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell  1934 290us398 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 1935 295us495 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc.  1935 294us511 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States  1935 295us602 
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.  1935 294us240 
Butler, United States v.,  1936 297us1 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., United States v.,  1936 299us304 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.   1936 298us238 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority  1936 297us288 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp 1937 301us1 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish  1937 300us379 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis  1937 301us548 
Palko v. Connecticut  1937 302us319 
DeJonge v. Oregon  1937 299us353 
Helvering v. Davis 1937 301us619 
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.  1937 300us577 
South Carolina State Highway Dept v. Barnwell Brothers  1938 303us177 
Carolene Products Co., United States v.,  1938 304us144 
Lovell v. City of Griffin  1938 303us444 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins  1938 304us64 
Helvering v. Gearhardt  1938 304us405 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization  1939 307us496 
Coleman v. Miller  1939 307us433 
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe  1939 306us466 
Cantwell v. Connecticut  1940 310us296 
Thornhill v. Alabama  1940 310us88 
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.  1940 309us33 
Darby, United States v.,  1941 312us100 
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Edwards v. California  1941 314us160 
Bridges v. California  1941 314us252 
Wickard v. Filburn  1942 317us111 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson  1942 316us535 
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire 1942 315us568 
West Virginia State Board of Ed v. Barnette 1943 319us624 
Korematsu v. United States 1944 323us214 
Smith v. Allwright  1944 321us649 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona  1945 325us761 
Marsh v. Alabama  1946 326us501 
Lovett, United States v.,  1946 328us303 
Causby, United States v.,  1946 328us256 
Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin  1946 328us408 
Everson v. Board of Ed of Ewing Township  1947 330us1 
Adamson v. California  1947 332us46 
United Pub Workers of America v. Mitchell  1947 330us75 
Shelley v. Kraemer  1948 334us1 
McCollum v. Board of Education 1948 333us203 
Toomer v. Witsell  1948 334us385 
Railway Express Agency v. People of State of NY  1949 336us106 
Hood & Sons Inc. H.P. v. DuMond  1949 336us525 
Terminiello v. Chicago  1949 337us1 
American Communications Association v. Douds 1950 339us382 
Sweatt v. Painter  1950 339us629 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison  1951 340us349 
Feiner v. New York   1951 340us315 
Dennis v. United States   1951 341us494 
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor  1951 340us602 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer  1952 343us579 
Zorach v. Clauson  1952 343us306 
Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952 343us250 
Kahriger, United States v.,  1953 345us22 
Terry v. Adams 1953 345us461 
Brown v. Board of  Education of Topeka (Brown I) 1954 347us483 
Bolling v. Sharpe 1954 347us497 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma  1955 348us483 
Griffin v. Illinois 1956 351us12 
Roth v. United States  1957 354us476 
Reid v. Covert 1957 354us1 
Cooper v. Aaron  1958 358us1 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson  1958 357us449 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority  1961 365us715 
Poe v. Ullman  1961 367us497 
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Baker v. Carr 1962 369us186 
Sherbert v. Verner  1963 374us398 
Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States   1964 379us241 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan  1964 376us254 
Reynolds v. Sims  1964 377us533 
Katzenbach v. McClung  1964 379us294 
Griswold v. Connecticut  1965 381us479 
Katzenbach v. Morgan  1966 384us641 
Harper v. Viriginia Board of Elections 1966 383us663 
Adderley v. Florida 1966 385us39 
Loving v. Virginia  1967 388us1 
Reitman v. Mulkey  1967 387us369 
O'Brien, United States v.,  1968 391us367 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.  1968 392us409 
Duncan v. Louisiana  1968 391us145 
Brandenburg v. Ohio  1969 395us444 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC  1969 395us367 
Powell v. McCormack  1969 395us486 
Shapiro v. Thompson  1969 394us618  
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15 1969 395us621 
Stanley v. Georgia  1969 394us557 
Dandrige v. Williams  1970 397us471 
Cohen v. California  1971 403us15 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed.  1971 402us1 
Lemon v. Kurtzman  1971 403us602 
Boddie v. Connecticut  1971 401us371 
New York Times Co. v. United States 1971 403us713 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis  1972 407us163 
Branzburg v. Hayes  1972 408us665 
Eisenstadt v. Baird  1972 405us438 
Wisconsin v. Yoder  1972 406us205 
Board of Regents v. Roth  1972 408us564 
Roe v. Wade  1973 410us113 
Miller v. California  1973 413us15 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez  1973 411us1  
Frontiero v. Richardson  1973 411us677 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton  1973 413us49 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Committee  1973 412us94 
Keyes v. School Dist No. 1  1973 413us189 
Nixon, United States v.,  1974 418us683 
Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.  1974 418us323 
Miami Herald Pub Co. v. Tornillo 1974 418us241 
DeFunis v. Odegaard  1974 416us312 
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co 1974 419us345 
Buckley v. Valeo  1976 424us1 
Craig v. Boren  1976 429us 190  
Washington v. Davis  1976 426us229 
Mathews v. Eldrige  1976 424us319 
Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council  1976 425us748 
National League of Cities v. Usery  1976 426us833 
Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc.  1976 427us50 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland  1977 431us494 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n  1977 432us333 
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey  1977 431us1 
Wooley v. Maynard  1977 430us705 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey  1978 437us617 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus 1978 438us234 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke  1978 438us265 
Federal Communication Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation  1978 438us726 
Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks 1978 436us149  
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of NY  1978 438us104 
Personnel Admin of Mass v. Feeney 1979 442us256 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Public Serv. Comm'n  1980 477us557 
Reeves Inc v. Stake  1980 447us429 
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia  1980 448us555 
Dames & Moore v. Regan  1981 453us654 
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp of Delaware 1981 450us662 
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County  1981 450us464 
Plyler v. Doe  1982 457us202 
INS v. Chadha  1983 462us919 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees  1984 468us609 
South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke 1984 467us82 
Cleburne, Tex., City of v. Cleburne Living Center Inc.  1985 473us432 
Garcia v. San Anontonio Metropolitan Transit  1985 469us528 
Bowers v. Hardwick  1986 478us186 
Bowsher v. Synar 1986 478us714 
South Dakota v. Dole  1987 483us203 
Morrison v. Olson  1988 487us654 
Mistretta v. United States  1989 488us361 
Texas v. Johnson  1989 491us397 
Richmond, City of v. Croson Co.  1989 488us469 
Employment Div. Dept of Human Resources Oregon v. Smith  1990 494us872 
Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept of Health  1990 497us261 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey  1992 505us833 
Lee v. Weisman  1992 505us577 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 1992 504us555 
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New York v. United States   1992 505us144 
RAV v. City of St. Paul Minn 1992 505us377 
Nixon v. United States  1993 506us224 
Lopez, United States v.,  1995 514us549 
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton  1995 514us779 
Boerne, City of v. Flores  1997 521us507  
Washington v. Glucksberg  1997 521us702 
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